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O.N.I.

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SUBJECT EFFECT OF MINE EXPLOSIONS.

From Z No. 315 Date May 1, 1915., 191

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date 191

5-8v
9
169
ENCLOSURE
2-2
Naval War College
MAY 12 191

I have had opportunity to see the reports and talk with two of the captains of the American steamers blown up by mines. Reports on the blowing up of the "CARIB" and "EVELYN" have already been submitted and a copy of the report of the "GREENBRIAR "explosion accompanies this report.

The feature which I desire to bring out is that while in one case the explosion was where it might be expected, under the bow, yet the other two cases the explosions were amidships (" CARIB") and aft (" GREENBRIAR").

From the circumstances governing the various cases it does not appear probable that the shipsw were attacked by submarine boats.

It would therefore appear that either the mines are usually connected together, or that there is a delayed action in the mechanism.

The captain of the "CARIB",while on board steamer which rescued him, heard something to the effect, that the mines were connected together, but in what manner and to what extent he was unable to say.

T5;
May (2)

SHIPBUILDING, MUNITIONS, AND TRANSPORT AREAS.

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

RETURN to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 29 April 1915;—*for*,

COPY "of REPORT and STATISTICS of BAD TIME kept in SHIPBUILDING, MUNITIONS, and TRANSPORT AREAS."

Treasury Chambers,
29 April 1915.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

(Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer.)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
1 *May* 1915.

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(A.)

ADMIRALTY REPORTS.

I.

Percentage of Hours worked by Government Employés in Portsmouth Dockyard during week ending April 24, 1915.

Men working	85 hours a week and upwards	.. .. ..	6	per cent.
,,	80 ,, ,,	.. .. ..	4	,,
,,	75 ,, ,,	.. .. ..	8	,,
,,	70 ,, ,,	.. .. ..	19	,,
,,	65 ,, ,,	.. .. ..	35	,,
,,	60 ,, ,,	.. .. ..	6	,,
,,	55 ,, ,,	.. .. ..	4	,,
,,	50 ,, ,,	.. .. ..	2	,,
,,	Normal (48 hours) ..	.. .. ..	11	,,
,,	Less than normal ..	.. .. ..	5	,,

It will be seen from the foregoing that no less than 78 per cent. of the workmen at Portsmouth were working for 60 hours or over in the week ending last Saturday—24th instant—*i.e.*, 12 hours or more in excess of the normal working hours of the week.

The above statistics may be taken as typical of all the Admiralty dockyards.

II.

Reports to the First Lord of the Admiralty on the Effect of Excessive Drinking on Output of Work on Shipbuilding, Repairs, and Munitions of War.

First Lord,

THE enclosed statement has been drawn up, showing the effect of excessive drinking on the output of work as regards shipbuilding, repairs, and munitions of war being carried out by contract for the Admiralty.

A report by the Director of Transports as to the effect on transport work is also enclosed.

F. C. T. TUDOR,
Third Sea Lord.

April 2, 1915.

REPORTS which have been received from the Clyde, Tyne, and Barrow districts recently are in agreement that at the present time the amount of work put in by the workmen is much less than what might reasonably be expected.

Put briefly, the position is that now, while the country is at war, the men are doing less work than would be regarded as an ordinary week's work under normal peace conditions. As instances of this, tables are attached showing the numbers of hours worked in a submarine engine shop and in shipyards on the N. E. Coast.

It will be seen that in the case of the 135 fitters employed on submarine engine work, the number of hours lost during the first week of March amounted to the equivalent of a full week's work of twenty-eight men, *i.e.*, on the average each man did little more than three-quarters of a day's work.

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The reports from the N.E. Coast show that over periods of five to seven weeks the time lost at one of the shipyards by riveters equals about 35 per cent. of the normal week's work; platers, 25 per cent.; and the caulkers and drillers about 22 per cent.; the later returns for the same yard show that by far the greater majority of the workmen are absent at starting time—6 A.M.

The figures reported from two other shipyards on the North East Coast are similar and the reports from the Clyde, though details have not been received, are to the same effect, showing that the large amount of lost time is general throughout the country.

Thus the problem is not how to get the workmen to increase their normal peace output, but how to get them to do an ordinary week's work of 51 or 53 hours, as the case may be.

The reasons for the loss of time are no doubt various, but it is abundantly clear that the most potent is in the facilities which exist for men to obtain beer and spirits, combined with the high rates of wages and abundance of employment. Opinion on this point is practically unanimous.

The matter has been referred to from time to time in letters which the firms have written in regard to progress of work in hand for the Admiralty, as shown by the following extracts :—

Clyde.

"We regret to say a number of men are losing a considerable amount of time, mostly, we are afraid, due to their drinking habits, no doubt aggravated by the extra money they are earning by working overtime, and we respectfully submit that if some step could be taken to restrict their opportunities to indulge in intoxicating liquor enormous benefits would result in the progress of this and other naval work we have in hand."

North-East Coast.

"Regret to say considerable number of our workmen absent from duty to-day—drinking."

Clyde.

"Regret to complain construction of H.M.S. ——— delayed through workmen absenting themselves from work through excessive drinking."

The Captains-Superintendent of the Clyde and Tyne districts, who supervise the warships being built and repaired by contract, are very well placed to form an opinion on this matter.

The Captain-Superintendent on the Tyne (which district includes the north-east coast of England and Barrow) reported on 26th February that the early morning drink was responsible for a great deal of the short time, and that it would be a great help if the public-houses were closed until 10 A.M. In a later report he stated that "everyone agrees that if the pubs could be closed until 10 A.M. things would improve, and they should close at 9 P.M., being open say from 5 or 6 P.M. In this district no one in uniform can be served between 1 and 6 P.M., so I would advocate closing altogether for those times—and not only in the neighbourhood of the shipyards. I have spoken to some of the foreman class, and they tell me 90 per cent. of the men would approve."

The Captain-Superintendent of the Clyde district considers that the one thing needed to get the full output of work is to prohibit the sale of all spirits.

In a further report, he states that the drinking is on the increase and is causing delay and bad work; and as a remedy he proposes the prohibition of spirits and of the sale of liquor by the bottle by public-house, grocers, &c., and the restriction of the hours during which public-houses are open.

The Captain-Superintendent of the torpedo-boat destroyers building in various parts of the country reports that "the main difficulty that contractors have to contend against is the inability on the part of the men to work full time, and the only way to meet the difficulty appears to be to have some form of enlisted labour, or further restrictions imposed on the licensed houses in the vicinity of shipyards."

An officer, who is overseeing the construction of vessels building by a firm on the North-East Coast, reports, "The time-keeping of the men is not at all satisfactory; whole gangs are thrown out owing to the absence of three

or four hands. The firm are of opinion that, short of Martial Law, the only thing to stop it is to stop the sale of spirits."

The Director of Naval Equipment's report, after his visit to the Tyne, is appended (p. 10); a further report has now been received from him after a visit to the Clyde.

In this he states that "the conditions of labour on the Clyde are such that, except for one or two firms, the abstentions are so great as to cause a serious loss of time, and consequent difficulty in meeting contracts.

"When war broke out the opening of public-houses was limited to the hours of 10 A.M. to 10 P.M., and this has had a beneficial result, but does not entirely meet the case, and it is generally considered that much greater restrictions should be imposed in the hours that liquor may be sold, and that such restriction should apply to all classes equally."

The foregoing remarks have reference chiefly to the large shipbuilding yards and engineering works, but amongst these are included some of the largest armament firms, who are manufacturing munitions of war of all sorts. The output of the last is also adversely affected by the drink question. The manager of works on the North-East Coast, where large quantities of shell are manufactured, stated that if the two public-houses just outside the works could be closed his output would be very largely increased.

The question of the extent to which it is desirable or necessary to curtail the sale of intoxicants involves serious national considerations, and is not a matter for one or two Government departments only, but from the point of view of Admiralty work it does not appear that partial measures are likely to be successful, judging from the results of the partial restriction of opening of public-houses which has been in operation on the Clyde during the war.

Total prohibition, with all its attendant objections and disadvantages, would at least have the general effect that all classes would at last realise the existence and seriousness of the war, and that they were personally involved in its consequences.

A great principle, such as "prohibition for the war," will probably depend for its success largely on details, such as the convenience of obtaining hot and cold non-alcoholic drinks, both outside and inside the yards and works.

Further, an attractive scheme for saving the large amount of money earned by the men, of which so much is now spent in drink (which might possibly be worked through the Government Insurance organization), seems well worthy of consideration, but should in no way delay decision and action on the vital question of restricting the sale of intoxicants.

Enclosures.

(A.)—Submarine engine-shop. Time lost by fitters.

(B.)—Time lost by ironworkers at shipyard on North-East Coast.

(C.)—Time lost by workmen on repairs of a battleship.

(D.)—Time lost by workmen at shipyards on North-East Coast.

(E.)—Copy of report from Captain Barttelot (Captain-Superintendent, Clyde district), dated the 25th March, 1915.

(A.)

Submarine Engine Shop.

Lost Time by Fitters working on Submarine Engine Work from 6 A.M. on Monday, March 1, to 12 o'clock noon on Saturday, March 6, 1915.

Monday, March 1, 1915.

Total number of fitters employed 135

Only 60 of these worked a full day (9½ hours).

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder:—

	Hours.
20 were absent all day, time lost	190
2 worked 3½ hours, time lost	12
1 worked 5 hours, time lost	4½
52 worked 7 hours, time lost	130
Total	336½
135 fitters working full time	1,282½
Actual time worked by 135 fitters	946
Time lost	336½

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 35 men working full time.

Tuesday, March 2, 1915.

Total number of fitters employed 135

Only 90 of these worked a full day (9½ hours).

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder:—

	Hours.
18 were absent all day, time lost	171
27 worked 7 hours, time lost	67½
Total	238½
135 fitters working full time	1,282½
Actual time worked by 135 fitters	1,044
Time lost	238½

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 25 men working full time.

Wednesday, March 3, 1915.

Total number of fitters employed 135

Only 86 of these worked a full day (9½ hours).

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder:—

	Hours.
21 were absent all day, time lost	199½
28 worked 7 hours, time lost	70
Total	269½
135 fitters working full time	1,282½
Actual time worked by 135 fitters	1,013
Time lost	269½

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 28 men working full time.

Thursday, March 4, 1915.

Total number of fitters employed 135
Only 77 of these worked a full day (9½ hours).

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder:—

	Hours.
22 were absent all day, time lost	209
1 worked 2½ hours, time lost	7
1 worked 2 hours, time lost	7½
33 worked 7 hours, time lost	82½
1 worked 6 hours, time lost	3½
Total	309½
135 fitters working full time	1,282½
Actual time worked by 135 fitters	973
Time lost	309½

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 32 men working full time.

Friday, March 5, 1915.

Total number of fitters employed 135
Only 91 of these worked a full day (9½ hours).

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder:—

	Hours.
16 were absent all day, time lost	152
1 worked 3½ hours, time lost	6
27 worked 7 hours, time lost	67½
Total	225½
135 fitters working full time	1,282½
Actual time worked by 135 fitters	1,057
Time lost	225½

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 24 men working full time.

Saturday, March 6, 1915.

Total number of fitters employed 135
Only 103 of these worked a full day (5½ hours).

The following statement shows the time worked and lost by the remainder:—

	Hours.
17 were absent all day, time lost	93½
15 worked 3 hours, time lost	37½
Total	131
135 fitters working full time..	742½
Actual time worked by 135 fitters	611½
Time lost	131

This represents a total loss on the day's working of 24 men working full time.

Summary.

——	Monday, March 1.	Tuesday, March 2.	Wednesday, March 3.	Thursday, March 4.	Friday, March 5.	Saturday, March 6.
135 fitters working full time.. (hours)	1,282½	1,282½	1,282½	1,282½	1,282½	742½
Actual time worked by 135 fitters(„)	946	1,044	1,013	973	1,057	611½
Number of men who worked full time	60	90	86	77	91	103
Number of men who worked 7 hours ..	52	27	28	33	27	15*
Number of men who were absent all day	20	18	21	22	16	17

135 fitters working full time for one week (53 hours) = 7,155 hours.
Actual hours worked by 135 fitters in one week = 5,644½ „
Time lost by 135 fitters in one week = 1,510½ „
This represents a total loss on the week's working of 28 men working 53 hours each.

* 3 hours each.

(B.)

STATEMENT of Lost Time of Ironworkers in a Shipyard on the North-East Coast.

Trades.	Pay ending 1915.	Number of Men.	Possible Hours.	Hours Lost.	Percentage Lost Time.
Riveters ..	Jan. 26 ..	219	11,169	3,576	32
	Feb. 2 ..	203	10,353	3,333	32
	„ 9 ..	211	10,716	3,770	35
	„ 16 ..	203	10,353	3,869	37
	„ 23 ..	210	11,340	4,002	35
	March 2 ..	215	11,610	4,270	37
	„ 9 ..	216	11,664	4,034	35
Platers ..	Feb. 2 ..	213	10,863	2,797	25·75
	„ 9 ..	216	11,016	2,525	22·92
	„ 16 ..	220	11,220	2,380	21·24
	„ 23 ..	222	11,988	3,251	27
	March 2 ..	226	12,204	3,615	30
	„ 9 ..	230	12,420	3,350	27
Caulkers ..	Feb. 9 ..	60	3,060	575	18·79
	„ 16 ..	62	3,162	627	20·00
	„ 23 ..	64	3,456	859	25
	March 2 ..	67	3,618	834	23
	„ 9 ..	80	4,320	978	23
Drillers ..	Feb. 9 ..	128	6,528	1,205	18·45
	„ 16 ..	130	6,630	1,223	18·44
	„ 23 ..	130	7,020	1,457	21
	March 2 ..	129	6,966	1,634	23
	„ 9 ..	141	7,614	2,162	28

PERCENTAGE of *Absentees* in the Ironworkers' Department of same Shipyard, Monday, 22nd March, 1915.

Trades.	Total Number of Men.	Absent at 6 A.M.	Percentage Absent from 6 A.M. to 9 A.M.	Absent at 9 A.M. and All Day.	Percentage Absent All Day.
Riveters	241	217	90	68	28
Holders-on	110	104	95	39	36
Platers .. .	232	164	71	39	17
Platers' helpers ..	404	350	87	107	26

PERCENTAGE of *Time Lost* by Ironworkers in the same Shipyard, Monday, 22nd March, 1915.

Trades.	Total No. of Men.	Absent All Day.	Percentage Absent All Day.	Possible Hours.	Hours Lost, including Parts of Day.	Percentage of Hours Lost.
Riveters	241	68	28	2,349	1,035	44
Holders-on	110	39	36	1,073	542	51
Platers	232	39	17	2,262	692	31
Helpers	404	107	26	3,939	1,650	42

ANALYSIS of Riveters' Time for week ending February 9, 1915.

Total riveters employed, 211, of which—

		Per cent.
16	were absent whole week	7·58
11	„ 40 hours and under 51 hours	5·21
14	„ 30 „ „ 40 „	6·64
41	„ 20 „ „ 30 „	19·43
50	„ 10 „ „ 20 „	23·70
65	„ from 2 to 10 hours	30·80
14	„ no time	6·64
		100

211 men at 51 hours = 10,761 hours; lost time, 3,770 hours = 35 per cent., an increase of 3 per cent. over the preceding two weeks.

(C.)

TIME Lost by Workmen on Repairs of a Battleship.

—	Average per Day before Advance Granted.					Average per Day since Advance Granted.				
	No. on Books.	Absentees.				No. on Books.	Absentees.			
		6 A.M.	Per Cent.	9 A.M.	Per Cent.		6 A.M.	Per Cent.	9 A.M.	Per Cent.
Ironworkers	162	38	23	22	14	198	64	32	32	16
Platers	20	6	30	3	15	24	8	33	5	21
Riveters and holders-on	142	32	23	19	13	174	56	32	27	16
Drillers	46	18	39	12	26	36	19	53	11	30
Carpenters	58	14	24	8	14	55	13	24	7	13

(D.)

TIME Lost by Workmen at Shipyards on North-East Coast.

—	Average per Week from February 9 to March 9.					Week ending March 16.				
	No. on Books.	Absentees.				No. on Books.	Absentees.			
		6 A.M.	Per Cent.	9 A.M.	Per Cent.		6 A.M.	Per Cent.	9 A.M.	Per Cent.
SHIPYARD A.										
Ironworkers	200	134	67	53	27	223	147	66	64	29
Platers	66	37	56	11	17	69	37	54	12	17
Riveters and Holders-on ..	134	97	72	42	31	154	110	71	52	34
Drillers	25	14	56	5	20	16	12	46	5	19
Carpenters	57	23	40	9	16	65	26	40	13	20
SHIPYARD B.										
Ironworkers	298	145	49	55	18	288	108	38	34	12
Platers	150	58	39	20	13	136	41	30	12	9
Riveters and Holders-on ..	148	87	59	35	23	152	67	44	22	14
Drillers	73	29	40	×13	18	91	22	24	11	12
Carpenters	89	19	21	7	8	100	12	12	5	5

(E.)

(No. 425/456.)

Sir, 3, *Clyde View, Partick, Glasgow, March* 25, 1915.

IN accordance with the directions contained in your telegram of the 20th March, calling for proposals that will facilitate the completion of H. M. ships, I have the honour to report on the effect of drink on the output of work.

2. From close observation—and my opinion is shared by all the managers of shipyards—the amount drunk by a section of the men is much greater than it was before the war, and it is on the increase. Those principally concerned are the iron-workers and shipwrights, and on their efficiency the output entirely depends.

3. The sole reason for this heavy drinking is that the men earn more money than they know what to do with.

4. In a shipyard last week where a warship is under repair, work on the inner bottom of the ship was so badly carried out as to suggest at once on inspection that it could not have been done by men who were sober. It was dangerous, and had to be condemned. In the same yard (and it is common in most others) drunken men, nominally at work, have had to be removed. Men are bringing or smuggling liquor into the yards in bottles, and facilities for buying spirits in bulk at public-houses and at licensed grocers must be stopped.

5. All this (and the serious point is that it is getting worse) has a much greater effect on delay than the shortage of labour.

6. I cannot state too forcibly my own opinion that the total prohibition of the sale of spirits would be the most effective act that could at the present time be taken to win this war. Any measure less drastic will not be a cure; it will keep alive the craving which has been growing after six months' indulgence, and some men will endeavour to satisfy it by keeping away from work.

7. The hours I recommend for the public-houses to be open for the sale of drink (not spirits) are from—

Noon till 2 p.m.

and

7 p.m. till 9 p.m.

and drink must be consumed on the premises, a prohibition being placed on the sale of liquor by the bottle by public-houses and by licensed grocers.

8. As to the districts in which restrictions should be enforced, they cannot be too wide. Public-houses here are opened at 10 A.M., and I am informed by the manager of one yard that some of his men have been known to go several miles before coming in to work in the morning in order to obtain drink under the travellers' clause. I would like to see—and in this view I am supported by all shipbuilders on the Clyde—the whole city of Glasgow, and from there down to Gourock and Dumbarton on either side of the river, included in the restricted areas.

9. If that is not considered possible, then the following districts closely connected with shipyards must be the minimum :—

On the North Bank—	On the South Bank—
All Finnieston.	From Kinning Park.
All Partick.	All Govan.
All Whiteinch.	All Renfrew.
All Scotstoun.	All Port Glasgow.
All Clydebank.	All Greenock.
All Dalmuir.	All Gourock.
All Dumbarton.	

I would also submit that a most beneficial effect would be produced if the men could be told by some leading statesman exactly and very plainly where they are failing their country. They have been flattered and told what splendid fellows they were just at the time when slackness was beginning to set in, and this has not had a good result. It is not that the men (I am referring always to the men who drink) are bad at heart or unpatriotic, but they have failed through weakness and opportunity, and they know they have failed and would at heart welcome being corrected and put right.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BRIAN H. F. BARTTELOT.

III.

Report by Captain Greatorex, R.N., Director of Naval Equipment, dated 4th March, 1915, to Third Sea Lord.

THE condition of labour is deplorable, and the men are in a most uncertain and undependable state. This is so serious, that at any time the whole of the ship-building work on the Tyne may come to a standstill.

Sunday working is of little value, as the money paid for Sunday work leads to abstention from all work for often two days, and a Sunday worker will frequently not return till Wednesday.

The money earned is sufficient to satisfy the men's standard of living, and anything extra beyond ordinary wages encourages abstention to enable loafing in public-houses, instead of doing their honest day's work.

The opening of public-houses at early morning conduces to abstention from work till after breakfast, and then the work is unsatisfactory, due to the amount that has been imbibed.

I was informed by one of the firms that the average non-attendance of workmen amounts to 1·45 days in six days' work, practically 25 per cent. of time is lost.

Unless something drastic in the way of measures is taken, I fear that the state of deliveries of ships and vessels of all kinds will be most seriously affected; but in the present frame of mind of the men, drastic measures might have the effect of producing a critical situation. On the other hand, further extra grants and bonuses only accentuate the present deplorable indifference of the workmen to their duty and to attendance to their daily work.

The only approach to a solution that was suggested as being likely to do good was to partially or totally close all public-houses, and that all offers of extra wages were most harmful, and only accentuated the difficulty.

I make the foregoing remarks with a full sense of the fact that it is not my personal duty to enquire into these matters, but these facts were apparent in the course of my visit of inspection to the ships building in the Tyne district, and as the deliveries of ships are being so influenced by these facts, I consider it my duty to bring them to your notice.

C. GREATOREX,
Director of Naval Equipment.

(B.)

REPORT OF DEPUTATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE SHIPBUILDING EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION ON 29th MARCH, 1915.

(Extract from "The Times" of the 30th March, 1915.)

AN important deputation from the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation was received yesterday at the Treasury by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary for Scotland. With Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. McKinnon Wood were:—

Mr. E. S. Montagu, M.P., Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, M.P., Rear-Admiral Tudor, Rear-Admiral Morgan Singer, Captain Greatorex, R.N., Major-General S. B. von Donop, Sir Francis Hopwood, and Sir George Gibb.

The following representatives of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation were present:—

Mr. G. J. Carter (Messrs. Cammell, Laird, and Co., Limited, Birkenhead), Mr. James Marr (Messrs. J. L. Thompson and Co., Limited, Sunderland), Mr. H. B. Rowell (Messrs. R. and W. Hawthorn Leslie and Co., Hebburn-on-Tyne), Mr. H. M. Napier (Messrs. Napier and Miller, Limited, Old Kilpatrick), Colonel R. Saxton White, Mr. F. E. W. Coller, Sir Charles Ottley (Sir W. G. Armstrong,

Whitworth, and Co., Limited, Walker-on-Tyne and Newcastle-on-Tyne), Mr. F. N. Henderson (Messrs. D. and W. Henderson and Co., Limited, Partick, Glasgow), Colonel J. M. Denny (Messrs. William Denny and Brothers, Dumbarton), Mr. A. B. Gowan (Messrs. Palmers Shipbuilding and Iron Company, Limited, Jarrow and Hebburn-on-Tyne), Mr. N. E. Peck (Messrs. Barclay, Curle, and Co., Limited, Whiteinch, Glasgow, and Messrs. Swan, Hunter, and Wigham Richardson, Limited, Neptune and Wallsend-on-Tyne), Mr. George Jones (Sir William Gray and Co., Limited, Hartlepool), Mr. W. Beardmore Stewart (Messrs. Beardmore and Co., Limited, Dalmuir, Glasgow), Mr. J. B. Hutchison (Messrs. Scott's Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Limited, Greenock), Mr. J. Barr (Messrs. Vickers, Limited, Barrow), Mr. J. Hamilton (The Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Limited, Govan), and Mr. Thomas Biggart and Mr. James Cameron, joint secretaries.

The deputation, which was representative of the leading shipbuilding firms in the country, was unanimous in urging that, in order to meet the national requirements at the present time, and the urgent necessities of the position, there should be a total prohibition during the period of the war of the sale of excisable liquors. It was represented by them that mere restriction of hours, or even total prohibition, within certain war work areas, was not sufficient, as certain classes would be entirely unaffected, and it was felt by the deputation that total prohibition should apply as an emergency war measure not only to public-houses, but to private clubs and other licensed premises, so as to operate equally for all classes of the community. In putting forward these views, those who spoke on behalf of the deputation expressed themselves as satisfied that there was a general consensus of opinion on the part of the workers favourable to total prohibition along the lines indicated.

Less Work than Before the War.

It was stated that in many cases the number of hours being worked was actually less than before the war, and, in spite of Sunday labour and all other time, the total time worked on the average in almost all yards was below the normal number of hours per week. In spite of working night and day seven days a week, less productiveness was being secured from the men. The deputation was of opinion that this was principally due to the question of drink. There were many men doing splendid and strenuous work, probably as good as the men in the trenches. But so many were not working anything like full hours that the average was thus disastrously reduced. The members of the deputation stated that, speaking with the experience of from twenty-five to forty years, they believed that 80 per cent. of the present avoidable loss of time could be ascribed to no other cause than drink. The figures of weekly takings in public-houses near the yards were convincing evidence of the increased sale of liquor. Allowing for the enhanced price of intoxicants and for the greater number of men now employed in shipbuilding, the takings had in one case under observation risen 20 per cent., in another 40 per cent.

Curtailment, in the opinion of the deputation, resulted in excessive drinking during the shortened hours. The takings of certain public-houses which had had their hours reduced from 10 to 9 had actually increased, and there had been a considerable growth in the pernicious habit of buying spirits by the bottle and taking it away to drink elsewhere. It was this "drinking habit" rather than drunkenness that the deputation had to face. The cost of the drink habit was sufficiently illustrated by the case of a battleship coming in for immediate repairs and having these repairs delayed a whole day through the absence of the riveters for the purpose of drink and conviviality. This case was one of hundreds.

This was not the only reason in favour of prohibition as against curtailment. As long as public-houses were open there would be found men to break the rules of the yard and come late to work in order to secure drink beforehand. And the indisposition to work after the consumption of excessive alcohol was too obvious to need elaboration.

Different members of the deputation gave different hours for their week's total of labour, but it was emphasised that the important factor was not the average time worked, but the time worked by certain of the most important branches. In one yard, for example, the riveters had only been working on the average forty hours per week, in another only thirty-six hours.

The deputation drew attention to the example set by Russia and France, and urged upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer the need of strong and immediate action.

(C.)

SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT BY THE SHIPBUILDING EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION.

HOURS ACTUALLY WORKED BY IRONWORKERS.

THE Shipbuilding Employers' Federation have laid before the Government detailed figures for the month of March 1915, taken out by 48 representative firms. Of these 48 firms, 15 are in the Clyde district, 27 in the North-East Coast district, and 6 at Birkenhead, Barrow, or Hull.

The figures analysed are not selected or merely illustrative figures. They are the record of the actual number of hours worked by every "ironworker" separately tabulated, and the resulting percentages are therefore based on precise and exhaustive facts.

By iron workers are meant: platers, riveters, holders-on, heaters, angle-iron smiths, caulkers, and drillers. The work of these men determines the output of each shipbuilding yard.

The ordinary working week for ironworkers is 53 or 54 hours a week according to district (excluding overtime). Analysis of the hours now actually being worked shows that in spite of the effort to increase the output by overtime, *the hours actually being worked are less than the hours of a normal week in a time of peace.* Only a quarter of the ironworkers are working more than this.

Table I.

Hours actually Worked by Ironworkers in March 1915.

(Standard Week in Time of Peace **53** or **54** hours (excluding Overtime).)

	Per thousand. Men.	
Over 80 hours per week	1·18	
„ 75 hours per week and up to 80	4·74	
„ 70 „ „ „ „ 75	15·16	
„ 65 „ „ „ „ 70	36·37	
„ 60 „ „ „ „ 65	62·02	
„ 53–54 „ „ „ „ 60	120·42	
„ 50 „ „ „ „ 53–54	113·8	
„ 45 „ „ „ „ 50	147·1	
„ 40 „ „ „ „ 45	139·0	
„ 35 „ „ „ „ 40	136·1	**493** men out of 1,000.
„ 30 „ „ „ „ 35	91·7	
„ 25 „ „ „ „ 30	55·3	
„ 20 „ „ „ „ 25	30·3	
„ 20 hours a week or under	40·6	

The above analysis shows conclusively—

(*a.*) Only 24 per cent. of the men are working more than a normal week of 53–54 hours.

(*b.*) Of the remaining 76 per cent., 40 per cent. are working between 40 hours a week and the normal week of 53–54 hours; 36 per cent. are working under 40 hours per week.

(*c.*) 493 men out of every 1,000 are in time of war working less than 45 hours a week.

Comparison of Districts

This state of things is not peculiar to any one district. The following table shows the comparison between the Clyde and the North-East Coast ironworkers :—

TABLE II.

Comparisons between Clyde and North-East Coast Ironworkers.

Clyde ...	...	27·6 per cent.	worked over	53–54	hours per week.
North-East Coast	..	19·7 ,,	,,	,,	,,
Clyde ...	...	39·4 ,,	,,	40 hours and under	53–54.
North-East Coast	...	40·5 ,,	,,	,,	,,
Clyde ...	...	33 ,,	,,	under 40 hours	per week.
North-East Coast	...	39·8 ,,	,,	,,	,,

An examination of the detailed statistics increases the significance of the summarised figures. For example, detailed sheets from a very important firm show in the case of every one of their "drillers" for four weeks in March how far each man—

(*a.*) Failed to come to work until after breakfast ; or
(*b.*) Was absent from work all day.

From these sheets it appeared :—

1. The vast majority of the men fail either in (*a*) or (*b*).
2. A minority of workmen are absolutely regular in their attendance. They keep uniformly good time. There are also a few cases where the only absence throughout the period is an occasional absence before breakfast.
3. Many workmen made it an almost regular habit not to come until after breakfast.
4. When a workman keeps bad time, it is nearly always continued for several days running. Many of them are absent from work altogether for three, four, or five days.

The effect of the detailed sheets about the "drillers" is shown in the following table. Similar results can be worked out for any other of the ironworkers :—

TABLE III.

Record of 159 *Drillers during* 22 *Days* (*8th March–1st April*).

——	No.	Average per Day.
Cases of "out all day"	554	25 out of 159 men, or 15·7 per cent.
Cases of "out first quarter," *i.e.*, until after breakfast hour (including those "out all day")	1,877	85 out of 159 men, or 53 per cent.

It must be remembered that these figures represent absences during ordinary working hours.

Another set of figures supplied by the same firm compares the absences from work of men in the Shipyard Department with those of men in (1) the Engine and Boiler Shops and (2) the Repair Department. The special importance of these figures is that they show that while engineers are not as bad as shipyard workers, they are also keeping very bad time, while the bad time kept in the Repair Department is (having regard to the urgency of repairs) a specially serious matter.

The figures provided show the number of men of each class (platers, joiners, pattern-makers, fitters, &c.) who were out all day for each day between the 1st March and the 8th April.

The figures have been extracted for a fortnight and put in summary form in a table as follows :—

TABLE IV.

Men out all Day.

—	Shipyard Department (4,900 Men).	Engine and Boiler Shop Department (4,500 Men).	Repair Department (average of about 1,000)
(No Sunday work.)			
Monday March 8	669	317	416
Tuesday, „ 9	627	291	447
Wednesday, „ 10	564	273	318
Thursday „ 11	670	284	297
Friday, „ 12	567	287	263
Saturday, „ 13	686	311	260
(No Sunday work.)			
Monday, March 15	624	290	381
Tuesday, „ 16	602	299	327
Wednesday, „ 17	633	296	284
Thursday, „ 18	690	304	301
Friday, „ 19	609	297	313
Saturday, „ 20	629	321	260
(No Sunday work.)			

The following points should be specially noted :—

1. Monday and Saturday are usually the worst days. (There must have been some special cause influencing the 17th and 18th March.)
2. No Sunday work was being done, so the men had a week-end rest.
3. These figures are limited to all-day absence. No account is taken of failure to work before breakfast.
4. Absences in the Repair Department are particularly serious, and though engineers are not so bad, their figures indicate great delay in construction.

The 2nd to 5th April were holidays. On Tuesday the 6th April, 1,798 men of the Shipyard Department failed to turn up ; 1,431 of the Engine and Boiler Shops, and 666 in the Repair Department ; and the absences continued abnormal for some days. On the 7th April, 2,916 men were out from work the first quarter of the day, of whom 1,670 remained out all day. Even on the 8th, 2,500 were out the first quarter, and 1,500 remained out all day. The importance of these last figures lies in the fact that three days' holidays had been given to the men in these yards.

Is Drink the Cause of this abnormal Loss of Time?

The evidence is really overwhelming that the main cause of this alarming loss of time is the "lure of drink." The employers say so most emphatically; the Admiralty have received elaborate reports emphasising the same conclusion in the case of shipbuilding, repairs, munitions of war, and transport. The Home Office reports are to the same effect, and the detailed figures summarised above are, in themselves, strong evidence that drink is the cause. A section of each class of workmen keep perfectly good time throughout the week, and therefore the cause is not one which is common to all workmen, or due to any general industrial condition. The worst time is generally kept after wages are paid, and at the beginning of the following week. When absence from work occurs the workman is usually absent for several days together. Staleness and fatigue no doubt must arise from working during long hours over an extended period, but inasmuch as half the men are not in fact working for more than 45 hours a week, the cause must be found elsewhere. The testimony of observers in each district is that drink is by far the most important factor. The facilities for excessive drinking in the immediate vicinity of these works are abundant; the men in many cases work at a long distance from their homes. The restriction of hours in these districts has rather tended to concentrate drinking into a period without diminishing the temptation, or limiting the quantity consumed.

The contention that the cause of irregular hours is the excessive time worked is completely disposed of by observing that on average the time worked is unfortunately not so great as the standard in time of peace. The figures show, not that workmen who have been working long hours for days together occasionally take a day off, but that while some workmen are working steadily day by day for long hours, those who fail to work even ordinary hours are continually repeating this failure.

In conclusion it may be pointed out the detailed returns which have been furnished by the Shipbuilders' Federation show that during the four weeks of March, 670,000 hours of work have been avoidably lost. This is no less than 25 per cent. of the normal working hours.

(D.)

EXTRACT FROM LETTER DATED 26th MARCH, 1915, FROM ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE TO THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY:—

I AM very uneasy about the labour situation on the Clyde and Tyne. I have sent a telegram or two lately about it. You may think I am exceeding my sphere of action in doing so, but the efficiency of this Fleet is so affected by it that I felt it my duty to wire.

To-day an officer in a responsible position arrived. His account of things on the Clyde was most disquieting. He said that the men refused altogether to work on Saturday afternoon, that they took Wednesday afternoon off every week (if not the whole of Wednesday), and worked on Sunday because they got double pay for it. He said also that they only worked in a half-hearted manner. My destroyer dockings and refits are delayed *in every case* by these labour difficulties, and they take twice as long as they need do. I feel that you ought to know the facts, and so put them before you now.

* * * * *

(E.)

REPORTS FROM ARMAMENT WORKS.

THESE are not as serious as those received from the shipyards. They indicate, however, that much time is avoidably lost in some of the most important works.

For example, this is a report received on the 19th March, 1915, from important works engaged in the manufacture of munitions :—

> "Some drastic restrictions are absolutely necessary if largest possible output of certain war munitions is to be obtained. . . . . Among some shell workers there is a considerable amount of lost time due to their drinking habits. With the better class mechanics the time lost due to drinking is comparatively small, but in the case of labourers and the semi-skilled trade it is a very serious item."

Another most important firm reports :—

> "Speaking generally, margin of lost time allowed by us before the war has now to be trebled. Condition much worse in shipyards. Much of this loss of time is attributable to drink."

In another report from these works it is said :—

> "Loss of time from drink most noticeable in shell department, about 10 per cent. of total time worked."

In another important munitions works :—

> "Avoidable loss of time considerable among a minority."

Even in districts least heard of in this connection, and from which fewest complaints are received, all say that work would be considerably improved were there a restriction of facilities for the sale of intoxicating liquor.

The following are particulars of a week's work in April in one of the most important shell shops in England :—

PARTICULARS of Times Worked in Week Ending April 13, 1915.

	Per thousand. Men.
Working over 80 hours per week	94·37
„ 75 up to 80 hours per week	86·77
„ 70 „ 75 „	177·42
„ 65 „ 70 „	130·00
„ 60 „ 65 „	156·27
„ 53 „ 60 „	100·96
„ 50 „ 53 „	38·83
„ 45 „ 50 „	39·33
„ 40 „ 45 „	23·7
„ 35 „ 40 „	31·2
„ 30 „ 35 „	10·18
„ 25 „ 30 „	12·72
„ 20 „ 25 „	16·07
„ 20 and under „	82·22
Percentage who have worked 53 hours per week and over	74·57
Percentage who have worked 40 hours per week and under 53	10·19
Percentage who have worked under 40 hours per week	15·24

NOTE.—The percentage of time lost for the corresponding week of last year amounted to 7·8.

Here is a report, dated the 16th March, 1915, which came from works engaged in the manufacture of high explosives :—

> "We would also take this opportunity of expressing in the strongest possible manner our opinion that something should be done in this district to curtail the sale of drink. We fear that unless drastic steps are taken to lessen the sale of alcohol, before long we shall find it impossible to deliver anything like the quantities

of trinitrotoluene we have undertaken to supply to your department. Even at the present time we are not turning out as much as we could otherwise, owing to various troubles, and this is due to the fact that the men have been making good money and unfortunately wasting most of it in drink. Consequently, they are in such a condition that it is impossible for them to attend to their duties in a proper manner even when they come to the works, which is at odd times and to suit their own convenience."

There are several works engaged in the production of munitions of which this is not in the least true. Here again the great majority of the workmen are above reproach, and their action is praiseworthy.

(F.)

REPORT OF ENQUIRIES MADE BY THE HOME OFFICE IN REGARD TO LOSS OF TIME IN THE SHIPBUILDING TRADES.

THE enquiries were made by 33 investigators, 17 of whom were sent to various places on the Clyde, 6 to Newcastle and the Tyne, 4 to Barrow, and 2 each to Sunderland, Stockton, and West Hartlepool respectively. The enquiries occupied three days, from the 1st to the 3rd April inclusive.

Separate districts were marked out for each investigator. Detailed instructions were given them in which they were asked to ascertain the principal causes which had led to the loss of time among the workers, and the questions put to them were so framed as not to prejudice their judgment.

Each investigator made a separate report of the results of his enquiry without collaboration with his colleagues. A general summary of these reports is attached, followed by a more detailed summary of the reports, arranged according to districts.

The enquiries made by these investigators have been supplemented by reports from three factory inspectors, which are printed in full.

April 12, 1915.

(1.)—REPORTS OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS.

(a.) *General Summary.*

Shipbuilding is the main industry of the districts visited, but there are also many engineering works and other factories engaged on Government contracts.

Owing to the demands made by the war on the trades engaged in shipbuilding and the manufacture of munitions, the pressure of work in these districts is unprecedented. The demand for labour is greater than the supply, especially as large numbers of the regular workmen have enlisted in the naval or military forces. Wages are uniformly high, which means a large increase in the spending power of the working classes. Wages of 5*l.* or 6*l.* a week are common, and it is possible for a skilled and energetic mechanic to earn as much as 10*l.* or 15*l.* a week.

The hours of work are about fifty-four a week, excluding overtime. The day is divided into two shifts of eleven or twelve hours with intervals for meals, but many of the men work overtime. There is also a certain amount of Sunday labour with the attraction of double pay, but this has not proved altogether a success. Steady workmen feel the strain of working seven days a week, while others are disposed to work on Sunday and lose time on other days. An important feature of shipbuilding is the system of working in gangs consisting of two riveters, one holder-up, and one or two boys. While many of the men are working regularly and steadily beyond the normal hours, there is a considerable number, especially among the "black squad," in the shipbuilding yards who are not working up to the maximum of their capacity.

The riveters are mentioned particularly, and some distinction is drawn between them and the mechanics employed in engineering factories.

The reasons given for irregularities of attendance are mainly staleness and fatigue due to long hours over an extended period: unusually high wages leading to idleness: and habits of drinking. It is not altogether possible to isolate these causes, as they are more or less closely connected one with another, but the reports are unanimous in the conclusion that drink is by far the most important factor.

Many of the workmen engaged in these industries are, in normal times, heavy drinkers, partly, no doubt, owing to the nature of the work. Much of it is hard manual labour in severe heat, which creates a desire for stimulant. It is not suggested that all the workmen drink heavily. Many of them are abstemious, and in Scotland especially there is a considerable proportion of teetotallers. To those who are heavy drinkers, the facilities for drinking are unfortunately very great. An instance is given in one street where there were no less than thirty public-houses within a distance of half-a-mile. The yards and works are surrounded by public-houses and drinking-bars, where every possible facility is offered for obtaining drink for consumption both on and off the premises.

The drinking habits of the workmen on the Clyde differ somewhat from those of the English workmen. The popular drink there is half-a-gill of whisky, quickly followed by a schooner of beer (about $\frac{3}{4}$ pint), and the beer is of a heavier quality than English beer. This particular combination of liquor, though it does not apparently produce much effect on the hardened drinker at the moment, is not calculated to improve the capacity of the men for sustained work. Heavy drinking on Saturday in the public-houses, and on Sundays in clubs, is described as a feature of the life of the workmen on the Clyde, which frequently results in unfitness or loss of time at the beginning of the week. There is also a prevalent practice in Scotland of taking whisky in bottles home in the evening, especially on Saturday night for consumption on Sunday when the public-houses are closed. On the Tyne and in Barrow, spirit drinking is not so common, as the popular drink is beer, and the English workman's drinking appears to be more evenly distributed over the week, though the effect is very much the same in all the districts referred to.

Apart from the public-house great facilities for drinking are offered by clubs, which are open to members and to which visitors can be readily introduced. These places are freely resorted to on Sundays when the public-houses are closed.

Attention is drawn in the reports to the fact that many of the workmen take insufficient food, which not only increases the temptation to drink, but makes the effect of the liquor taken more injurious, so that the result is to incapacitate the workmen for the strain of heavy work. The men whose homes are near the works are able to obtain meals without difficulty, but owing to the lack of housing accommodation many workmen are obliged to travel long distances to get to their work. This is especially the case at Barrow-in-Furness. The usual practice is for the workmen to take cold food with them, which is generally consumed in the public-houses with their liquor. Reference is made in some of the reports to cases where food could not be obtained at the public-houses, and it is evident that the sale of drink is out of all proportion to that of food. The reports emphasise the need for mess-rooms and canteens in the yards where the men could get good meals in comfort without having to resort to the public-houses. Such accommodation is very rarely provided.

The practice of paying the whole wages of a "black squad" to the leader is also said to be productive of drinking, as the men go to the public-house to divide the money, and the custom is for each member of the squad to stand drinks all round.

It is stated that some of the worst offenders in the matter of drinking are men who in normal times are not employed in the yards but who now owing to the scarcity of labour have been given work. Where a large proportion of the steadiest men have enlisted, and great numbers of inferior men are brought in to meet the pressure, a general increase in drinking is inevitable.

The investigators say that trade union restrictions which might tend to diminish the output have been very generally abrogated to meet the exceptional conditions, though some of the men still display reluctance to undertake different work from that to which they are accustomed.

Much absenteeism is caused by the "black squad" system. If one of the members of the squad is absent from idleness, or drinking, the rest of the squad is held up, and where several squads are affected the cumulative result is very marked. To some

extent this evil is being met by pooling men, so that if one of a squad is away, his place can be taken by another.

The evils of excessive drinking were readily admitted by some of the better workmen, who considered that the action of a minority was bringing unmerited discredit on the workmen as a whole. Others considered that the part played by drinking had been exaggerated, that the workmen had been subjected to too great a pressure and were suffering from the strain, and that the deficiency of output was largely due, especially on the Clyde, to the withdrawal of skilled men who should be recalled from the colours.

(b.) *Detailed Summaries.*

The Clyde.

Scotstoun and Clydebank.—The investigators who visited Scotstoun and Clydebank came to the conclusion that the falling-off in output is mainly due to excessive drinking, especially at the week-ends. Fatigue and insufficient food are contributory causes. The day-shift men have an interval for dinner from 1·30 to 2·15, when a considerable portion of the workmen indulge in drinking. The day-shift ends at 5·30, when a smaller number of men take a drink before their tea. At 9·45 P.M. the night-shift men have an interval of ten minutes, when some of them get drink.

There are large numbers of drinking bars in the neighbourhood of the works with circular bars designed for quick service. There is, as a rule, no seating accommodation, but they are said to be well conducted.

Although there is a considerable amount of drinking during meal times, most of the drinking takes place on Saturdays at the drinking bars. One of the features of these bars is the preparation for drinking after wages have been paid. Three or four hundred glasses of whisky are made ready to meet the rush of customers, and in some cases some of the workmen are taken on to help in the service. These are called "5*s.* helpers." If drinking were limited to Saturdays, and the men took a rest on Sundays, they might recover in time for the work on Monday, but unfortunately men take bottles of whisky home with them, which is frequently consumed the same night. Although the public-houses are closed on Sunday, it is also easy for them to obtain liquor at the various clubs. These places are restricted to members, but they are able to introduce one or more visitors. The clubs are used, not only on Sundays, but also on week-days late at night when the public-houses are closed. The normal drink taken by the men is half-a-gill of whisky followed by three-quarters of a pint of beer, and the gravity of the beer is said to be higher in Scotland than in England.

The workers admit that the output could be increased, but in their opinion many of them are overtired from working long hours of overtime, and they also allege that their meals are insufficient owing to the want of proper accommodation for getting meals in the yards. Others allege that the want of skilled labour is the chief cause of the falling off of output, and those who are employed are working as hard as possible.

It is stated that the trade union restrictions have been set aside in the present emergency, but they still exist to a certain extent, as many workmen will not accept work outside their own particular line.

Renfrew and Govan.—In one of the reports a distinction is drawn between the engineers and iron-turners engaged mainly on the production of shell cases, and the men who comprise the "black squads" employed in shipbuilding. The former are said to be working strenuously and are very abstemious, many of them being teetotallers. Instances are given of engineers working thirty-six hours at a stretch, with intervals for meals. The "black squads," on the other hand, are frequently held up by irregularities on the part of members of the gang. Attention is drawn to the practice of paying the "squads" a lump sum, which is afterwards divided in the public-house. This leads to treating all round and much heavy drinking, and it is suggested that if each man could be paid his own wages there would be an improvement.

Although the amount of drinking during the day did not appear to be excessive having regard to the character of the work, a large number of men drink to excess at the end of the week. One of the investigators states that in one public-house in Govan between 12.30 and 1.35 P.M. on Saturday he saw 100*l.* taken. The national drink is a half gill of whisky, price 4*d.*, followed by a schooner of beer, price 2½*d.* The beer in Scotland is heavier than in England. Bottles of whisky are also sold in large quantities

on Saturday night, as the public-houses are closed on Sunday. Drinking goes on very largely on Sunday in clubs, and this is responsible for a lot of time lost on Monday.

Another reason suggested for the deficiency of output is that many skilled men have joined the colours, and their places have been filled by unskilled men. If some of the men who have enlisted could be sent back the output would be materially increased.

The public-houses are large open bars without seating accommodation. They have conspicuous notices affixed, "Liberty and sobriety: avoid excess."

Large numbers of bottles, varying in price from 6*d.* to 2*s.*, are put ready in the public-houses, to be carried away just before closing time for use the next morning, owing to public-houses not opening until 10 A.M. In some cases men wait about in the morning till they do open, preferring the loss of time to going without their morning drink.

In none of the yards on the Clyde, except one at Govan, is there any accommodation for taking meals. Men have to go long distances to and from their homes, and form the habit of taking refreshment by the way. The provision of accommodation for meals inside the works would be greatly appreciated, and would lessen temptation to drink.

Partick, Pointhouse, Old Kilpatrick, Dalmuir, and Whiteinch.—There was not much evidence of excessive drinking during the day in this district, though men frequent public-houses at meal-times. In the evening, about 6 o'clock, the men resort to the public-houses and drink freely. Week-end drinking is the principal feature. After being paid on Saturday men adjourn in parties to the public-houses and indulge in drinks all round. The popular drink is half a gill of whisky swallowed at a gulp, followed by a schooner (three-quarters of a pint) of beer. Afterwards many of them adjourn to a football match or other amusement, and then return to the public-houses for the rest of the day. In the evening bottles of whisky are taken home for Sunday drinking, but they are often consumed the same evening. On Sundays drink is freely obtained in clubs, where members can introduce visitors. Liquor is also obtained from the licensed grocers, who deliver whisky or bottled beer to their customers.

The method of working known as the "black squad" is said to encourage excessive drinking. A "black squad" is composed of one blacksmith, two riveters, one holder-up, and two boys. The wages are paid to the principal of the squad, and the money is divided in a public-house, when the custom of standing drinks all round is observed. One of the investigators states that during the conversations which he had with some of the workers in the "black squads," they gave him the impression that they could not perform the work of holding and striking hot metal without the aid of stimulants.

The men complain that there are no places in the yards where they can take their meals. The majority of the men are of opinion that the workmen employed are turning out as much as possible, but there is a want of skilled labour, as many of the younger skilled men have enlisted, and their places are filled by inferior workmen. A good deal of time is lost where one member of a "black squad" fails to turn up and the rest are obliged to stand down for the day. This defect has been remedied to some extent by the system of pooling men, by which men can be found to take the place of absentees.

Dumbarton.—Two reports were made on the conditions found at Dumbarton, in which deficiency of output is attributed partly to fatigue on the part of the steadier workmen, principally those who have been working overtime on hard manual work, and partly to excessive drinking by a minority of the workmen. A number of the best workmen have joined the army, and their places have been filled by men who, prior to the war, did little or no work, or existed on what the regular workers would give them. It was suggested that if some of the men who have joined the army were allowed to return to their work it would have a good effect on the output.

As regards drinking habits, there were not many signs of drunkenness, but the public-houses were well patronised during meal times. In addition to drink consumed on the premises the men were in the habit of purchasing whisky in bottles, which usually contain a "mutchkin," or just over half a pint. The usual drink in Dumbarton, as in other parts of Scotland, is whisky followed by beer. Many of the men have two or three such drinks on each visit to the public-house. One of the investigators mentions the case of a workman who had been away from work five days drinking, and had spent 1*l.* a-day in drink for himself and other persons. He was

decidedly shaky, though not drunk. He was expecting to work on the sixth day, but it was obvious that he was not in a condition to stand hard work for any length of time.

The difficulty of working in squads where one of the squad is absent from drink may be obviated to some extent by a new arrangement, which seems likely to be made in the shipbuilding yards at Dumbarton, for pooling the squads. Where there are several broken squads, complete squads would be formed by allowing a riveter to act as a holder-up, &c. This is against the ordinary trade-union rules, but has been agreed to.

Some of the better-class workmen suggest that the drinking problem would be overcome by closing the public-houses outside, and opening canteens inside, the yards. Many of them who are apparently anxious to do their best to expedite the output, expressed the opinion that some stimulant is necessary for men engaged in some branches of shipbuilding.

The public-houses in Scotland being closed on Sunday, a practice has grown up of purchasing whisky on Saturday night. One of the investigators noticed a barman who had filled about 100 bottles of whisky which he expected to sell between half-past nine and closing time. The result is that the men are able to drink on Sunday and are frequently unfit for work on Monday morning. The question of prohibition has been much discussed in Dumbarton; many of the working men are in favour either of total prohibition or of suspending the sale of liquor for consumption off the premises. Total prohibition would meet with considerable opposition from others.

The suggestion made by one investigator is that the public-houses should be closed during meal hours and also from 12 to 3 on Saturdays, in order to induce the workman to go to his home with his wages and get proper meals. The practice of taking drink without food has a bad effect on their physical condition.

Greenock.—The men are working more than normally, and loss of time may be due in some cases partly to fatigue and partly to wet weather; but, generally speaking, it is due to the temptation to idleness owing to good wages and heavy drinking among a minority.

Drinking is indulged in especially on Saturdays, Mondays, and Tuesdays, when drunken persons can be seen both in the streets and public-houses. The favourite drink is whisky, followed by beer, and if spirit drinking were stopped there would be less drunkenness. Many of the workmen admitted that drink was the chief cause of the decrease of output and advocated universal prohibition.

The public-houses are open from 10 A.M. until 9 P.M., so that early and late drinking is prevented; but there is a great deal of liquor taken during the meal-times by men on the day-shift, and in the afternoon by men working on the night-shift.

The system of working in squads also leads to drinking where one of the squad is absent from any cause, and the usual result is that the whole squad goes off work and drinks.

While the above statement in regard to excessive drinking is true of a considerable number of the workmen, there are many who are working very hard, and who feel the strain of the prolonged hours. The more respectable workmen are in favour of drastic restriction, and even prohibition, either of spirits or of all liquor, and the belief is that some such steps will be taken. Prohibition on the Clyde or in Scotland alone would lead to trouble; the men say that if prohibition is to come it must apply to the whole country.

There are plenty of facilities for drinking in Greenock. The public-houses have small rooms like cubicles, where several men can sit comfortably round a small table and drink as long as they wish, as they are free from observation. The suggestion was made in the town that the firm should establish canteens in the yards.

Port Glasgow.—This small town on the Clyde has a population of about 17,000, almost entirely supported by shipbuilding.

Men work from 6 A.M. to 9 A.M., 9·45 A.M. to 1 P.M., and 2 to 5·30 P.M. On Saturdays work ends at noon. The week's work is fifty-four hours, but there is much lost time as well as insufficiency of labour. The loss of time is attributed mainly to drink, especially in the evenings. The public-houses are open from 10 A.M. to 9 P.M. (instead of 8 A.M. to 10 P.M. before the war). In many cases men prefer to wait until 10 A.M. in order to get a drink before going to work, thereby losing half a day. The popular drink is four pennyworth of whisky followed by a pint of beer. The investigator could find no evidence of men being overtired or idling because of good wages. Most of the men are in ordinary times heavy drinkers, and while further restrictions are needed, prohibition would be resented. The establishment of canteens in the works would be a great safeguard.

The Tyne.

Six investigators visited various places on the Tyne, including Newcastle, Walker, Elswick, Hebburn, Wallsend, and North and South Shields. The war has brought great prosperity to all workers on the Tyne generally, with the result that high wages are readily obtained by all who are willing to work. Many of the men attracted by high wages are working steadily and during long hours, and some of the regular workmen become stale and need an occasional holiday. The general impression, however, is that the loss of time, which is considerable, is due to idleness, and especially to drink. It is not alleged that there is a large amount of open drunkenness though one of the investigators states that at 7·30 A.M. in South Shields he saw fifteen men who had come off the night-shift all under the influence of drink, and several of them hopelessly drunk; but there is plenty of evidence of heavy drinking. The public-houses on the Tyne are generally open from 8 A.M. to 9 P.M., with the exception of South Shields, where the public-houses open at 6 A.M. There is some drinking during the breakfast and dinner hours, but the principal time of drinking is at night, when all the public-houses are crowded. The majority drink beer, not spirits, and the extra halfpenny on beer has not led to a change from beer to spirits, as money is plentiful; but more spirit is drunk than is usual with English workmen, and there is some drinking of spirit and beer mixed. The habit of drinking in batches is a common feature on the Tyne. Four or five men on the same shift will enter a public-house and each stands drink successively. One investigator saw five men consume five half-pints each in less than ten minutes.

It is said that the payment of double wages for Sunday labour has led to idling on Monday, and no doubt the drinking on Saturday and Sunday has produced the same result. For this reason it is suggested that special restrictions should be made in regard to Monday hours. The earlier opening of public-houses at South Shields not only invites early drinking among workmen from that place, but also attracts men from Jarrow and Hebburn.

Two of the investigators comment on the insufficient food which the men take, partly owing to the difficulty of getting food in the public-houses. It is thought that in this way they are more easily affected by the amount of liquor which they consume, and are consequently unfitted for hard work.

Generally, the effect of the reports from the Tyne is that drinking is a serious evil, largely leading to loss of time, and that further restriction should be placed on the hours during which public-houses are open. Local opinion expects some such restrictions, but would not tolerate total prohibition.

It may be added that shortage of labour has led to the employment of men who would not in ordinary times be given employment, and no doubt they are more likely to take to drink than the regular workman.

One of the investigators, who has had experience of workers in Government establishments, states that he has never seen so much drinking at all times of the day as he witnessed in Newcastle and the surrounding district.

Sunderland.

The chief industry is shipbuilding, which employs most of the working population. As in other places, the men work in two shifts covering the twenty-four hours, 6 A.M. to 6 P.M., and 6 P.M. to 5 A.M., with two stoppages of half-an-hour for meals. There is no work between 5 A.M. and 6 A.M. The two investigators who visited Sunderland say that drinking is very prevalent, and that this rather than fatigue is the cause of loss of time. Many men idle because of their good wages, and it is suggested that the temptation to idle from this cause might be met if the employers would bank a portion of the wages until the war is over. It is said that many of the men would willingly agree to this suggestion.

The public-houses, of which there are a large number (in one street thirty in the space of half-a-mile), open at 6 A.M. and close at 9 P.M. The Sunday hours are 12.30 to 2.30 P.M. and 6 to 9 P.M. One of the features of the public-houses in Sunderland is the sitting-room where tables and lounges are placed and liquor is brought to the customer. These sitting-rooms are crowded nightly, mostly by the better-class workmen, and they are used by men and women alike. Beer is the popular drink, and it is sold at 2*d.* per glass of rather under half-a-pint to meet the increase of duty.

The early hour at which the public-houses open seems to be a great incentive to drinking, as the men coming off the night-shift loiter about until the public-houses open, and those starting on the day-shift remain drinking and are late at the yards. One of the investigators visited several public-houses between 6 and 7 A.M. and asked for a cup of tea or coffee, but he was told that it could not be supplied, and apparently nothing can be purchased except liquor and cigarettes. There is a great deal of time lost on Monday owing to Sunday drinking.

The drink question is apparently a common topic of conversation among the workmen in Sunderland, and many of them would like to see the public-houses closed altogether during the war, but there are others who say they cannot work without beer, especially where the work is in intense heat, and the opinion is that the case could be met if the public-houses were closed for consumption of liquor on the premises, but opened for about two hours in the middle of the day for the sale of bottled beer to be consumed off the premises. The suggestion also was put forward that canteens should be provided at the works where food and beer could be obtained.

West Hartlepool.

About 12,000 to 15,000 are employed in shipbuilding, engineering, and steel and iron works. The normal hours are, for the day-shift, from 6 A.M. to 5 P.M., and for the night-shift from 6 P.M. to 6 A.M., with intervals for meals. Overtime is worked by a good many, but there is very little Sunday work. The two investigators who visited Hartlepool did not think that the men suffered from fatigue and they heard no complaints of the kind : the workmen looked healthy and cheerful. Good wages were causing idleness in some cases, but generally speaking the men were working well. Drink does cause loss of time, but the effect on output would not be very considerable.

The public-houses open at 8 A.M. and close at 9 P.M., and on Sundays from 12·30 to 2 P.M. and 6 to 9 P.M. The men are unable to obtain liquor on their way to their work, but they drink freely during the intervals for breakfast and dinner. They carry food in their pockets which they take to the public-houses to eat. The favourite drink is a glass of whisky or rum followed by a pint of beer, which is sometimes repeated. Public-houses are very busy in the evening, and though there is too much heavy drinking there is comparatively little drunkenness. The consumption of spirits has somewhat increased since the extra tax on beer. There is a good case for restricting further the hours during which the public-houses are open, especially during the breakfast hour, but prohibition would cause a great deal of trouble in the labour world.

Both these investigators thought that the output was affected by trade union restrictions. For instance, a squad is frequently held up by the absence of one of their number, although the work could proceed with other assistance if it were not for trade union rules, which do not allow one class of job to be done by a man of a different trade.

Stockton-on-Tees.

The two investigators who made the enquiries in Stockton-on-Tees came to the conclusion that loss of time was due solely to drinking; although many of the workmen complained that over-work made them stiff and that they were thus unable to keep time. This especially applies to the men working in squads, as frequently one of them fails to turn up and thus prevents the whole squad from working. The public-houses are open from 8 A.M. until 9 P.M. (the hours before the war were 6 A.M. and 11 P.M.), and on Sundays 12–12·30 and 6–9. The favourite drink is beer, taken in great quantities, and very little spirit is drunk. When the public-houses were opened at 6 A.M. a good trade was done with men on their way to their work. This has now stopped, but there is reason to believe that men take beer home with them in the evening for early morning consumption. Stockton is well supplied with public-houses, many of them close to each other, and these are all crowded in the evenings and on Saturday afternoons with workmen drinking beer. The publicans appear to be taking as much money within the restricted hours as when the hours of opening were longer.

Barrow-in-Furness.

Barrow has a population of about 70,000, and of these about 20,000 are employed at Messrs. Vickers, Son, and Maxim, and about 3,000 at the Hematite Steel Works.

The men work in two shifts:—Day-shift from 6 A.M. until 5 P.M., with intervals of half-an-hour for breakfast and an hour for dinner. Night-shift, 5 P.M. until 6 A.M., with intervals of two hours for meals. Some of the men, chiefly shell-makers, work two or three hours overtime.

The four reports agree that there was little evidence of drunkenness in the streets, and few cases of drunkenness had been brought into the Courts, but there was evidence to show that during the particular week when the enquiry was made there had been considerably less drinking than recently, owing probably to the fact that the employers had offered double wages on Good Friday and one and a-half wages on Saturday morning to men who had worked regularly all the week, which was a distinct incentive to the workmen to remain sober. It is not clear that the conditions were normal when the enquiries were made.

There was evidence to show that there had been less drinking since the hours of the public-houses had been restricted. They now open from 10·30 A.M. and close at 10 P.M.; on Sundays they are open from 12·30–2 and 6·30–9. The publicans do not, however, seem to have been hit by the restricted hours, as the men drink more heavily during the shorter period and some take drink away with them.

The men are not spirit drinkers, although the influx of men from Scotland has led to the greater sale of spirits. They are generally drinking at present a rather expensive beer known as "6*d.* and 10*d.*," which is a combination of two beers priced at 10*d.* and 6*d.* a quart respectively, and sold at 5*d.* a pint. Prior to the present boom the men could only afford to drink beer at 3*d.* a pint. A good deal of beer is consumed in the evening and on Saturday afternoon and evening, but on the whole there was not at the time of the reports very much ground for complaint, though much time had been lost in the past through heavy drinking.

Though the drinking habit may have had serious effects on output, it appears that excessive drinking is not very general. The majority of the men seem to have been keeping good time and working long hours, and there was evidence of fatigue and staleness. The reports indicate that better work could be got out of the men if they were on three shifts of eight hours, but this would be impossible without a large number of extra men, and a great increase in the accommodation.

Accommodation is very difficult to get, and many of the workmen have to live outside Barrow, at places several miles away. In some cases this increases the temptation to drink, as men have to pass public-houses on their way to and from work. It also appears that the means of travelling are inadequate. It is suggested in one of the reports that increased accommodation could be provided by vessels in the docks.

(2.)—REPORTS OF FACTORY INSPECTORS.

The Clyde.

I have had many interviews from time to time with shipbuilders and engineers on the subject of bad time-keeping among workmen, and to-day I have supplemented my information by interviewing the Chief Constable of Govan and a number of publicans in an area surrounding the largest shipbuilding yards.

There does not appear to be any noticeable increase of drinking since the war began. The quantity consumed is about normal, the same men frequent the same premises, and those inclined to drink too much continue as before the war commenced. There is, however, some evidence that small bottles of whisky are purchased and consumed off the premises, especially by men on night-shift work, This, however, is confined to a very few men. For instance, in a yard employing 10,000, three men in one night were found partially intoxicated in the works and expelled.

In fairness to the men it should be noted that irregular time is confined largely to certain specific trades: riveters, caulkers, platers, riggers, and to a very much less extent engineers, are the chief offenders; such tradesmen as pattern-makers, moulders, turners, and time-workers generally keep relatively good time. Broadly speaking, the men engaged in outdoor work, that is, on the construction of the ship itself, usually piece-workers, are responsible for most of the irregular time, and their behaviour has cast a stigma on the general class of workers employed in shipbuilding and marine engineering which is certainly not justified by the facts, and it is undeserved.

Coming to the causes of irregular time-keeping among the outdoor workers, while drinking is an important source of bad time-keeping, it is only one cause, and here

again the action of a relatively small proportion will disorganise the work of many others who may be capable and willing to work full time. Riveters and platers work in squads, but if one man fails to turn up at 6 A.M. the squad cannot proceed, and because of the absence of one man four or five will lose a morning's or possibly a whole day's work. Riveting is hard and exhausting work, and it is frequently and necessarily carried on in trying conditions — exposure in winter to bitter cold and damp. The temptation to take a morning or a day off during very cold or very hot weather is great, as the riveter knows he is indispensable at present, and will not lose his job if he does lie off. Moreover, his pay is sufficent, even with a partial week's work, to keep him and his family in comfort. The machine men working under cover are in a comfortable shop and have not the same temptation to lie off. Again the pay is relatively much less, and being time workers they cannot make up the lost time by a special spurt. Another important point frequently overlooked is that at present, owing to the extraordinary scarcity of skilled labour, men who in ordinary times would never be employed on account of their irregular habits, are at work in many yards, and materially affect the numbers of those losing time. Briefly, I am convinced that the "black squad" piece-workers have not risen much above the social position of the man earning 30*s.* a-week, yet their remuneration is equal to that of a professional man. They have not yet been educated to spend their wages wisely, and the money is largely wasted, for they have few interests and little to spend their wage on apart from alcohol.

For some reason, difficult to define, men do not readily take up riveting and plating, and consequently there is a constant shortage of this class. This shortage has tended to force up wages to such an extent that the present pay is in excess of their needs. The fear of loss of employment is absent, consequently there is no spur to stimulate a man to work regularly such as exists in most callings.

The question of fatigue due to prolonged overtime does not arise to any great extent. The same men do not work overtime week after week, and Sunday work is only done by the same man every second or third Sunday. The general feeling among employers is that Sunday work with double pay is not a success, it is considered that stopping it would improve time-keeping in the rest of the week.

One large works has just taken a vote of their men on the question of further restrictions, and I attach particulars of the questions put to them, and the percentage of men in favour of each alternative.

	Per cent.
1. Are you in favour of total prohibition?	31
2. Are you in favour of leaving matters as at present?	44
3. Are you in favour of reducing hours to from 12 noon to 2 P.M. and 7 to 9 P.M., and on Saturday 6 to 10 P.M.?	11
4. Are you in favour of reducing hours to from 7 P.M. to 9 P.M. on week-days, and Saturday from 6 P.M. to 10 P.M.?	4
5. Leaving hours as at present, but for sale of *beer* only	10

Out of the 2,500 men employed about two-thirds voted.

Most of the drink on the Clyde is consumed on licensed premises; it is not the habit to drink much in the homes. A prohibition of the purchase of alcohol for consumption off the premises would possibly improve one class only, namely, those who have to work at night, and now take liquor to their place of employment. One must also recognise that teetotalers lose time as well as those who do not abstain. Away from shipbuilding pure and simple there does not appear to be any serious irregular time-keeping; it does not exist to any material extent in engineering generally, nor in the iron and steel producing towns in Lanarkshire.

The whole question has arisen because of the action of a few men in the more important shipbuilding yards, and there is a feeling that the mass of workers throughout the country should not be penalised because of the dissipated and unpatriotic behaviour of a small minority of overpaid men in one or two specific callings.

More comfortable working conditions improve timekeeping; for instance, during the last three weeks of fine bright weather distinctly better time has been kept. Again, much time lost by the "black squad" is due to wet and windy weather; work outside is difficult and almost impossible under such conditions unless the building berth is a roofed one. To meet this difficulty, sheds are being built over the berths devoted to submarines and small shallow draft craft.

Figures showing the percentage of hours lost by outside workers are valueless unless allowance is made for the periods in which work was impossible owing to weather conditions. It is not uncommon for men to work on piece work until their clothing is

wet through, and the experience of employers is that in this condition, if they hang about afterwards, colds and chills supervene, with perhaps the consequent loss of a week or fortnight's employment. These facts I mention so that the men's position can be given full justice.

HARRY J. WILSON.

April 3, 1915.

THE TYNE.

I beg to report that I have taken a deep interest in the subject of lost time since the commencement of the war, and on every possible occasion I have made it a point to discuss the subject with employers, managers, foremen, and with the workers themselves. The following statements show the conclusions I have arrived at:—

1. So far as shipyard workers are concerned, there is no doubt whatever, in my mind, that the "drinking habit" is more responsible than any other cause for the great loss of time amongst the workmen. It is common knowledge to those who know the habits of shipyard workers in this district, that in normal times they usually indulge pretty heavily every week-end, and that Monday is a very bad day as regards the time worked. In the present time of continuous employment, this week-end habit is to some extent broken up, but results in spasmodic indulgence at irregular intervals during the week. The fact that double time is paid for Sunday work, and that consequently the men's earnings are so much more than usual, no doubt tends to foster the habit of frequent indulgence in drink.

As regards engineers and armament workers, and others engaged in emergency work, the drinking habit undoubtedly plays an important part, although to a lesser extent, in the reasons given for lost time. Only yesterday, I was informed by an engineering employer that a number of his men occasionally stopped work at 8 P.M. instead of 9 P.M., the usual overtime period. He explained that, when asked the reason for their action, the workmen informed him that "the 'pubs' closed at 9 P.M. and they wanted a few drinks before closing time." He stated, further, that he had noticed that the men who indulged in this practice formed the majority of the late arrivals next morning.

The "drinking habit" is not confined to men alone in this district. I have had similar complaints as regards women workers in rope and waggon cover works.

2. The fact that double pay is given for Sunday work, no doubt, is also a factor in the situation. The men openly state that they can afford to have a "good time" (as they call it) occasionally, without reducing their wages below normal. In one large engineering works recently I was shown a statement which one of the directors had prepared. This showed that a large number of men systematically lost time during the week equivalent to nearly a full normal day, so that the Sunday work on double time was of no real value at all to the firm. He also pointed out that a fair percentage of the men—good, steady workmen—kept excellent time week after week.

I have formed an opinion that Sunday labour can only be made of real value if the sale of alcoholic liquor is entirely prohibited except under doctors' prescription.

3. I do not place a great deal of reliance on fatigue having much to do with lost time. I think the financial aspect combined with the indulgence in drink is solely responsible.

In several works recently I have been informed that the employers intend, as an experiment, to introduce a new system, whereby if a man loses more than a quarter of a day from Monday to Saturday inclusive, he will not be allowed to work on Sunday at all. This is, I think, an excellent plan as, if the lost time is due to fatigue, it gives the workman a day's rest on Sunday, and if due to a drinking bout, it will reduce the man's wages and make him, perhaps, more careful the following week. Further, if in a riveting or plating squad one of the men keeps bad time and is not allowed to work on Sunday, it will probably prevent the squad working on Sunday altogether, and consequently the man's mates will put pressure upon him to keep better time.

W. B. LAUDER.

April 2, 1915.

Barrow-in-Furness.

Since the outbreak of the war I have paid five visits to the above firm in connection with Emergency Orders, and on each occasion have made enquiries as to loss of time by the workers and the question of drinking. At my second visit, owing to an allegation made that the reasons why Vickers could not obtain sufficient men, and why they were continually losing their men, were that they did not pay them so highly and they had "a bad name" amongst the workers, I took the opportunity of going round some of the public-houses in the evening and mixing freely with the men. I then ascertained that the general opinion was that Vickers was an extremely good shop. There was plenty of drinking, though I saw no actual cases of drunkenness up to 9 P.M. The men gave me the impression that they could stand a fair amount of liquor without showing signs of drunkenness.

At subsequent visits I have always noted that the public-houses in Barrow were well patronised during the daytime, and one always saw a number of men in their working clothes in the vicinity of these, with signs that they had had quite as much liquor as they could carry, though I have never seen a workman actually drunk in the town.

1. I think the drinking habit is prevalent in Barrow amongst riveters and platers, and the less skilled workers and labourers. At my visit last month several of the foremen whom I interviewed said that drinking had always been rather bad in Barrow and was now worse than ever. The statement was made that restriction of the hours of public-houses should be uniform throughout the district. Serious complaint was made by several of the managers that though the Barrow public-houses were open only between 9 A.M. and 9 P.M. there were no restrictions at Dalton 6 miles away, and many of the night-shift men took train to Dalton and started drinking there soon after 6 A.M., as the Barrow public-houses were not open. I was unable, for lack of time, to verify this statement personally.

2. I doubt if there is anything like the amount of fatigue among the workers which is considered in some quarters to be prevalent. Much of the manual work in the factories at the present day is not fatiguing: the workmen have simply to stand and watch their machines. The workers at the large shell forging presses and the heating furnaces are an exception, and also the riveters and platers in the shipyards.

3. I attribute the loss of time in Barrow which, from figures I have seen, is serious in some of the departments at Vickers' works, to the fact that many of the workers are earning such good wages that they can maintain their ordinary standard of comfort and living with four or five days' work. Without doubt much is also due to drinking habits. Loss of time through sickness has not been at all pronounced in Barrow during the last winter. In fact, I was assured that the amount of sickness had been below the normal.

W. SYDNEY SMITH.

(G.)

REPORTS ON TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES.

I.

Report by Director of Transports to the First Lord of the Admiralty.

First Lord,

I WISH to call attention to the fact that the transport work is now being conducted under serious difficulties.

The workmen—seamen, dock labourers, &c.—are rapidly becoming absolutely out of hand. The present labour situation on the Clyde and at Liverpool is merely the beginning. Unless effectual measures are taken we shall have strikes at every port in the United Kingdom, and supplies to the Army and the Fleet will be stopped. In the main, we have now to deal, not with the ordinary British workmen, but with what remains after our best men have been recruited for the Army and Navy.

Yesterday the crew of a transport deserted. The same thing happened the day before. The firemen go on board the transports drunk, making it impossible to get up a full head of steam, so greatly reducing the speed and endangering the lives of thousands of troops by making the vessels a target for submarines.

The root cause of the serious congestion at some of the docks is not a shortage of labour but the fact that the men can earn in two or three days what will keep them in drink for the rest of the week.

What is wanted, in addition to a proper control of the drink traffic, is a well-devised scheme promptly applied for bringing the seamen under naval, and other workmen in Government employ under military, discipline. In many cases it is now taking three times as long to get ships fitted and ready to sail as it did when war broke out. Expedition is a thing of the past, and it is obvious that this may at any moment have a disastrous effect on the naval and military operations.

The following practical instance of the effect of military discipline, even on those totally unused to it, may be of interest :—

We sent 250 dock labourers to Havre under capable civilian supervision. They all got drunk and out of hand in the first fortnight. We brought them back and enlisted a similar lot of men under military discipline. On the first pay day one got drunk and was given twelve months' hard labour. There has been no trouble since, and the men are working splendidly.

GRAEME THOMSON,
Director of Transports.

March 6, 1915.

II.

As an example of a case in which it was deemed urgently necessary to take police court proceedings in this country, the following may be cited :—

Seven firemen employed on a certain transport were charged at Southampton on a warrant with unlawfully combining together to neglect duty, and to impede the navigation of the ship, and the progress of the voyage.

All seven pleaded not guilty, but, in answer to a further question from the Magistrate's Clerk, admitted " signing-on " in the usual way.

Mr. C. Lamport, prosecuting, said that he appeared really on behalf of Captain John Roberts, the commander of the transport, and the prosecution, which was supported by the authorities, was of a similar character to that before the Bench a few weeks ago. It was considered by the authorities, as well as the officers, to be a matter of national importance. All these men had signed articles, as they had admitted, and part of their duties were in connection with the transport service. It was necessary for the transport to sail at a certain time, and no man was entitled to be absent without obtaining leave. No leave was asked for and no leave granted, and orders were given that all firemen must be present at a certain time. There were over 1,000 troops on board this ship ready to go away, and he must not say more than that the vessel was held up through the absence of these men, and actually had to return to the port, or near it, and the troops had to be transferred to another vessel, for the Bench to see what a terribly serious thing this was. One could scarcely conceive that the legislature had given sufficient power to deal with such offences. As an Englishman and an advocate, he said that it might well be that men who undertook to serve on a transport ought to be under the same liability to severe punishment as those under military or Admiralty law.

Captain Roberts, the commander of the transport, told the Court that there were over 1,000 troops on board, and that the men should have joined the ship not later than 3·30 on the afternoon in question. The sailing hour was 6 o'clock. Two men were brought on board at 7, one of them intoxicated, but the rest did not put in an appearance at all. In consequence of the absence of these men witness was unable to proceed with the ship, which, as a matter of fact, had to return to Southampton. The troops had to be transferred, there was twenty-four hours' delay, and everything was dislocated.

Harold Graham, the chief engineer of the transport, and George Tounson, the second engineer, bore out the evidence of their captain, both stating that they gave no leave whatever.

Asked what they had to say in defence, Carpenter and Payne told the Court that they had no intention of leaving the ship, and, as a matter of fact, did rejoin ; Hock and Podesta stated that their reason for absence was that they were not feeling well ; Thompson and Hatton explained that they were detained at the Bargate by the police on charges of drunkenness, and therefore could not join the ship ; and Mountain refrained from saying anything.

In passing sentence, the presiding magistrate said :—

> " By the way you have acted by not joining your ship at the proper time you impeded the progress of the ship and affected its destination, and the vessel had to put back and reship its troops. The Bench under these circumstances cannot consider any question but the utmost penalty, and you will all go to prison for twelve weeks with hard labour."

The magistrates having passed sentence as recorded above,

Commander Prefect, who said that he represented the Principal Naval Transport Officer, desired to emphasise the seriousness of these cases. Some of the troops, said the Commander, had been travelling for fifty or sixty hours from the north of Scotland and the west of Ireland, and they were detained on board, not by military exigencies, but by the action of these men.

III.

Extract from Report made by Director of Transports to Admiralty, dated March 27, 1915.

Some of the transport workers at most of the large ports are content to earn in three days money which keeps them in drink for the rest of the week. It is necessary to secure throughout the country a state of affairs which will make it possible for transport operations to be carried out with speed and efficiency. At present this is impossible, and neither the Fleet nor the Army can get on without transport.

In my opinion measures are necessary to withdraw all licences to sell intoxicating liquors throughout the country.

IV.

Extract from letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty from Mr. T. Royden (member of Director of Transport's Advisory Committee), dated March 29, 1915.

. . . . . the labour situation at our seaports is so unsatisfactory that immediate action is imperative. In any remedial steps that may be taken it should be borne in mind that our best men have joined the colours in various capacities, and that in consequence their influence, which under normal conditions exercises a steadying effect on their fellow-workers, is for the time being lost. At the best of times casual labour, and under that category I place dockers and ship-repairers, is unsatisfactory and unreliable, and this characteristic has become still more pronounced with the increased opportunities for employment brought about by the war. The men know they can get work whenever they want it, however indifferent their behaviour may be, and as a result there is an absolute lack of discipline. I am confident that the root of all the trouble is drink, and the high scale of wages now ruling, instead of acting as an inducement to increased effort, tends to produce the opposite effect, inasmuch as it enables the men to earn in a shorter time the amount of money they regard as sufficient for their immediate needs, and they are able to work fewer hours and spend more of their time drinking. I trust that in the national interest, and in the interest of the men themselves, it may be found possible to deal with this great and growing evil by a drastic reduction in the hours during which intoxicants may be sold, or, preferably, by absolute prohibition. If sailors can, and do, abstain from alcoholic refreshment while at sea, it does not seem unreasonable in a time of national urgency

that those whose work keeps them at home should do likewise. Pressure should be brought to bear, through the Licensing Justices, on the owners and tenants of licensed premises with a view to largely increasing the facilities for obtaining reasonable refreshment of a non-alcoholic character, as it would be unreasonable to prohibit the sale of intoxicants without providing reasonable substitutes. I have discussed the situation with a large number of employers of labour both on the docks and in the repair shops, and so far have failed to discover any who do not endorse my views. I gather from notices that have appeared in the public press that the officials of the Transport Workers' Union are also in sympathy with them.

Yours truly,
T. ROYDEN.

V.

Report from Director of Transports to the Third Sea Lord, dated 1st April, 1915.

Third Sea Lord,

I enclose extracts from reports from Naval Transport Officers at various ports in the United Kingdom indicating the extent to which drink is obstructing the progress of transport work.

I can only reiterate that the time now taken to prepare ships for service is a grave danger to the success of the naval and military operations, which depend so largely on efficient sea transport.

To-day I find a transport, required for urgent military service, to prepare for which would normally occupy seven days, will take twenty-two days to complete, in spite of every effort made to accelerate the work.

GRAEME THOMSON, *Director of Transports.*

I.—Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South Coast).

December 12	..	..	Seamen under influence of drink; captain and pilot clear ropes away, and take ship out themselves.
January 8	..	..	Men on shore all returned drunk; ship unable to put out to sea.
January 20	..	..	Men again drunk; much delay in putting out.
November 11	..	..	Firemen and seamen on shore return drunk; ship loses the tide.

Comments by Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South Coast).

1. Considerable drunkenness: prosecutions not pressed owing to circumlocution of the law and difficulty of obtaining conviction.

2. Recommends as an "excellent remedy" Naval Discipline Act for Transport Service instead of Merchant Shipping Act. Masters ask for this themselves.

3. Cases quoted taken from the twelve transports in port; if details were obtained from the twenty-three transports away, total number of offences would be proportionally greater.

This report is from an officer who will never make a complaint if he can possibly help it.—Graeme Thomson.

II.—Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (North West Coast).

The following points have been arrived at after consultation with the various firms engaged in Transport Service on the North West Coast:—

Restrictions are necessary; delay from drink notorious.

A large Coaling Company say:—

1. Some of the men begin to drink on receipt of wages on Saturday, hence Saturday afternoon "hands" contain a good proportion of men under influence of drink, so choice of men restricted.

2. Men engaged at 4 P.M. on Saturday for work early on Sunday, anticipating well-paid work on Sunday, drink freely in interval, turn up unfit, so ship is undermanned.

3. Every Saturday a certain number of men are dismissed for returning after meals drunk.

4. In event of any inevitable delay men go to public-house, and return long after proper time for resumption.

5. Many regular employees cannot be given important orders Friday or Saturday owing to drink; many stay off on Monday, and do not turn up till Tuesday morning.

III.—Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (Bristol Channel).

1. Increasingly difficult to get crews for transports owing to laziness, lack of discipline, and drunken habits.

2. Steamship (————) 21st March, 4 seamen, 20 firemen, 9 trimmers } absent;

she had to stop at ——— to obtain subsidiary labour.

Steamship (————) sailed 6 men short.
„ (————) „ 2 „
„ (————) „ 6 „
„ (————) had to take 16 men substitutes.

3. Crews, rather than dock labourers, are usually seen drunk, hence impossible to rely on ships leaving at stated times.

IV.—Report from Principal Naval Transport Officer (Bristol Channel).

1. Drink question in relation to transport service not so bad here as at other ports.

2. Drunkenness among *dock labourers*, chiefly amongst night shifts coming out at 6 A.M.

3. British *seamen* and *firemen* of mercantile marine chief offenders, *e.g.*, crew of steamship (————) unfit for work, officers have to do crews' work.

15th October to 3rd February—

Twenty-six ships delayed through desertions, &c., resulting in total delay of thirty-four days six hours—almost entirely due to drink. Since February behaviour much improved.

V.—Report from Divisional Naval Transport Officer (South-East).

Many cases wherein crews have failed to join their ships owing to drunkenness, though the men do not drink to excess in the docks themselves.

VI.—Report of Principal Naval Transport Officer (South Coast).

Transport work hampered by:—

1. Drunken members of crews miss ships, hence ships sail short-handed, or on occasion are prevented from sailing altogether.

2. Firemen return in drunken condition, hence they are unable to keep steam, causing speed to be seriously reduced with obvious dangers resulting—constantly occurring.

3. Dock labourers and coal porters, especially latter, knock off work early to get drunk before closing time.

(Original mailed May 3, 1915)

Duplicate

T 5131

Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople,&c.
Date of Report..May 3,1915. *Need not be returned.*
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.

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1. Dardanelles.

(a) On April 25-26, the British landed at four places:—
1. Ara Burnu (Ara Cape).
2. Sighin Déré (Sighin Valley).
3. Tékié, Téké, or Nikié Burnu (Téké Cape), on European side, and
4. Kum Kale, on Asiatic Side.

[I enclose a copy of a sort of relief view of the Dardanelles, from a local Turkish paper, on which these positions are marked. This view is copied from a view which originally appeared in the Liepzig "Illustrate Zeitung", after the naval action of March 18. Names of above points have been added however, and translations are written alongside, Kritia Tépé (Kritia Hill), and Kaba Tepe (Kaba Hill), referred to below, are also indicated (positions 5 and 6 respectively).].

(b) At Ara Burne (Ara Cape), position No.1, the British landed from 10,000 to 15,000 troops, under protection of a heavy protecting sheling of beach from ships, and proceeded inland to occupy Kaba Tépé (Kaba Hill), position No.6, two one half miles to N.E(d, about 100 feet high, which dominates Maidos and adjoining forts. When they had arrived at summit they were suddenly outflanked by Turks previously entrenched under brow of hill, and charged with bayonet. They were forced to retire, and lost from 1,000 to 5,000 killed, with proportionate loss in wounded and prisoners. The remainder re-embarked for the time being, but no other landing have since been effected. Fighting continues daily. The Turks admit British are still entrenched at foot of Kapa Tepe, but say all their efforts to capture the hills have been repulsed.

(c) At Sighin Dere (Sighin Valley), position No.2, and Tekie, Teke, or Nikie Burnu (Teke Cape) position No.3, from 25,000 to 40,000 troops were landed, and a combined assault made on Kritia, Kiritia, or Kirithia, Tepe (Kritia Hill) near Sed ul Bahr, which is about 750 feet high and dominate the Chanak forts. Fighting still continues. Final outcome not known. Losses not known. Turks also admit allies' troops are still on shore here, but say they have not taken Kritia Hill yet.

(d) At Kum Kale from 35,000 to 60,000 troops were landed and crossed river, but are said to have since been forced to retire, and re-embark. Facts are not known, known losses British 1,000 to 3,000, corresponding losses in wounded and prisoners. It is believed now that the landing here, the first day, was simply a feint, as nothing further has been heard of Kum Kale.

(e) Turkish losses, in above engagements, not known, but about 2,500 Turkish lightly wounded were brought to Constantinople, on two transports, on April 30., and two, or three, transports have been arriving with wounded, daily, ever since. Between 7,000 and 8,000 wounded have been brought in during the week.

(f) The wrecked British submarine, "E-15", is about 400 yards to southward of Kephez Burnu (Dardanos), and is partly visible above water.

(g) The Turkish troops, at Dardanelles, are ~~strictly~~ in good spirits, under command of Turkish Officers, (not Germans), well drilled, and enthusiastic, according to Captain R.H.Williams, C.A.C., U.S.Army, who

ENCLOSURE 2-1 JUN 22 1915 Naval War Coll.

Country.....Turkey. Place.....Constantinople,&c.
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.
Date of Report.....May 3,1915.

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has just been at Dardanos two days,and saw the fiercest part of the landing operations. Captain Williams saw a great deal of importance,but cannot divulge anything in accordance with arrangements under which he went, until after the war is over, or under certain conditions. HSB

(h) Three British submarines are said to have been sunk,or captured,in the Sea of Marmora, near Merefli,(about 40 miles above Gallipoli), during the past week.The prisoners from one of them were brought into Constantinople April 30. I have heard they came thru the Dardanelles Straits during the recent moonlight nights.

(i) The "Haraddin Barbarrossa" and "Torgut Reis" alternate on duty at the Dardanelles,one of them being there while the other overhauls and provides at the Golden Horn.They have been relieving each other about every week or so.

2. Black Sea.

(j) The Russian Fleet has continued bombarding various parts of the Turkish Black Sea Coast near the Bosphorus,and the past three days have bombarded the entrance itself, each day. The past week, the civilian inhabitants have been sent out of Buyukedere,on European side above Therapia,the same as they were from Beicos,on the other side, some time ago.Shots have fallen as far south as Therapia,and are of large caliber.No material injury has been done so far as known. On May 2d the Russian fleet sent up two balloons, apparently directing fleets fire. HSB HSB

3. Constantinople.

(k) Patrols are still maintained between Seraglio Point and Scutari,as previously reported;and recently,on two occasions,three small tugs were observed maintaining definite positions,at different places in this vicinity,apparently also on look out duty.This was before the three British submarines, known to be in the Sea of Marmora,were sunk or captured.

(l) Several of the larger Chirkets (=Bosphorus passenger steamers) have been taken over for use as trasnports the past week.

(m) On April 28 about 30 British and French prisoners were brought into Stamboul,and the same number was also brought in April 30.About 60 are said to have been brought in,in all. HSB

(n) Between 7,000 and 8,000 lightly wounded Turks have been brought in during past week,and taken to the different hospitals in city and vicinity.About 2,000 wounded have been arriving,daily,during past week.The transports first stop at Haida Pacha,(near Scutari,on Asiatic side),and,it is said,discharge their more seriously wounded at the hospital there; then they bring the others here.The very grave cases are said to be left at the Dardanelles of course

(o) The "Sultan Selim",(ex-German "Goeben"),stood down from Stenia at 7.30 p.m.,May 2,and stood in again and up Bosphorus at 4.30 a.m.,this morning,(May 3). She was escorted by a torpedo boat and destroyer. HSB

(p) A hostile aeroplane appeared over the outskirts of Constantinople,May 2,and dropped bombs and papers.

Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople,&c.
Report from U.S.S. SCORPION.
Date of Report....May 2,1915.

-o-o-o

May 6, 1915.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

~~June 28, 1915.~~

COPY.

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No. 9

NAVAL ATTACHE.

AMERICAN LEGATION.

PEKING.

580 9 207 JUL 7 1915

May 6, 1915.

From: Naval Attaché, Peking.

To: Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department (O.N.I.)

Subject: Naval Base at Hsiang Shan, Nimrod Sound, Chekiang Province.

1. The value of a naval base at Hsiang Shan has been realized for quite a while by the Chinese Government.

2. The Xhinese Navy has made an estimate of the construction of such a base, and appended hereto is a translation of the same.

C. T. HUTCHINS, Jr.

Lieut.Comdr., U.S.N.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

June 26, 1918.

No. 3

NAVAL ATTACHÉ.

AMERICAN LEGATION.

PEKING.

May 6, 1918.

From: Naval Attaché, Peking.

To: Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department (O.N.I.)

Subject: Naval Base at Heiung Shan, Tsingtao Bay, Shantung Province.

1. The value of a naval base at Heiung Shan has been realized for quite a while by the Chinese Government.

2. The Chinese Navy has made an estimate of the construction of such a base, and appointed Peiyang is a guard-ship of the same.

G. T. HUTCHINS, Jr.

Lieut.Comdr., U.S.N.

Need not be returned.

The following detailed estimate of the cost of labor and material for the construction of the proposed naval base at Hsiang Shan is respectfully submitted for Your Excellency's perusal.

Item 1. A sea-wall is to be built in an east and west direction,---length 5700 feet (6697.5 feet); 20 feet (23.5 feet); width at the bottom 12 feet (14.1 feet); width at the top 6 feet (7.05 feet); average width 9 feet (10.575 feet). The foundation of the wall to be faced with large concrete blocks of the following demensions:- 8 feet long, 4feet thick, and 4 feet wide. A total of 713 blocks. Labor in connection with same at six taels per block,----4278 taels. On top of the above mentioned concrete blocks, the wall to be faced with cut and dressed stone blocks 1 foot square and 2 feet long,---a total of 51,180 blocks at taels 2.50 per block, or 123,950 taels.

To cover the wall there will be needed 2,850 large blocks of stone 1 foot thick, 4 feet long, and 2 feet wide, at 8taels per block, or a total of 22,800 taels. The inside of the wall to be built of stone, that is, roughly quarried rock without regard the size. 10,260 fang (a fang is 1 foot thick and ten feet square, or 10 cubic feet). Taels 3.50 per fang, a total of 35,910 taels.

548 fang (10 cubic feet) of broken stone at 4 t taels per fang, or 2,192 taels.

365 fang (10 cubic feet) of sea sand at 3 taels per fang, or 1,095 taels.

6,100 barrels of cement, at taels 3.80 per barrel, or 23,180 taels.

The above mentioned three articles,---the broken stone, sea sand, and cement,--- are the necessary materials for making the 713 concrete blocks.

The entire wall, being 5700 feet long, with an average width of 9 feet and a height of 20 feet contains 1026 cubic fang (10,260 cubic feet).

Labor cost for building one cubic fang,--100 taels. Total labor for wall, 102,600 taels .

Cement for laying stones for the entire wall: 22 barrels for every cubic fang,---a total of 22,572 barrels, at taels 3.80 per barrel, or 85,773.60 taels.

2320 fang of sea sand (a fang is 10 cubic feet) at 3 taels per fang, or 6,960 taels.

20 wooden forms for moulding concrete blocks; labor and material,---total cost 670 taels.

Building a wooden bridge for use in connection with the construction of thesea wall andfor transporting materials for same; also removing this bridge when the whole work is completed.

Cost of labor, 1,200 taels.

Material for the bridge, which is 5700 feet long, and consists of 800 spans of 7 feet each.

2,500 pine poles for piles, 18 feet 7 inches long, at taels 2.40 each,---6,000taels.

170,000 square feet of pine planks (foreign) at taels .035 per square foot,---4,950 taels. (should be 5,950 taels).

Screws and nails, both included,---16,000 pounds at taels .08 per pound,---14,000 taels. (should be 1,280 taels).

Total for the above mentioned item,---

Construction of sea wall,-labor and materials

both included,---440,838.60 taels. (should be 427,838.60 taels).

Item 2. Filling in and laveling behind the sea wall an area 5700 feet long east and west and an average width of 1830 feet north and south, a total of 104,310 fang.

The top of the sea wall is to be 20 feet above the level of the foreshore (above low water level ?).

Filling in behind the sea wall,---1,251,720 fang (10 feet square by 1 foot thick) at an estimated cost for labor of taels .55 per fang,-total for labor 688,446 taels.

The total land reclaimed is 1,738.5 mu at a cost of taels 396.10 per mu for filling in. Total cost of the above mentioned item 2,-filling in behind the sea wall,- 688,446 taels.

Item 3. An iron pier 500 feet long east and west and 500 feet wide north and south? The face of the wharf to extend 26 feet above the surface of the water at low tide when there is a depth of 20 feet alongside the pier.

For the scheme of construction and the materials to be used, see the drawings.

The piles to be 3 feet square and of an average length of about 45 feet over all, is to be built up of 3/10 inch steel plates and filled with cement reinforced with 3 inch triangular steel bars.

Total number of piles,---180.

Steel "I" beam,---445.

Lattice girders for the side of the wharf,---534.

Labor and material as follows:-

Steel plates 3/10 inch thick, 3 feet wide 12 feet long,---1,330,000 pounds at taels .038 per pound. 50,540 taels.

3-inch triangular steel bars,---880,000 pounds at taels 3.80 per 100 pounds. 33,440 taels.

3 1/2-inch triangular steel bars,---187,000 pounds at taels 3.80 per 100 pounds. 7,106 tael

2 by 4 inch "T" bars,---154,000 pounds at taels 3.38 per 100 pounds. 5,205.20 taels.

Rivets,---458,800 pounds at taels 4.69 per 100 pounds. 21,517.72 taels.

Steel "I" beams,---300,000 pounds at taels 3.38 per 100 pounds. 10,140 taels.

Flat iron bars, 2 2/10 inches wide by 2/10 inch thick,---65,000 pounds at taels 3.65 per 100 pounds. 2,372.50 taels.

Iron plates, 11 1/2 inches wide by 2/10 inch thick,--39,000 pounds at taels 3.00 per 100 pounds. 1,170 taels.

iron plates for the wharf face,--553,000 pounds at taels 3.38 per 100 pounds. 18,691.40 taels.

Cement,---55 (5,500?) barrels at taels 3.80 per barrel. 20,900 taels.

Broken stone,---353 fang (1foot thick by 10 feet square) at taels 4.00 per fang. 1,412 taels.

Sea sand,---262 fang (1foot thick by 10 feet aquare) at taels 3.00 per fang. 786 taels.

Fitting fenders to three sides of the wharf. Total length of 1,360 feet for say 50 fenders. Labor and material 3,000 taels.

Mooring bollards,---10. Weight,2,000 pounds.

70 taels.. (700 taels?).

Iron rail stanchions,---720. Each 3 feet long and 1.2 inches in diameter and weighing 21 pounds. Total 15,120 pounds at taels .10 per pound. 1,512 taels.

Rail stanchion sockets,---720. Total of 5,760 pound 691.20 taels.

Galvanized iron chain for the railing,---4,000 feet weighing 3,600 pounds. 432 taels. (4,320 taels?)

Ladders,---4 Total of 1,200 taels.

Boat davits,---4 sets. 8 iron davits and 16 blocks and falls complete. 1000 taels.

Lamps for the wharf with posts,---10. 200 taels.

Painting the entire wharf three times. 1500 taels.

For the above mentioned Item 3.

For materials 182,886.02 taels

For labor 133,800.00 taels

Toxtal for laber & material 316,686.02 taels.

In all cases when building an iron pier on the foreshore, it is necessary to build a rough wooden wharf frrst for the use of the workmen, and when the work of of construction is finished and the iron wharf completed, the wooden wharf is entirely removed.

This Item is abcolutely necessary.

Total cost for labor and material, 4,000 taels.

Item 4. On the edge of the wharf a pair of shear legs to be erected, together with necessary machinery for same, for handling machinery and guns requiring repairs and for like usage.

The shears to be 100 feet high and capable of lifting 60 tons, and to consist of 3 legs instead of having rope backstays.

The engine, boiler, and ~~whixxx~~ winch to be located in rear of the shears.

The blocks and falls to have a capacity of 60 tons; the latter to be wire rope and of a length suitable for the shears; all complete. (Investigation shows that this item must be purchased abroad)
Total cost 45,000 taels.

Item5: A machine shop for making all kinds of minor repairs.
A building 200 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet high at the eaves; inside measurements. In all, 80 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang for labor and material.
Total cost 11,300 taels. (11,200 taels?)
Equipment for machine shop as follows:-
About 60 machine tools of various kinds and sizes.
Total cost 120,000 taels.
Nippers, pliers, tongs, etc., assorted sizes. 40 in all. Total cost 320 taels.
Shafting, pulleys, and belting.
Total cost 25,000 taels.
A shop engine of about 80 nominal horse-power, with the boiler for same. Total cost 17,000 taels.
Total cost of item 5, labor and material. 173,520Tael

Item 6. Boiler shop.
A building 150 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet high at the eaves; inside measurements.
In all, 60 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang for labor and material.
Total cost 8,400 taels.
Equipment for boiler shop as follows:-
1 combined punch and shears. 3,500 taels.
1 reamer 1,200 taels
1 plate rolls 5,500 taels,
1 cast iron bending slab, 10 feet wide by 20 feet long, built up of 4 sections. 260 Taels.

1 blower 1,500 taels.

6 forges 90 taels

6 anvils 78 taels.

60 hammers of assorted sizes 90 taels.

Total cost of Item 6, labor and material.

20,858 taels. (20,618 taels?)

Item 7. Blacksmith shop.

A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18feet high at the eaves; inside measurements.

In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang for labor and material.

Total cost 5,600 taels.

Equipment for blacksmith shop as follows:-

1 2-ton steam hammer. 4,000 taels.

1 1-ton steam hammer 2,000 taels.

10 anvils 150 taels.

4 cast iron slabs 160 taels.

12 forges 180 taels.

1 blower 800 taels.

50 hammers ofaassorted sizes 100 taels.

Total cost of item 7, labor and material?

12,990 taels.

Item 8. Brass and iron foundry.

A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet high at the eaves; inside measurement.

In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang for labor and material.

Total cost 5,600 taels.

Equipment for ~~melting~~ foundry as follows:-

1 crane 5,000 taels

1 cupola for melting iron 2,000 taels.

1 blower for same 1,900 taels.

Total cost of item 8, labor and material.

14,500 taels.

Item 9. Coppersmith shop.

A building 60 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet high at the eaves; inside measurements. In all, 24 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang for labor and material.

Total cost 3,360 taels.

Equipment for coppersmith shop as follows:-

Nippers, pliers, tongs, etc., in all, 10. 80 taels.

1 forge 15 taels

30 hammers, asserted sizes 45 taels.

Total cost of item 9, labor and material, 3,500 taels.

Item 10. Woodworking shop.

A building 100 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 18 feet high at the eaves; inside measurements. In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang for labor and material.

Total cost 5,600 taels.

Item 11. Main boiler house.

A building 100 feet long 40 feet wide, and 18 feet high at the eaves; inside measurements. In all, 40 fang, at a cost of 140 taels per fang for labor and material.

Total cost 5,600 taels.

Item 12. Chimney

A chimney 120 feet high.

Total cost for labor and material. 3,400 taels

Item 13. Store houses.

To consist of three buildings. The main building to be 90 feet long east and west, 30

Item 9.

Item 10.

Item 11.

Item 12.

Item 13.

feet wide north and south, and 2 stories high. Each side building to be 90 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 1 story high.

In all, 108 fang for the three buildings, at a cost of 115 taels per fang for labor and material. Total cost for labor and material. 12,420 taels.

tem 14. Coal storage.

4 coal store houses, each 250 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 16 feet high at the eaves. In all, 400 fang for the 4 buildings, at a cost of 85 taels per fang for labor and material.

Total cost 34,000 taels.

Storage capacity for the 4 buildings about 1,000 tons (10,000 tons?)

4 stone-walled enclosures, with a storage capacity of 2,500 tons of coal each,- a total of 10,000 tons. Each enclosure to have 100 fang of storage ground.

Total cost 27,200 taels.

Total cost of Item 14, labor and material. 61,200 taels.

Item 15. Office buildings.

Director's office and residence to consist of about 40 chien, at an estimated cost for labor and material of 300 taels per chien.

Total cost 12,000 taels.

Item 16. Quartes for the staff.

About 100 chien, at an estimated cost for labor and material of 200 taels per chien.

Total cost 20,000 taels.

Item 17. Workmen's drelliings.

About 200 chien, at an estimated cost for labor

and material of 150 taels per chein?

Total cost 30,000 taels.

Item 18. Naval Headquarters.

Not yet definitely decided upon.

Estimate for labor and material, including furnishing same. 100,000 taels.

Item 19. Water works.

Laying fresh water mains and building reservoir and water tower. Estimated cost of about 120,000 taels.

Item 20. Light railway.

To be used for transporting earth and coal. Total length 7,500 feet, at a cost for labor and material of 26.80 taels for 10 feet.

Total cost 20,100 taels.

16 iron cars for same at a cost of 90 taels percar 1,440 taels.

Total cost of item 20, labor and material 21,540 taels.

Item 21. Working qquipment.

A mat shed and certain machinery and tools, as listed below, must be obtained before the work of building the sea wall and wharf is begun. A rough mat shed 400 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 14 feet high to the eaves.

In all, 160 fang, at an estimated cost of 90 taels per fang. 1,440 taels.

1 boiler 5 feet in diameter and 20 feet long, iron smoke stack, and all complete including a small feed pump 2,600 taels

1 horizontal engine of about 80 horse-power (20 nominal horse-power) 3,500 taels.

75 feet of 2.7 inch shafting in 7 sections. Also 7

7 hangers assorted belting, and 10 pulleys
1,500 taels

1 pump with 1 1/2 inch discharge 1,800 taels.

1 steam driven combined punch and shears. (not belt driven) 3,600 taels.

5 hand-pwoer punches 1,500 taels.

1 reamer 600 taels.

1 drill press 1,000 taels.

1 large lathe & 1 small lathe 2,000 taels.

4 forges 48 Taels

6 anvils 72 taels

60 wooden bellows, various sizes 240 taels

2 cast iron slabs 8feet by 4 feet 320 taels.

100 hammers, assorted sizes 200 taels

20 dozen files, assorted sizes 200 taels

1 grindstone, 4feet in diameter, with tank belt, and pulley all complete 180 taels

1 cement mixing machine 750 taels.

1 diving suit (outfit?); outside rubber suit, 2 small garments, and rubber cloth for repairs
1,500 taels.

2 machines for pouring cement 500 taels

2 road scrappers (?) 600 taels

12 wooden double blocks, laarge and small 48 taels

4 pile drivers (?),-2 steam and 2 hand 3,200taels

2 small vertcal boilers, with 2 small feed pumps 3,600 taels

2 4-ton differential purchases at 35 taels each
70 taels.

4 3-ton do do at 30 taels each
120 taels

8 2-ton do do at 22 taels each
176 taels

4 1-ton do do at 14 taels each
56 taels

2 1/2-ton do do at 10 taels each
20 taels

1,000 feet 3-inch wire rope, weighing about 15 pounds per 10 feet (?) at taels .23 per pound 345 taels

1 coil 2-inch coir rope,- 89 pounds to the coil at taels .25 per pound 22.25 taels

2 coils 3-inch coir rope,-198 pounds to the coil at taels .25 per pound 99.50 taels

1 coil 4-inch coir rope,-408 pounds to the coil at taels .25 per pound 102.00taels

1 coil 4-inch tarred rope,- 418 pounds to the coil at taels .24 per pound 100.32 taels

100 steel shovels

70 at taels .67 a piece

30 at taels 1.10 a piece 79.80 taels (79.90 taels?)

200 pickaxes 150 taels

Assorted kinds and sizes of round and flat iron and round and square steel for making tools 3,000 taels

A small stone pier to be first built for use in handing materials 3,500 taels

The various items of material specially needed for the construction of the sea wall and of the wharf are required when the work is begun.

Total cost of Item 21, labor and material 51,918.87 taels

Grand total of the above enumerated 21 items required to begin the work 2,199,967.49 taels.

Item 22. Mooring buoys.

Laying down 10 mooring buoys in the harbor at a cost of 3,500 taels per buoy 35,000 taels.

Item 23. Dry docks.

Dry dock No.1. 500 feet long inside, 90 feet wide at the entrance, and 15 feet over the blocks at low water. Pumping machinery, boilers, and smokestack

350,000 taels.

Dry dock No. 2. 300 feet long inside, 40 feet wide at the entrance, and 10 feet over the blocks at low water. Pumping machinery, boilers, and smoke-stack 250,000 taels.

Dry dock No.3. 240 feet long inside, 40 feet wide at the entrance, and 5 feet over the blocks at low water. Pumping machinery, boilers and smakestack 150,000 taels.

This dock is especially for docking torpedo-boats and small crafts

After the docks are completed, the several shops will be added to and additional tools installed, the estimated approximate cost for this being about 80 taels (800,000?)

Total cost of item 23 , labor and material.

1,550,000 taels.

Careful estimates of the cost to build the sea-wall on the foreshore and the cost to build it on the rice fields are as follows:-

On the foreshore.

Building the sea-wall and filling in,- 2 items.

Total cost 1,129,284 taels.

1738.5 mo of land to be levelled off at a cost of 647.30 taels per mo.

On the rice fields at Hsi Shan

Cost of filling in. 479,357.70 taels.

672 mo of land to be levelled off at a cost of 713.33 taels per mo.

As a result of this comparision it is seen that if the rice fields are used there will be a saving of 650,000 taels.

Also it will avoid many difficulties in connection with the work.

A mo of cultivated land costs about 50 taels. Labor for filling in costs about 180 taels per mo. The rice fields have to be filled in to a height of 5 ft, and each mo of ground takes 300 fang of earth.

Summary of the foregoing items.

Item	1.	Building the sea-wall	Taels.	440,838.60 (427838.60?)
Item	2	Filling in behind the sea-wall		688,446.00
Item	3	Building iron wharf		356,636.02
Item	4	Shear legs		45,000.00
Item	5	Machine shop		173,520.00
Item 6	6	Boiler shop		20,585.00
Item	7	Blacksmith shop		12,990.00
Item	8	Brass and iron foundry		14,500.0
Item	9	Coppersmith shop		3,500?00
Item	10	Woodworking shop		5,600.00
Item	11	Main boiler house		5,600. 0
Item	12	Chimney		3,400.00
Item	13	Store houses		12,420.00
Item	14	Coal storage (including enclosures)		61,200.00
Item	15	Office buildings		12,000.00
Item	16	Quarters for the staff		20,000.00
Item	17	Workmen's dwellings		30,000.00
Item	18	Naval Headquarters		100,000.00
Item	19	Water works		120,000.00
Item	20	Light railway		21,540.00
Item	21	Working equipment		51,918.67
Total for the above enumerated 21 items required to begin the work			Taels	2,199,967.49
Item	22	Mooring buoys		35,000.00
Item	23	Dry docks		1,550,000.00



(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) *Need not be returned.* 5

MAY 23 1915
RECEIVED
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT Present Constitution of Italian Fleet. .7

From T *No.* 104. *Date* May 7, 1915.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ——— *Date* ———

ENCLOSURE 1-1
JUN 8 1915
Naval War College

1. As well as can be determined with war imminent the following is the present constitution of the Italian fleet. This allows for the dreadnought Duilio which, from all reports, can join at any moment.

2. The assignment of destroyers to divisions is impossible, as no information has been given out since last July.

1st. Squadron

Commander-in-Chief, S.A.R. il Duca degli Abruzzi,
Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Cito,
Flagship - Conte di Cavour.

1st.Division.	3d.Division.	5th.Division.
-Rear-Admiral Corsi.-	-Rear-Admiral Trifari-	-R.Admi.Cervin-
Dante Alighieri	Garibaldi	Brin
Leonardo da Vinci	Ferruccio	E.Filiberto
Giulio Cesare	Varese	Saint Bon
Duilio.	V. Pisani.	Carlo Alberto.

2d. Squadron

Commander-in-Chief, Vice Admiral Presbitero,
Chief of Staff, ?
Flagship - Regina Margherita.

2d. Division.	4th. Division.
-Rear-Admiral Cutinelli-	-Rear-Admiral Cagni-
Regina Elena	San Marco
Napoli	Pisa
Vittorio Emanuele	San Giorgio
Roma.	Amalfi.

Division of Scouts

Nino Bixio
Quarto
Marsala.

Destroyers
(37)

Alpino	Bersagliere	Indomito
Aquilone	Borea	Impavido
Artigliere	Carabiniere	Intrepido
Ardito	Corazziere	Impetuoso
Ardente	C.Rossarol	Irrequieto
Audace	Dardo	Insidioso
Animoso	Espero	Lampo
Ascaro	Euro	Lanciere
A;Poerio	Fuciliere	Nembo
	Fulmine	Ostro
	F.Nullo	Pontiere
	Garibaldino	Strale
	Granatiere	Turbine
	Guglielmo Pepe	Zeffiro.

No change in Torpedo-Boats.

Submarines
(21)

Delfino	Volella	Jalea
Glauco	Medusa	Jantina
Squalo	Argo	Zoea
Narvalo	Fisalia	G.Pullino
Otaria	Salpa	G.Ferraris
Trichoco	Nautilus	Atropo
Foca	Nereide	Argonauta.

580 / 7 / 175 ENCLOSURE 3-1 MAY 27 1915 War Coll.

Asterisk (*) designates Austrian vessels; all others are German.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

BUREAU OF NAVIGATION

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1915.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN VESSELS IN PORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Name	Gross tons	Net tons	Passengers	Crew	Speed	At	Owner
Vaterland	54282	23548	2264	923	24 -	New York, N.Y.	Hamburg-American.
George Washington	25570	15379	2755	525	19 -	do.	North German Lloyd.
Amerika	22622	13637	2567	541	17½	Boston, Mass.	Hamburg-American.
Kronprinzessin Cecilie	19503	6584	1576	650	23½	do.	North German Lloyd.
Kaiser Wilhelm II	19361	6353	1593	655	23½	New York, N.Y.	do.
President Lincoln	18168	11171	2751	305	14½	do.	Hamburg-American.
President Grant	18072	11112	3503	292	14½	do.	do.
Cincinnati	16339	9733	2449	370	15½	Boston, Mass.	do.
Pennsylvania	13333	8527	2671	222	13½	New York, N.Y.	do.
Grosser Kurfurst	13102	7881	1965	260	15½	do.	North German Lloyd.
Bulgaria	11440	7218				Baltimore, Md.	Hamburg-American.
Barbarossa	10984	6463	1838	215	14 -	New York, N.Y.	North German Lloyd.
Prinzess Irene	10893	6443	1930	235	15½	do.	do.
Friedrich der Grosse	10771	6585	1827	215	14½	do.	do.
Hamburg	10531	6420	1382	232	16 -	do.	Hamburg-American
Rhein	10058	6398	2080	155	13 -	Baltimore, Md.	North German Lloyd.
Neckar	9835	6200	1920	170	14 -	do.	do.
Konig Wilhelm II	9410	5764		172	15½	New York, N.Y.	Hamburg American.
Bohemia	8414	5248			13 -	do.	do.
*Martha Washington	8312	5379	1101	250	17 -	do.	Unione Austriaca.
Koln	7409	4666	656	105	12½	Boston, Mass.	North German Lloyd.
*Dora	7037	4536			13 -	New York, N.Y.	Unione Austriaca.
Pennsylvania	6600	4141		81	12½	Philadelphia.	Hamburg-American.
*Erny	6515	4171			13 -	Boston, Mass.	Unione Austriaca.
Prinz Oskar	6026	3777	1045	104	13 -	Philadelphia.	Hamburg-American.
Wittekind	5640	3607	1265	90	12	Boston, Mass.	North German Lloyd.
Ockenfels	5621	3452		69		do.	Hansa.
Armenia	5464	3386	978	44		New York, N.Y.	Hamburg American.
Arcadia	5454	3412		44		Norfolk, Va.	do.
Adamsturm	5000	3159		66		New York, N.Y.	Hansa.
Elsa	4967	3148	1148	42	12	do.	Hamburg-American.
*Himalaia	4948	3152				do.	D.Tripovich S.S.Co.
*Morawitz	4795	3106				Galveston, Tex.	Atlantica Sea Nav.Co.
Willehad	4761	3012	1071	91	12	Boston, Mass.	North German Lloyd.
Prinz Joachim	4760	2981		96	13 -	New York, N.Y.	Hamburg-American.
Serapis	4756	3068		43		San Francisco.	Kosmos Line.
Prinz August Wilhelm	4733	2975		101	13 -	New York, N.Y.	Hamburg-American.

Name	Gross tons	Net tons	Passengers	Crew	Speed	At	Owner
*Ida	4730	3093			12	New York, N.Y.	Unione Austriaca.
Prinz Eitel Friedrich	4650	2921	62		12	do.	Hamburg-American.
*Franconia	4637	3019				Philadelphia.	D.Tripovich S.S.Co.
Allemannia	4630	2915	82		13-	New York, N.Y.	Hamburg-American.
Marburg	4472	2837				do.	Deutsche-Australische
Saxonia	4424	2782	48			Seattle, Wash.	Hamburg American.
*Clare	3932	2541				New Orleans,La.	Unione Austriaca.
Kassovia	3902	2475	44			New York, N.Y.	Hamburg American.
*Teresa	3769	2381				New Orleans,La.	Unione Austriaca.
*Budapest	3651	2321				Norfolk, Va.	Atlantic Sea Nav. Co.
*Campania	3551	2267				Galveston, Tex.	D.Tripovich S.S.Co.
Hohenfelde	2974	1867	37			Savannah, Ga.	Kissle & Gunther MFLG.
Portonia	2778	1744	28			New York, N.Y.	Dampschiffs Reed Horn Atk.
Maia	2555	1635	20			do.	Holm and Molsen.
Clara Mennig	1685	1005				do.	Otto Zelch.
Anna	1575	959				New Orleans,La.	Unione Austriaca.
Neptun	197	131				San Francisco.	Joliet.
Pommern	6557	4086			12½	Honolulu.	North German Lloyd.
C. J. D. Ahlers	7490	4737				Hilo	Hansa.
Prinz Waldemar	3227	1737			12	Honolulu.	North German Lloyd.
Setos	4730	3084				do.	Kosmos.
Holsatia	5649	3533				do.	Hamburg-American.
Locksun	1657	1020				do.	North German Lloyd.
Loong Moon	1971	1245				do.	Hamburg-American.
Staatssekretar Kraetke	2009	1208			12	do.	do.
Governeur Jaeschke	1738	1045				do.	do.
*Lucia	6744	4386			13 -	Pensacola.	Unione Austriaca.
Rudolph Blumberg	1769	1077				do.	Leonardt & Blumberg.
Vogesen	3716	2357				do.	H. Vogemann.
Frieda Leonhardt	2822	1818				Jacksonville.	Leonhardt & Blumberg.
*Borneo	3621	2337				Tampa, Fla.	Soc. Anon.Ungherese di Armamento Maritt. Orient
Edenwald	3537	2098				San Juan, P.R.	Hamburg-American Line.
69 vessels	530,835	308,503	42,135	7,685			

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1906.)

Need not be returned.

MAY 25 1915
RECEIVED
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

5
8
(3)

SUBJECT Fortifications of Taranto - Italy.

From T No. 105. Date May 8, 1915.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ——— Date ———

580
9
180
ENCLOSURE 3-3
JUN 3 1915
Naval War College

1. The fortifications of Taranto are complete with the exception of 3 new batteries, which I hear from good authority are under construction - 4, 10 and 20 meters, respectively S. or S-E from Cape San Vito. These, I understand, are off shore - but no details are available.

2. Besides the forts there have been constructed submerged breakwaters as shown on the attached sketch. These breakwaters enclose the harbor except between the island of St. Paolo and the shoal of San Vito.

3. All mines,etc, are stored in the old castle.

4. Fortifications as follows:

Rondinella Pt.		4 to 8	28 cm. howitzers on circular mounting;
St.Pietro	Is.	6 to 8	28 cm. howitzers.
St.Paolo	Is.	4 -	28 cm. " under shields;
		3 -	119 ton Bl. Krupp in Gruson turret;
		4 -	6" guns on naval mountings;
		2 -	120 cm. guns.
C.San Vito		8 -	28 cm. howitzers.
Castello		8 -	57 mm.
"		4 -	37 mm.
Shore battery		4 -	120 mm. behind shields in earthworks.

Encl. 1.

6

FORTIFICATIONS

TARANTO

MAY 1915

MONTINELLA Pt.

4 TO 8 - 28 CM. HOWR.

BREAKWATER

6 - 8 cm HOW.

TRO-
IS

BREAKWATER

St. PAOLO

8 CM. HOW.

TON B.L. KRUPP
CANNON TURRET.

4 - 6" GUNS.
NAVAL MOUNTINGS

MARE GRANDE

MARE
PICCOLO

TARANTO

CASTELO

8-57 mm
4-37 mm

OIL
COAL

XXXI
Aeroplane
Hangars

4 - 120 mm
SHIELDS

BREAKWATER

SAN VITO
SHOAL.

C. SAN VITO

8 - 28 CM. HOW.

3 BATTERIES
UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

5
See map of Venice in back of the binder. 10
(1)

SUBJECT Fortifications of Venice and Precautions against attack.

Need not be returned.
MAY 23 1915
RECEIVED
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

From T No. 106. Date May 10, 1915.

Replying to O. N. 1. No:——— Date ———

580/9/183
ENCLOSURE 5-3
JUN 7 1915
Naval War College

1. I forward herewith the very latest information I have been able to compile on the fortifications of Venice and various military precautions taken against attack. The Italians consider Venice a very vulnerable spot, although an ideal base for torpedo craft for naval operations in the Adriatic. The forts have been lately overhauled, and many new batteries have been installed. It is believed that the below list of guns is substantially correct.

2. As regards precautions against attack, I learn that wire network has been placed over the entire inner basin and over all shops and submarines under construction. This is within the Arsenale where no foreign Attachés have been permitted since August last. All works of art have been removed.

3. There have been mounted on tracks along Cavallino shoal many aeroplane guns of French manufacture, and I believe the same has been done alongthe Lido.

4. Fortifications:

All forts and batteries will be found marked in red ink on the attached tracing and numbered:

(1) Cavallino Shoal: Two - 30.5 cm. 30 Cal. / Four- 15 cm. modern Q.F. — Battery completed in 191[illegible].

(2) Fort. San Andrea: Six - 15 cm. Q.F.

(3) Regia Marina: Two - 30.5 cm. B.L. guns — Arc of fire between S. [illegible] and E.S.E.

(x) (4) Fort. Tre Porte: Six - 24 cm. B.L. howitzers; / Four- 15 cm. — This battery may have been moved.

(5) Fort. San Erasmo: Six - 6 inch Q.F. in shields. — Probably mounted on Southern end of island.

(6) Fort. San Nicolo': Three - 30.5 cm. B.L. howitzers
Four - 75 mm. Q.F.
Four - 15 cm. B.L. & Q.F.
Four - 12 cm. Q.F.
Four - 75 mm. Q.F.
Two - 15 cm. siege guns on wheel-carriages.

(x) Not shown on chart -

(7) Lido Chemmol Battery: Four - 57 m. { Commanding Lido Chemmol.

(8) Fort Cesa-Bianca: { 2 Turrets - 2 - 30cm. Cal. 45
4 - 24 cm. 30 Cal.

(9) Fort Malamocco: 1 - 24 cm. Howitzers.

(10) Fort. San Leonardo: Six - 24 cm. B.L. Howitzers.

(11) Fort. Alberoni: Six - 24 cm. guns.

(12) Fort. Enrico Dori: { Two - 30.5 cm B.L. 50 cal. mounted singly in turrets.
Six - 24 cm. B.L. Guns.

(13) Fort. San Pietro: Four- 15 cm. B.L.

(14) Fort. Santo Stefano: Eight- 21 cm. B.L. guns.

(15) Fort. Caroman: Four - 4 - 15 cm. howitzers.

(16) Fort. Brondolo: Montyfour - 1[illegible] cm. guns 5 miles south Caroman

Encl. 1.

Archives
N.W.C. No 1915/107 5 .10 (2)

100 copies made June 3, 1915 and one given to each officer at W.C.

Office of Naval Intelligence, Page 1.

May 10, 1915. NHL

CONFIDENTIAL.

ENCLOSURE 1-1 MAY 17 1915 Naval War College
5580/9/15

From: Lt.(j.g.) J. H. Klein,
To: Chief of Operations,
via Director of Naval Intelligence.

SUBJECT: Battle Practice - Discussion.

1. In reading over and studying the "Operations" of the various warring nations (the filing of which is assigned to my desk) I have been more than surprised to note the extreme ranges at which hits are now being made by both the English and the German men-o-war. In this paper I have tried to condense the data and the lessons deduced from these Operations abroad and to present them for your consideration with special reference to the form of Battle Practise as conducted in our Navy. Regardless of the manner in which these suggestions may be received, I shall feel more than thankful if any small amount of discussion be begun which will work toward the increasing of our Gunnery Efficiency in order to fit us to cope with vessels that seem to be able to make hits at hitherto unheard of ranges.

This discussion can best be divided into the following main topics.

I. Lessons drawn from the present War.
II. Notes on English and German Battle Practices.
III. Comparison with United States Navy.
IV. Battle Practice U.S.Navy.
(a) Range
(b) Speed
(c) Weather Conditions.
V. Conclusion.

As much of the information concerning affairs abroad is "Confidential", it is most urgently requested that none of these notes be given out.

I. Lessons drawn from Present War.

Of all the engagements which have taken place to date, only the following three major operations are cited, as these are the only ones in which two fleets of nearly the same strengths have engaged each other.

Action of January 24, 1915,
or
"Sinking of Blücher".

English Fleet	German Fleet
1.LION(Flag)(B.C.)28.5 kts-8-13"5	1.Derflinger(Flag)(B.C.) 30 kts.- 8-12".
2.TIGER (B.C.) 30 kts.-8-13"5	2.MOLTKE (B.C.)27.2 kts-10-11".
3.PRINCESS ROYAL(B.C.) 28.5 kts.- 8-13"5.	3.SEYDLITZ(B.C.)29 kts.-10-11".
4.NEW ZEALAND(B.C.)26.4 kts-8-12".	4.BLUCHER(A.C.)25.8 kts. - 12-8"2.
5.INDOMITABLE(B.C.)27.3 kts.8-12".	
Speed - 26.4 to 30 kts.-Full	Speed-25.8 to 30 kts.-Full
Guns - 24 - 13"5	Guns - 8-12"
16 - 12"	20-11"
	12-8"2

Sea Smooth

British fired single 13"5 ranging shots (8.53-9.09 A.M.) at 20,000 yds.-one of which hit. INDOMITABLE lagging behind. NEW ZEALAND exceeding contract speed.Fleet speed 29 to 30 knots. Began salvoes at (9:20 A.M.)18000 yds.PRINCESS ROYAL opens on BLUCHER 17500 yds.BLUCHER hit at about this range.Many German shells hit but did not explode.

Germans open fire 18000 yds. and minimum range 16,400 yds. Average range reported 17000 yds.BLUCHER hit.Shell penetrated decks and explodod in fire-room,putting 4 boilers out of commission.Direct cause of lagging behind and becoming prey to smaller ships.Finally sunk by torpedo at very short range after resistance ceased.

Tactics.

English maneuvred to catch up and then hold position so as to keep just out of range of 11" and 12" guns of Germans.

Tactics.

Using full speed to escape - trying to return to Helgoland or get behind mine-fields.

Both fleets steaming in column, courses practically parallel,(about E.S.E.)

English Fleet withdrew-said to have done so to avoid mine-fields, However,the 2nd in command,R.Ad. Moore was later relieved of command for not pursuing Germans farther.

Note:-British Battle Instructions provide that when 5 ships engage 4 ships, No.1 and 2 British, concentrate on No.1 enemy; No.3, fires on enemy No.2; No.4 on enemy No.3; and No. 5 on enemy No. 4.

During this fight, INDOMITABLE(No.5) fell behind-could not make the Fleet speed. LION (No.1) fired on DERFLINGER(No.1).

TIGER(No.2) fired on DERFLINGER(No.1)as per instructions.

PRINCESS ROYAL (No.3) fired on SEYDLITZ (No.3), assuming INDOMITABLE out of position.

NEW ZEALAND(No.4) fired on BLUCHER(No.4), assuming INDOMITABLE out of position.

INDOMITABLE (No.5) fired on BLUCHER (No.4).
(when she caught up)

As a result, MOLTKE(No.2) escaped almost untouched and probably inflicted most of the damage on LION and TIGER.

Results

Damage to LION - one shell struck engine room below armor;(caused her withdrawal from fight), one shell exploded in forward torpedo room;one exploded on armor belt and loosened plate.Hit about 24 times.

Damage to TIGER - more general than to LION, but not as serious.Details lacking.Hit 14 times,nearly all in upper works.

NEW ZEALAND,PRINCESS ROYAL and INDOMITABLE damage not known, if any, very slight.

BLUCHER-eventually sunk, Armor not pierced until near end.Neither engine room damaged when she sank.

SEYDLITZ hit abaft 11" turret by long range 13"5 shot and explosion ignited 4000 kilos powder. Evidently penetrated vicinity

handling room as entire personnel of turret and handling room killed by burns (34 men). No reports on further damage.

No report on nature of damage to DERFLINGER.

MOLTKE probably escaped with very slight damage, if any at all.

Gunnery Lessons: English made single 13"5 hits at 20,000 yards and landed salvoes at 18,000 yds, while steaming at full speed. BLUCHER hopelessly outranged. Long range hit on BLUCHER made her easy prey to faster English cruisers.

Germans inflicted some damage at long ranges (averaging 17,000 yds.) with 11" and 12" guns, while steaming full speed.

German report states minimum range - 16,405 yds.(15000 metres).

Action of December 8, 1914.

"Falkland Islands."

This action consisted of a series of duels, but for the purposes of this paper, only the main action between the INVINCIBLE and INFLEXIBLE versus SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU need be considered.

English		Germans	
INVINCIBLE(B.C.)	28 kts.8-12".	SCHARNHORST(A.C.)	22.7 kts.8-8".2
INFLEXIBLE(B.C.)	27.2 kts.8-12".	GNEISENAU(A.C.)	23.5 kts.8-8"2.
Guns-16-12"		Guns-16-8"2	
Speed-Practically full speed throughout.		Speed-Full speed attempting to escape.	
Tactics-Maneuvred so as to (1)get within 12" range (2)keep outside 8"2 range.		Tactics-(1)Attempted to escape (2)Changed course frequently to throw off English spotting.	

Sea - Smooth

Weather-Clear and Fair.

Range - 13,500 yds. to 16,500 yds.

Battle commenced 12:55 p.m.
INVINCIBLE developed about 29 knots.
INVINCIBLE and INFLEXIBLE said to have fired 800 rounds 12" apiece.(Not confirmed)
INVINCIBLE first hit at about 16,000 yds.INVINCIBLE hit between 20 and 30 times during battle.
No serious material damage.No personnel losses.Damage INFLEXIBLE not known.

SCHARNHORST sank 4:17 p.m.
GNEISENAU sank 6:00 p.m.
" ran out of ammunition about 4:30.

Gunnery Lesson:-The British made sufficient 12" hits to sink 2 armored cruisers at from 13,500 yds.to 16,500 yds. while both fleets were steaming full speed. The reported unusually heavy expenditure of ammunition may be due in a great measure to the tactics of the Germans in changing course frequently and to the fact that the entire battle was fought at long ranges.

The Germans made from 20 to 30 hits with 8"2 guns at ranges of from 13500 yds.to 16500 yds., while steaming at full speed. The slight material damage to English is due not to faulty German gunnery, but to the great ranges at which these shell were fired.

Note:-The SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU were both gunnery trophy ships.

Action of Nov.1, 1914.

"Coronel Chili."

This action was virtually a duel between SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU versus GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH. GLASGOW and OTRANTO escaped. Small German cruisers inflicted little damage.

German		English	
SCHARNHORST(A.C.)	22.7 kts.	8-8"2	GOOD HOPE(C) 23 kts.	2-9"2-16-6"
GNEISENAU(A.C.)	23.5 kts.	8-8"2	MONMOUTH(C) 22.5 kts.	-14-6"

Guns - 16 - 8"2
Speed - Full Speed
Tactics-Maneuvred to obtain advantage of light after sun had set and to keep beyond 6" range.

Guns - 2-9"2; 30 - 6"
Speed - 17 knots

Sea - Very Heavy.
Weather - Heavy winds - unfavorable.
Some of 6" guns could not be used due to heavy seas and spray which also interfered with the 2-9"2 guns.

Range-12000 yds.to 4500 yds.
Third salvoes (about 12000 yds).
Set both GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH afire.
Small material damage.
English did not get within 6" range until too dark to see.

GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH sank.

Gunnery Lesson:Germans 8"2 guns completely outranged English 6" guns. GOOD HOPE'S 2-9" guns hampered by heavy sea and spray. Germans made 8"2 hits at 12000 yds.in a very heavy sea after sunset, while steaming at, or nearly at, Full Speed.

A study of these Gunnery Lessons will reveal the following points:

(a) Hereafter Naval battles will be fought at ranges about twice as great as the average of those of the Russo-Japanese War - namely at 15000 yards.

(b) Hereafter Naval Battles will be fought at, High Speeds, (which in two of these three actions was almost 29 knots)

(c) Hereafter, the victor must be able to make hits at very long ranges while steaming at Full Speed, and in some cases, be able to accomplish this in a heavy sea way.

(d) The victor in each case suffered small material and personnel losses. The vanquished lost every thing.

(e) A small initial advantage, either in gunnery or material, doubles itself before one third of the engagement is fought and increases to an insuperable advantage by the middle of the engagement. In short, the victor is invariably the one who possesses this initia superiority,measured in terms of speed,guns or gunnery efficiency.

Is our Fleet sufficiently skilled in gunnery to "draw first blood" from any possible enemy, or rather do our battle practice results compare favorably with the results of these actions?

Note:-A statement of the percentage of hits made in these three battles,if compiled from the meager data available to date,would probably be so inaccurate as to be misleading.An attempt is being made to obtain reliable information on this subject.

II. Notes on English and German Battle Practices.

1. There is very little data on file in this office referring to this subject, but the following isolated notes, are inserted for what they may be worth.

(a) Both Germany and England have, for some years, anticipated a fleet engagement in the North Sea. It is said that

they therefore engaged in practices under North Sea conditions - that is - choppy sea, hazy weather and range of visibility about 6000 yds. However, they probably did not confine themselves entirely to this short battle range as the following notes prove; nor would the excellent gunnery during the war have been possible had they not practiced at longer ranges than 6000 yds.

(b) The Scott director system as used in the English Navy has increased the British efficiency in long range gunnery. The Germans have investigated the director system and may have installed it in some of their vessels - but on January 8, 1915, no evidence of the director system was found on an inspection of the battle cruiser MOLTKE and of the small cruiser STRASSBURG.

(c) In 1913, England fired experimental strings at the old "Empress of India" with 13".5 guns at a range of eight miles.

(d) In 1912, England conducted battle practice at from 8000 to 10,000 yards.

(e) As early as 1908 or 1909, the Germans conducted practices at 10,000 yards or more, and quite recently they fired at a minimum range of 13124 yards (12,000 metres).

2. It is very regrettable that no data is at hand regarding the exact ranges and conditions of the sea during these practices. The English issue tables containing the percentage of hits made but this is of no particular value because the other conditions are omitted. Incidentally, these tables which usually refer to gunlayers tests, state that weather conditions were "Excellent" "Favorable" etc., but in a very few isolated cases were the conditions reported to be "Unfavorable."

3. Comparison with United States Navy.

In comparing our Gunnery Efficiency with that of England and of Germany, the comparison naturally follows two separate and distinct lines - i.e.-(a)"Material" and (b)"Fire Control".

(a) "Material". The following verbatim quotation from the daily press is said to have been authorized by the Navy Department:-

"There is an axiom with regard to calibres which amounts to this - that a ship should mount the smallest big gun that will pierce the enemy's armor over vitals at the maximum probable fighting range. The 14" guns of the PENNSYLVANIA will get through the maximum armor afloat, so far as our knowledge goes, at a range of 12000 yards.

It is not my purpose to discuss at length the subject of material. The following notes, bearing on the above statement, are inserted without comment.

1. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were destroyed by 12" guns at ranges between 13500 yards and 16500 yards.

2. The Blucher was disabled by 12" and 13".5 guns at about 17000 yards range.

3. The Good Hope and Monmouth were defeated by 8".2 guns at a range of 12000 yards in a rough sea after sunset.

4. The substance of 1, 2 and 3, indicates that battle ranges of 12000 yards are now out of date.

5. The English, evidently due to recent experiences, are building two or four vessels of the following characteristics:

Length - 800 feet.
Displacement - 17000 tons.
H. P. - 120,000.
Speed - 32 knots.
Armament - Main - 4-15" guns.
Secondary-Probably 6"-number of guns not known. All to be mounted on center line.

Fuel - Probably Oil.
Armor - None of any kind neither vertical nor horizontal.

These vessels are designed to sacrifice armor for speed. A fleet of such vessels will be able to outspeed our fleet on about 1/3 to 1/2 total H/P.-certainly can they choose and maintain their own battle range. Further, the omission of armor and the mounting of 15" guns indicates that these vessels will and must fight at the very greatest ranges possible in order to protect themselves. This again emphasizes the fact that the next fleet engagement will be fought at enormous ranges and that victory must certainly be won by accurate long range firing. One well placed shell on one of these vessels will be sufficient to spell her doom, yet the English are taking that chance in order to be able to dictate battle ranges and at the same time to win the battle by long range heavy plunging hits, such as disabled the Blucher.

It is not my intention to convey the idea that England intends to build all her future capital vessels along these lines- but it is my aim to invite attention to the possible changes in gunnery ideas which are bound to come if these vessels prove effective.

(b) Fire-control.

As stated heretofore, there is no satisfactory way of comparing results of our Battle Practices with the results of English or German Practices. Nor can the results of these engagements be accurately compared, because the advantages of a larger target are more than offset by the interference of the enemy, the greater speed used in action, etc.

We assume that our fleet in time of war would also arise to the occasion and perform marvelous feats of gunnery. I say we "assume" that, we "hope" that, and we "believe" that - but do the results of our battle practices warrant such an assumption? Can we actually make a reasonable percentage of 12" or 14" hits at from 13,500 to 20,000 yards?

The Department states that the battle practice of 1914 showed little improvement over that of 1913. Further I have heard that the practice of 1915 could not be classified as "good". The Department also states that the Spotting of 1914 was not as good as that of 1913. These three sentences indicate that we are not advancing. The first section of this paper certainly proves that England and Germany are not merely improving their gunnery, but that they are advancing by leaps and bounds. What is being done to improve our gunnery?

IV. Battle Practice - U.S. Navy.

Conditions under which battle practice is held divide themselves naturally into three headings - (a) Range, (b) speed, (c) weather conditions. Briefly stated, the Range should be as great as possible up to limits of accuracy of gun fire; the speed should be the most the vessel is capable of up to the point where vibration interferes too seriously with gun pointing; the weather conditions (other than visibility) should be the average weather expected at sea, i.e., not "Excellent" nor always "Favorable". To reconcile these three factors, to give each its proper weight, and then to frame a set of rules for Battle Practice is an undertaking that merits much consideration and discussion.

The Rules for 1914 Practice prescribe
Ranges - 7000 to 9000 yards,
Speed - 15 knots.
Weather Conditions - little is said except that conditions must be fair to all ships.

(a) Range - Summaries of previous practices.

1912 - 12" ranges, 10640 to 11760 yards. Full charges.

1913 - 12" ranges, 8770 to 8410 yds. Reduced charges.

1914 - 12" ranges, 9050 to 10790 yds. Full charges.

Also note that in 1914, among the battleships, the LOUISIANA fired at from 10380 to 12510 yds. (the maximum average range), the DELAWARE fired at from 6850 to 8900 yds. (the minimum average range) and that the VIRGINIA actually fired at a range of only 6330 yds. at some point in her run.

In his report on 1914 practice, a Division Commander remarked on battle ranges of 10,000 to 12,000 yds.

When the above practice ranges are compared with the actual battle ranges of the three battles noted abroad, it seems that our ideas of battle ranges are short by about 5000 yards.

The following table shows approximately the limits of accuracy of our guns:

8" - 45 cal. - 15,000 yards.
12"- 40 cal. - 15,000 yards.
12"- 45 cal. - 18,000 yards.
14"- 45 cal. - 20,000 yards.
12"- 50 cal. - 22,000 yards.

I believe our practices should be fired at ranges as great as possible, up to the limit where "chance" enters into ballistics. Additional attempts should be made to build and handle larger targets in order that the range may be increased to 15,000 yards and still remain within "accuracy" limits. Further, the 8" guns should be discounted in this connection and the rules framed with reference to the 12" and 14" guns only.

(b) Speed.

The old conception of two fleets of nearly equal strength and speed, steaming in parallel columns, more or less willing to decide the issue, needs revision. In modern times, no two fleets have fought under those conditions. Probably never again will two fleets be both willing to engage - one will invariably be forcing the engagement on the other, i.e. there will be a pursuer and a pursued. This applies directly to cruiser etc. actions and it may also be more or less applicable to Battleship Fleets.

Discussing these three engagements the following becomes apparent:

(a) Craddock's ideas will never be known, But he was severely criticized for his foolishness in not attempting to escape from the Germans at Coronel - at least for not running away until the Canopus joined him. The Germans, were using all speed possible to sink the Good Hope and Monmouth before this junction could be affected and to gain the advantage of the light just after sunset. Without superiority of speed theiGermans would have failed to force the engagement under their own terms. Again, let me repeat, while going at full speed, they dropped salvoes on the English ships at 12000 yds., with 8"2 guns, under severe weather conditions.

(b) At the Falklands, the Germans unknowingly stepped into a trap and then used all speed possible in trying to escape. The English battle cruisers needed their high speed to overtake the Germans, and when overtaken, to maintain the range within limits to their own advantage. Yet, while both fleets were steaming at full speed the English made sufficient 12" hits, to sink their adversaries, while the Germans made 20 to 30 - 8"2 hits on the Invincible at ranges of 13,500 to 16,500 yards.

(c) On January 24, 1914, the Germans were evidently on their way to raid the English coast when surprised by the English

battlecruisers. Knowing they were outranged and outnumbered by the English, the Germans made all speed possible to escape. Again, while steaming at full speed, each side did some remarkable long range shooting, i.e. at least 24 - 8", 11", and 12" hits at 17000 yards average range were made by the Germans. No record of damage inflicted by English other than the notes under the results of the battle quoted at beginning of this paper.

The question of building faster ships is not under discussion (see 32 knot, new English ship) but the subject of "making long range hits while our ships are steaming full speed" should and must soon be duly considered. I do not believe we have ever held a long range battle practice with the firing vessel making full speed. Does 15 knots speed give us the necessary experience, practice or data? The question of speed, as discussed herein, is not confined to the "change of range" factor. I refer especially to the interference of gunnery caused by 1- excessive vibration, 2- smoke and powder cloud interference on own ship and on other ships, 3- additional confusion below decks when operating at high speeds, etc., etc.

I suggest that each ship have a point on her speed curve determined where the interference by vibration be considered as detrimental to gunnery and that each vessel fire her individual battle practice at slightly less than that speed. The higher the speed the more realistic will battle conditions be reproduced. Turbine ships should be able to fire when steaming at full speed.

If it be considered necessary or desirable to adopt a fleet speed for all these practices, why not adopt the speed of the ship whose vibration point is lowest on the curve? This point certainly should exceed 15 knots. Before leaving the question of speed, attention is invited to the subject of "Speed versus submarines".

In the battle of last August (Helgoland) Admiral Beatty reports that while his battle cruisers were waiting to support the light cruisers and flotillas they steamed about at full speed. Suddenly they were attacked by three German submarines, but, due to the high speed of the battle cruisers, the submarines were easily avoided. The battle cruisers later on engaged and assisted in sinking the Ariadne, Koln, Mannz and V-187.

In short, although a battle fleet is subject to submarine attack at any time, it is especially so during and just immediately before and after an engagement. In the present stage of submarine development, 25 - 30 knot battle cruisers easily avoided 10 - 12 knot submerged speed submarines. Could a 15 knot fleet avoid 10 - 12 knot submarines as easily? When submarine speed is increased to 25 knots on surface and 15 knots submerged, our creeping 15 knot battle fleet will not be able to outmaneuvre them as easily as Admiral Beatty did. Speed is the best, possibly the only, defense against submarines.

(c) Weather Conditions.

Of the three factors concerned in Battle Practice Rules, this one is the least important, but is not a neglible factor by any means. It must be subordinated to range and speed in order to avoid unnecessary inaccuracies. However, neglecting it entirely is very apt to result disastrously especially in affairs such as the Coronel Battle.

Our last individual practice rules made no special mention of unfavorable state of sea, etc.

By state of weather is meant the wind and sea only, visibility should always be of the best because it is worse than useless, it is absolutely misleading, to fire when the visibility is poor or deceptive.

As stated before, England and Germany practiced under North Sea conditions, which I assume to mean that they fired battle practice when the sea was choppy, etc.

Lieutenant Commander Jackson (in 1913-1914) of the Wyoming, advocated firing in the open sea under deep sea conditions.

I can not refrain from mentioning another topic which bears on this subject, i.e., the spirit of competition in each ship, in each division and in each fleet is so strong, that most of us will sacrifice many other considerations in order that our turret, ship, division or fleet may get "the edge" on the other turret, ship, division, or fleet. And a favorite way of getting this small advantage is to use every possible means of being able to fire our strings during the most favorable weather conditions. I doubt not that the English feel the same way about it. But the German system of administration is such that this is not likely, further, if it were possible, I believe that each unit in the German Navy is willing to sacrifice its small individual advantage if it benefit the German Navy as a whole. A study of the Coronel battle will certainly convince anyone that the Germans must have had some practice at battle ranges under unfavorable weather conditions. The string of protests usually following any event which tends to reduce scores is evidence of this spirit. Competition must be fostered as it is necessary to induce extra effort, but some method should be devised or some rule framed in order that the Fleet be made to fire under weather conditions other than those of the "mill-pond" variety.

V. Conclusion.

1. The conclusions to be drawn from this discussion are properly left to the Chief of Operations. However, in order to emphasize the main points, I invite attention to the following summary statements, which, in my opinion, must be carried out in order to bring our Gunnery Efficiency up to that of England and of Germany.

(a) Battle Practice ranges must be increased to 15000 yards or more.

(b) The firing vessel must steam at high speed - as nearly Full Speed as practicable.

(c) The firing should be conducted in the open sea under average weather conditions.

J. H. Kemp.



Need not be returned.

uplicate - Original mailed on May 10-1915

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Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople,&c.
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.
Date of Report.....May 10,1915.

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Confidential

1. Constantinople.

(a) On Sunday May 2,a Turkish aeroplane with pink underbody,which had left the Turkish hangars at San Stefano and was flying to northward(-- possible in pursuit of the hostile aeroplane with green underbody,which was mentioned in last report,was fired upon and shot down outside of Chichli,(a suburb of Constantinople). The funeral of the two officers killed,one Turkish and the other German or Turkish,was held the following day,a part of the aeroplane's wings being carried on the coffins.

(b) On May 2,and 3,nearly all the British and French subjects remaining here,(about 3,000 in all,it is said,mostly Maltese and other provincials), were notified to hold themselves in readiness to go to the Dardanelles on Thursday,May 6. They were later told to report at Tophane Quay, ~~on morning of May 6,~~ 50 of them,25 British and 25 French,were then chosen by the Chief of Police, and embarked on small steamer,which took them to Gallipoli.Mr.Hoffman Philip,1st.Secretary of the American Embassy,by order of the Ambassador,accompanied them.It is understood he has since been recalled,the State Department having disapproved of his having been sent there;but he has not arrived back yet.Two American newspaper reporters, a representative of Collier's Weekly and a reporter of the Brooklyn Eagle,who arrived here recently from Berlin,also went on same steamer.It is said they are to be stationed in undefended towns which have been bombarded on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

(c) The Turkish battleship "Torgut-Reis" stood in from Sea of Marmora,en route from the Dardanelles,and into Golden Horn,on Thursday,May 6.Since then both the "Torgut-Reis" and "Hariddin-Barbarossa" have been here,in Golden Horn,undergoing repairs,the former,among other things,reseating a 28-cm (11-inch) gun,it is said,and the "Hariddin-Barbarossa" repairing one of its masts.

(d) The Turkish cruisers "Hamadieh" and "Midilli" (ex-German "Breslau") stood out of Golden Horn and up Bosphorus early on morning of Thursday,May 6;and at 5.00 a.m.,the "Sultan Selim"(ex-German "Goeben"), "Breslau","Hamadieh",and two torpedo boats,stood out of Beicos and into the Black Sea,along the Anatolia, (Asia Minor) side.On Friday night they returned again,with two coal vessels they are said to have been convoying,and the "Hamadieh" and "Breslau", went into Golden Horn again on following morning, and "Goeben" remains off Stenia.

(e) As mentioned in preceding paragraph,a collier and another coal vessel,came in on evening,May 7,from either Chamli or Zongaldak,having been convoyed, part of way,by part of the Turkish fleet.The collier is said to have brought in 3,000 tons of coal, and the other coal vessel,about 500 tons.This is for the Government.At the same time,another small private vessel got in with 41 tons,which has been bought by the SCORPION,and has been taken on board.

Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople,&c.
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.
Date of Report.....May 10,1915.
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(f) From 3,000 to 4,000 more wounded have arrived from the Dardanelles the past week;and from 5,000 to 6,000 more troops have been sent there from here. There are now said to be about 160,000 Turkish troops at the Dardanelles;and it is said there are 300,000 more at Adrianople,which could be brought thereat short notice.

(g) A law has been promulgated here,the past week,by which all civilians are required to report,and turn in all fire-arms,ammunition,and weapons,when considered necessary by Military Governor. The Greeks and Armenians are said to have a large number of arms stowed away,and it is supposed that the law is directed principally against these.

2. Dardanelles.

(h) The city of Gallipoli is reported by Mr. Hoffman Philip,1st. Secretary of the American Embassy,who went there May 6,to be "unoccupied and without food or beds."

3. Black Sea.

(i) There have been no more Russian bombardments of the Bosphorus the past week,but the Russian Fleet bombarded other small places,on Anatolian coast, during first part of week.

(j) Part of the Turkish Fleet went outside into Black Sea again for first time in some time,as reported above;and "Goeben" accompanied the force.

J. B. Moore

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American Embassy,

London.

May 11th 1915

Need not be returned.

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From: Lt. Col. Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.
To: Naval Attache.

Subject: Holland and the War.



The undersigned visited Holland officially May 4 - 8, and the following report is based on information obtained at that time. No attempt is made to go into details of the situation from point of view of the Netherlands, or concerning the Army or defences of that country, as Captain Sunderland, U.S.A., now Military Attache at the Hague, has no doubt made reports on these subjects.

About April 25, the regular passenger service to and from Holland was stopped by the Admiralty. Mail boats, however, continued to run under direction of the Admiralty from Harwich to the Hook of Holland. I had received authority from the Admiralty to go over on the Mail boat from Harwich to leave on morning of the 3rd May. On May 1st I received word that no boat would leave Harwich for Holland on the 3rd, and about 7 p.m. on the 2nd that a boat would leave Tilbury for Flushing on the following morning. I took this boat with Mr. Minot, an Attache to the American Embassy in Berlin, and though it was a regular steamer of the Zealand Line there was only one other passenger. After May 3rd. the regular passenger service was resumed to and from Flushing, but only for a limited number of passengers - 100 on each trip. Passengers are put to great inconvenience in making this trip, and are subject to strict examination at both ends of the line, and it is strictly



prohibited for any passenger to carry letters or written messages to or from Holland. During the ten days that passenger service was stopped about 2,000 people had collected in The Hague who were waiting to make the trip to England.

No reason was given for this interruption of the passenger service, and taken in connection with the rather critical condition in Holland at the time, and the fact that Great Britain was still full of troops of the New Armies that had not yet been sent over, there were of course various rumours in England as to the cause, such as that Holland would be drawn into the war, that Great Britain would land troops there, that it was on account of naval activity in the North Sea, that Germany intended to violate the neutrality of Holland by using the port of Antwerp for naval or military operations, etc. The most plausible reason, however, seems to be that the passenger service was stopped on account of spies. Holland is full of German spies who could obtain information of sailings to and from England, as well as of naval and military movements, if passengers were to pass to and fro freely. The interruption of passenger traffic also corresponded with the meeting of the Women's Peace Conference at the Hague, and this meeting would have given opportunity for a large number of passengers to go back and forth, and consequently an increased opportunity for spies.

The position of Holland has been critical, and the tension in the country high since the beginning of the war. After the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg many feared that Holland was threatened with a similar fate and would be unable to keep out of the war. Then there was the apprehension that Great Britain might practically blockade the coast in order to prevent war munitions and food from getting to Germany via Holland. After the fall of Antwerp there was the threat that Germany might seek to use that port as a

naval base and thus violate Dutch neutrality. During April much tension was caused by the torpedoing of a number of Dutch vessels and the seizing of others, which were taken in to Knocke and Zubrugge. A considerable number of Belgian, British, and German troops were forced over the border and interned; there are now in the country ofer 200,000 Belgian refugees; and the country is full of German spies.

The interned Belgians numbered over 30,000, and are in camps at Ziest and Hardinierfk. There are about 1,600 interned British at the Island of Usk and Groningen; and a smaller number of Germans at Bergon and Alknear.

Since the war began Holland has made every effort to preserve neutrality, and it is probably almost the unanimous wish of the inhabitants to remain at peace, for they have little to gain and much to lose by going into the war. At the same time, the difficulty of maintaining strict neutrality, owing to the geographical position of the country, has been great and may in the future be even greater. At the present writing, however, it seems to be the general opinion there that nothing short of actual invasion of her territory will drive Holland into the war. The general feeling of over 90% of the population is in favor of the Allies, but many of the officers of the Army are pro-German.

The Army of the Netherlands has been mobilized since the beginning of the war, and now consists of about 255,000 officers and men. Of this number 90,000 are on the frontier, 90,000 in depots, and 70,000 in garrisons of defensive works. The organization and training of the Army is based on the German system. There are now with the Colours the levies of 17 years, 1899-1915. The mobile army is organised in 4 divisions, and a fifth is now being organized.

The Division is organised as follows:-

3 Brigades of infantry of 2 regiments each - each regiment consisting of 3 battalions and machine gun company.
1 regiment of cavalry of 4 squadrons.
1 regiment of artillery of 12 batteries.
1 company pioneers.
1 company bicyclists.
Pontoon detachment.
Telegraph detachment
Infantry and artillery ammunition columns.
Field and supply column.
Field hospital and field ambulances.

The total strength of the division is 538 officers, and 22,351 men.

The army is understood to be short of munitions of war and equipment.

The troops seen drilling and marching at the Hague did not appear to be very well drilled or efficient, and were in the gret service uniform, in blue uniform, a canvas working suit, and many in various combinations of these.

The scheme of defence of Holland against a strong force provides for the openeing of the dykes and flooding a portion of the country. The area to be defended would then include only a small part of the country, but one including the largest cities - Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Hague. This line passes outside of Amsterdam, Utrecht, and Rotterdam, is which defended by numerous forts and entrenchments between, and outside the line would extend a broad band of flooded country.

Amsterdam is also enclosed by a line containing over 40 forts, and country without this line may be flooded, thus isolating that city. How much of an obstacle this scheme of defence would prove to an invading army could not be estimated without actual trial, but it seems probable that it might be rather a serious one even though the forts are only earth works without elevation, and containing few large calibre modern guns. There would be little difficulty to an invading army landing on the coast, for the Dutch Navy is weak, and such coast fortifications as there are are low earthworks with inferior

guns.

At the present period of the war, the strategic position of Holland is of great importance to both Great Britain and Germany.

If Holland should go into the war on the side of the Allies and Great Britain should land a strong military force on the coast, she should be able to make the German position in Belgium untenable and force the Germans to evacuate the country, without the heavy cost in time and casualties that might be required to force back the strong German line as at present held and the probably stronger Antwerp-Liege line. Again, such a strong British force would be in a position for a campaign to throttle the German coast and drive out the German Navy. There then arises the question if, in view of the present British campaigns, involving considerable forces in France, Egypt, the Dardanelles, and Mesopatamia, and smaller forces in the 3 German colonies in Africa, Great Britain would feel strong enough or justified in undertaking another campaign in a new theatre.

If Holland should join Germany, that country could use the Dutch ports and make use of Antwerp as a naval or submarine base. In case of the hostility of Holland, it does not seem probable now that Germany would have any military necessity, or that she could spare the troops, to attack that area that could be protected by flooding the country. There is, however, danger that the neutrality of Holland might be violated on account of the importance of using Antwerp as a base. Antwerp was taken by the Germans early in October and since that time has been useless to them as a naval base because the Scheldt flows for some 30 miles through ~~Dutch~~ Dutch territory. Antwerp would appear however to be of great importance to Germany if it could be used as a naval or

guns.

submarine base, or as a base for a military invasion or raid on England. It is only about 130 miles from nearest point of English coast, whereas the German ports in Heligoland Bight are about 300 miles, a fact which would increase the chances of a successful raid immensely. Although it is reported that much shipping was destroyed or damaged before the Belgians evacuated Antwerp, yet it is one of the principal commercial ports of the world, and it is probable that there is now sufficient shipping available there in good condition to furnish transport for a large number of troops. It is believed that such an attempted raid is not considered by any means impossible by the authorities in Great Britain, and recent German activities might be considered as intended to prepare for such an attempt. There have been numerous German units that have been reported as sent to Belgium and that have not appeared on the Western front. The torpedoing of numerous trawlers in the North Sea would seem to be intended to clear that area from observation by these craft; The sinking of the Lusitania to draw off naval force to protect merchant steamers; and the recent air raids on English east coast principally for the purpose of reconsaissance.

W. Denham.

Need not be returned.

Duplicate Original mailed May 19-1915

Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople,&c.
Report from U. S. S. SCORPION.
Date of Report.....May 17, 1915.

JUL 1 1915

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1. Constantinople.

(a) Mr. Hoffman Philip, First Secretary of the American Embassy, the two reporters, and the fifty British, and French, subjects, referred to in the report of May 10, as having been sent to Gallipoli, were returned on May 12, to Constantinople, and set free. The reasons for returning them are not explained. There was no bombardment of Gallipoli during their stay there.

(b) On May 11, a Turkish gunboat, similar to the MEDJIDIEH, with her bow badly damaged, as if from collision, came in from the Bosphorus and anchored. A large transport, with her bow torn open, as if by mine or torpedo, came in from the Dardanelles, and went up the Golden Horn. There are persistent reports that, at least, one of the Allies' submarines is in the Sea of Marmora, and that it sank one small Transport, and damaged a large one, and has taken supplies of food from small vessels that it has held up. Immediately following the arrival of the large Transport, greater precautions were adopted in the sending of ships to the Dardanelles. They now, invariably, are convoyed by destroyers and gunboats. It is estimated that from 3,000 to 6,000 troops are proceeding daily from here. Artillery and horses are being transported in great numbers.

(c) It is estimated that there about 18,000 wounded Turkish soldiers in the Constantinople hospitals. They are nearly all lightly wounded.

(d) The former Stationnaire "ISKELEI", which was interned at the beginning of the war, has been towed into the harbor, and moored near the SCORPION. It flies no flag, and is, apparently, in charged of civilians.

(e) The SULTAN-SELIM (ex-GOEBEN), is in a small bay at Stenia, and is, apparently, in good shape. The MIDILLI (ex-BRESLAU), has made a few trips up the Bosphorus, but is now at the Navy Yard. There is great activity among the torpedo boats and destroyers - they make frequent trips to the Dardanelles, and in the direction of the Black Sea.

(f) Salvos were heard, in the direction of the Black Sea, late in the afternoon of May 16.

(g) A collier, which went into the Black Sea for coal, returned to her anchorage with four shot holes in her side, evidently made by 5" or 6" shells; all were well above the water line. Three colliers, that left here on the 15th. to get coal, were sunk in the Black Sea.

2. Dardanelles.

From reliable sources the bombardment, by the Allied Fleet, is being much reduced, the damage caused by shells being very slight. The QUEEN ELIZABETH has been using a captive baloon to observe the fall of shot. She fires over the peninsula at a range of about 11' miles. At times an aeroplane has observed the fall of the projectiles, and the fire has been controlled thereby. For this reason the Turkish vessels have often quickly shifted their anchorage. The destroyer, that sank the GOLIATH, carried a German officer. The presence of a single German Officer has an immense effect on the Turkish troops, apparently giving them increased confidence. In all important undertakings, requiring dash and skill, at least one German is sent along.

3. I failed to mention, in my last report, that while I was in Gibraltar (on the S.S.CELTIC) I saw the INFLEXIBLE come in and immediately go into dry dock; she was badly damaged and had all her pumps going. Was informed, upon my arrival, that she was expected, and that the docks at Malta had all they could attend to.

Confidential

Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople,&c.
Report from U. S. S. SOCRATES.
Date of Report....May 17, 1915.
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(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.) Enclosure not to be returned.

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17
(2)

SUBJECT Disposition Torpedo Craft - Italian Fleet.

From A *No.* 121. *Date* May 17, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— *Date* ———

580/9/191 ENCLOSURE H-1 JUN 15 1915 Naval War College

1. I hear on good authority that at the present time all submarines of the Italian fleet have mobilized at Venice. All destroyers of the Indomito Class and of a later date are with the fleet at Taranto. All destroyers and torpedo boats previous to the Indomito class are divided between Venice and Brindisi.

2. The fourth division of the fleet consisting of the San Marco, Pisa, San Giorgio, and Amalfi are at Brindisi, but I understand this is only for temporary duty, upon the completion of which they will re-join the fleet at Taranto.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

CONFIDENTIAL

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.18
(1)

SUBJECT General situation in Germany as regards America, Japan and Italy.

From Z (H) *No.* *Date* May 18, 1915, *191*

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date* *191*

ENCLOSURE
580
9
191
JUN 15 1915
Naval War College

In the first place, the German people are a unit in every new proposition - knowing that the Government is under the control of the military and naval authorities I have been attempting to find out how the people feel, especially the social democrats which are in great number in Germany, and also the finance people. The opinion and sentiment of those two classes the mass and the finance people, mean more to me than the military because they are really the country; furthermore, I know full well how the military and naval authorities feel.

In the first place, every German feels and believes that America has been unneutral and that America is aiding in a great measure the Allies. They feel that by sinking the LUSITANIA they have "got back" at us in a small way for what we are doing. In case of war, with our country, they would heartily support it because they believe that it would stop the supply of ammunition and that we could not do more harm to Germany than we are doing at present.

The next sentiment or feeling that the German people have is the feeling of revenge - they will "get back" at us for what we have been doing. They consider Japan our great enemy; they confidently expect war sooner or later between Japan and America.

About three months ago I noticed a sudden falling off in the harsh and bitter talk against Japan. During the past three months there has hardly been a word said against Japan. Several months ago a prominent man here, financially, at whose house I have frequently been a visitor, came to see me about a matter of importance, as he termed it. He said that the son of a very dear

friend of his had been lost and requested that, if possible, an inquiry be made concerning him of the French Embassy in Paris. After settling this and when about to leave, he said:"By the way, what do you think of the Japanese situation?" I replied that I had no late nor definite information concerning it. He then asked: "Do you not think that Japan and America could come together on some amicable agreement whereby any chances of war would be averted?" I replied that as far as I could see agreements nowadays seemed easily made and more easily broken. He then asked what made the present ill feeling, commercial or racial reasons. I replied that it was racial. He then asked several random questions which I sidestepped. The result of this conversation was to lead me to the supposition that he intended to invest there and as he is in with numerous other big interests, it appeared that some Germans were intending to invest money in Japan. I have recently learned that other big men, financially, are putting what money they can in Japanese investments and that there is a big plan whereby Japan is to be really subsidized by German money. They say what they have done in Turkey they can also do in Japan. Underlying all this is the opposition to America. Japan is to be the tool of Germany against America; Germany and Japan will line up against America.~~and~~(if not openly, at least secretly.)

There is also a plan whereby in case of war between Japan and America, ammunition and arms will be shipped to Japan via Russia.

There is good reason for believing that two months ago Germany and Japan came to an agreement. The exact terms are, of course, a secret but it is believed that the agreement is for certain cooperation between the two countries in the event of a war with America.

In this connection it can be stated that the German financial men are right with the Government - it is no exaggeration to state that their patriotism extends to the last pfennig.

In one way it is wonderful - an example of patriotism which our "big men" will probably find difficult to equal. In another way it is absolutely selfish, because they know that if the Kaiser and the Germans win, they will win later financially, and if the German lose, "they" lose also - so why make private fortunes if such should be lost after the war; better, they argue, to give everything to the Government to win because in the long run they rise or fall with the Government.

Several days ago, the political leaders of the Reichstag, representing all the various parties of Germany, met and discussed the coming budget and the general situation. The leaders were unanimous in their confidence and belief in the victory of the Germans and were determined to push the war to the very limit. They claimed that their financial and military status was sound enough to withstand the entrance into the war of Italy - and <u>any other</u> country. They stood ready to give Italy wha t was offered (claimed to be 1,000,000,000 marks) and stood equally ready to fight her if she did not accept the offer. The Germans claim that every preparation has been made to meet Italy in case she comes into the war. According to news from a prominent Russian, if Italy does not come into the war, Russia may make peace by fall; it will not be because Russia lacks men; it will be because Russia lacks money and artillery. According to information from Roumania, Russia will be able to get money and be able to carry on the war as long as the Grand Dukes and Generals wish it. The fact, however, that the financial men in Moscow favor an early peace is worthy of note.

The entrance of Italy into the war makes all calculations worthless. One of the queer sides of this war is the dislike of America in Russia, notwithstanding the supplies which she is getting from us.

One fact looms up constantly and that is that America is becoming more disliked every day by all sides. If we keep clear

of this war, we will emerge without a friend and with many enemies. And I believe that the people who come over to Europe and go to both sides, go back to America not so much pro-Ally or pro-German, as pro-American because they see the position of our country as regards the world and realize that it is not a time to worry about the warring factions over here, but a time to worry about our ability to win in a war with <u>any</u> nation or <u>any</u> combination of nations.

Several days after the sinking of the LUSITANIA, there appeared an article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (Official Government organ here) concerning the loss of American lives and property in Mexico, this article being near other articles concerning American opinion of the loss of American lives on the LUSITANIA. The evident purpose of this was to show that we should not be so aroused about the loss of Americans on the LUSITANIA when we had lost so many lives in Mexico; in other words, they said, if we stand for Mexico, why not stand for the LUSITANIA? A certain man in the Foreign Office here stated to a certain American that all we would do concerning the loss of American lives on the LUSITANIA would be to send a note or protest.

I hope that this will be of interest to you and that it will give you an idea of the situation here. We are plugging along and neither worried nor excited, and hoping that everything will be settled satisfactorily to all concerned. However, knowledge and consequent preparation are always of importance.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.] *Need not be returned.*

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(2)

SUBJECT S I T U A T I O N TO MAY 18th 1915.

From Z *No.* 231 *Date* May 18, 1915. *, 191*

Replying to O. N. I. No. *Date* *, 191*

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183
ENCLOSURE 5-2
JUN 7 1915
Naval War College

The diplomatic note from America to Germany over the various happenings affecting the loss of American life and of American shipping was handed to the Foreign Office Saturday morning. No reply has up to this writing been received. From what Rear Admiral B e h n k e told me after the "LUSITANIA" affair, ~~that~~ they felt fully justified in what had been done and no change of policy would ensue. Also the newspapers foreshadowed the same reply. As the terms of the American note are mandatory, I therefore judge the situation to be extremely critical. The note has been published in American papers and the Ambassador in Berlin immediately upon receipt cabled the State Department that in his judgement the answer to it would be unfavorable.

The German government has held a strong censorship on the American news and the comments of the American press on the "LUSITANIA" affair have not appeared. The American note was not allowed to be published until last night.

In the meantime, the press has been filled with accounts of the Italian situation, almost to the exclusion of other news.

THE NAVY.

Outside the submarine warfare and the fighting in Turkish waters there is not much to record. The Zeppelins have been showing increased activities in their visits to England. Stories are circulated here of the enormous bombs that are being made which will destroy whole sections of London when the time for an attack comes.

THE EASTERN ARMIES.

There does not seem to be any doubt but that the fighting of the past month has resulted in a triumph for the Austrian-German armies in Galicia. Whether the actual number of prisoners is 150,000, as stated and whether the Russian demoralization is so great as claimed are open to doubt, but the whole campaign is one which has given the greatest encouragement in Germany and Austria and has considerably modified the attitude of Roumania.

THE WESTERN ARMIES.

Western During the progress of the armies in the East, the ~~Eastern~~ armies have been continuing the position warfare with activity and have prevented any marked advance of the allies.

GENERAL REMARKS.

There can be no doubt that in Government and military circles there is strong optimism and a belief that they will bring the war to a successful conclusion at an early date.

Among the generality of the people there is a certain amount of depression due to the length that the war has lasted beyond their expectations and this depression will be greater if Italy comes in against Germany. There is however no surface manifestation of this feeling and all political parties strongly support the government and are prepared to vote it all the money and men asked for. There is a talk of raising the serviceable age from 45 to 55 years.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

Need not be returned

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.19

SUBJECT Royal Decree increasing the Budget for the Italian Navy.

From T *No.* 125. *Date* May 19, 1915.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ---------- *Date* ----------

380
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191
ENCLOSURE
H 3
JUN 15 1915
Naval War College

1. The Budget for the Italian Navy, as originally compiled for Fiscal Year 1914-15 has now been increased by Royal Decree No.619 of May 14, 1915. This increase amounting to Twentyfive million lire is required owing to the European situation which has necessitated a large active fleet to be always ready.

2. The Decree in question provides at the same time for an increase of One Hundred million Lire for the Army, likewise required for military purposes owing to the present European situation.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1907.) Need not be returned.

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.21

SUBJECT DEFENSE OF NAVAL STATIONS AND FUEL STATIONS AGAINST AIR-CRAFTS.

580 / 9 / 183 ENCLOSURE 5-K JUN 1915 Naval War College

From Y *No.* 91 *Date* May 21, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. 13411 *Date* ~~May 6, 1915~~.

1. From my observations and experience in the present war, I have to submit the following plan for defense of naval and fuel stations against air-craft

2. Defensive Measures. - All buildings in which it is probable that work will be done at night should have shaded fitted over all windows, glass roofs, etc., which effectually prevent any light from showing. A simple and effective method that I have seen for doing this is the way it is done at the Works of the Westinghouse Company here in Paris. In common with most of the manufactories in Paris, their buildings are fitted with glass roofs, and their factory is illuminated during daylight by this method, there being no windows.

3. Thick matting shades have been fitted to this glass roof, and by a simple system of cords and pulleys, these can be quickly drawn, shutting out all light from within.

4. In Paris and London also the street lights and arc lamps have been painted black on top, so that all light is thrown directly down and none up.

5. So far as I have been able to ascertain - and I have made dilligent inquiries - no attemps have yet been made in France to make fuel oil tanks impervious to air attacks. I saw personally the tanks at the naval station at Brest, and no defensive precautions against air attacks had been taken. Furthermore, the European representative of one of the largest oil companies in the world has personally looked into the matter at my request, and he states that no precautions have been taken. At the Le Bourget aerodrome, where there are constantly over one hundred and fifty aeroplanes, the gasolene tanks are left out in the open and unprotected.

6. But, it is needless to say, no matter what the French practice is, any plans drawn up for defense of a naval station should contemplate the placing of all fuel oil tanks underground, and similarly it should be a standing order, that unless absolutely necessary, all dry-docks should be kept full.

7. Offensive-Defensive Measures. - In my opinion, the real defense of stations against air-craft will, in the future, be found in guns and searchlights. The general plan for this should contemplate the use of a system similar to that of torpedo defense aboard ship.

8. There should be a central fire control station, similar to that aboard ship, and connected up with sub-control stations by wires and tubes laid underground. The guns should be limited in number; - it is much harder to spot for aerial firing them other kinds. Guns and searchlights should be below ground and concealed as much as possible. Their location should be kept as confidential as possible. If in advance an enemy knows the location of searchlights, they serve to him the same purpose as a lighthouse on land. One of the reasons why the recent air raids on Paris have been so unsuccesful, I am convinced is because the pilots both during the day and night attacks could not locate themselves successfully.

9. It has been the experience during this war that shrapnel shells are not successful in employment against air-craft. High explosive shells are much more effective. The French are making a high explosive shell now for this work, fitted with a special fuze. Detailed drawings and a sample of this fuze have already been forwarded by me to the Department.

10. To show the ineffectiveness of shrapnel and rifle fire against aeroplanes, there is now on exhibition at the Hôtel des Invalides a Maurice Farman biplane in which there are more than four hundred distinct shrapnel and bullet holes. The damage

done is practically nil so far as these hits are concerned; the engine has simply worn out from use.

11. The aerodrome attached to the station for its defense should be separate from and at considerable distance from it, for the reason that at night landing lights have to be displayed and necessarily they will tend to serve as pilot lights for the enemy also.

12. Each station should have an auxiliary power and pumping station, concealed in the earth, so that by no possibility could they be damaged by air-craft. The necessity for safe-guarding against fires caused by incendiary bombs is obvious. For this reason an auxiliary pumping station for the pressure mains is a necessity.

13. On the night of the first Zeppelin raid on Paris, the fire and searchlight control was pitiful. Since that time it has improved greatly, but I have never yet seen a drill. This drill is as necessary for the efficient work of the defense as torpedo-boat attack drill on board ship. I am convinced that a well-drilled crew, at a well equipped station, could drive off almost any sort of air attacks that may be delivered against it. One of the reasons why more air craft have not been brought down in this war is because, in my opinion, army officers are not as familiar as naval officers in fire and searchlight control. The same lack of control existed similarly in London as in Paris. All the errors and faults, that we of the Navy have been taught to guard against in handling searchlights, are still being committed here in Paris, and in December last in London, in Paris during the last few weeks, aeroplanes at night carry distinguishing and recognition lights: white, red or green, either color is used indiscriminately, to serve as it were as a counter-sign for the night in question.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. TRANSLATION-FV.

June 29, 1915.

Number 659 (May 22, 1915) of the Official Collection of the Laws and Decrees of the Kingdom contains the following decree:

580 / 9 / 207 ENCLOSURE 7-3 JUL 7 1915 Naval War College

VICTOR EMMANUEL III.

KING OF ITALY.

Having consulted the Code of the Merchant Marine of the Kingdom of Italy (Title IV);

Since the belligerent powers in the present international conflict exercise the right to capture and have retained in their ports the enemy merchant vessels which were there at the outbreak of hostilities;

Having consulted the Cabinet of Ministers;

Upon proposal of Our Minister of the Navy, and with the consent of the Attorney General;

We have decreed and do decree:

Single Article.

In case of participation by Italy in the present international conflict, Articles 211 and 243 of the Code for the Merchant Marine shall not be applied.

The present decree, which will go into effect on the day of its publication, shall be submitted to Parliament to be made a law.

We order that the present decree, sealed with the Seal of the State, shall be inserted in the Official Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Kingdom of Italy, requiring all concerned to observe it and see that it is observed.

Done at Rome, this 16th day of May, 1915.

VITTORIO EMANUELE

SALANDRA - VIALE - ORLANDO.

Witnessed, ORLANDO.

Keeper of the Seals.

NOTE (by Naval Attaché, Rome).- This Decree permits the confiscation of all belligerent merchant ships found in Italian ports at the outbreak of war.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900) *Need not be returned.*

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(1)

SUBJECT Naval base - Brindisi -

From T *No.* 130 *Date* May 24, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ..... *Date* .....

580
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198
ENCLOSURE
14 2
Naval War College.
JUN 28 1915

1. There has been forwarded this day a Royal Decree ceding Brindisi to the Italian Company as a fortified naval station, this confirming report "T" No. 121 of April 24, 1915. On April 16th, the entire main battle fleet in company with destroyers and colliers left Taranto for Brindisi where all the vessels were successfully moored. Upon being furnished with the ability of placing the entire fleet in Brindisi, the fleet returned to Taranto.

Need not be returned.

Le TRIBUNA and th GIORNALE D'ITALIA 24,1915.

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24
(2)

Attacks on the Forts of Ancona, Porto Corsini, Barletta, Jesi, and Venice, May 4,1915.

(Official communication)

It was foreseen that the declaration of war would have scarcely been made before the enemy would make an offensive attempt against our Adriatic coast, more for the moral effect then to gain any military objective; but it proved as an encounter to be of short duration.

Small detachments of the enemy's ships, particularly destroyers, fired with their main batteries on our Adriatic coast. This was between the hours of four and six in the morning of the 24th. Aeroplanes also attempted to attack the Arsenal of Venice.

The enemy's ships were forced to retreat by our division of torpedoe boats. The enemy's areoplanes were shot at by our anti-areoplane guns, and by rifles while our areoplanes attacked them as did a dirigible that was flying over the Adriatic.

The localities attacked are: Porto Corsini whose fire drove the enemy off at once; Ancona, where the attack was chiefly against the railroad where slight damage was caused but which was easily repared; Barletta, where the attack was made by a scout and by destroyers, those were put to flight by our torpedo vessels and another vessel.

At Jesi the enemy's areoplanes attempted to drop bombs on a hangar but without success.

Any other notice of operations on this night are without foundation.

58°/9/198 ENCLOSURE 14-8 JUN 28 1915 Naval War College

Il comunicato ufficiale

"Era previsto che, appena dichiarata la guerra, vi sarebbero state azioni offensive contro la nostra costa adriatica intese a produrre un effetto morale anzichè a raggiungere un obbiettivo militare; ma si era provveduto per fronteggiarle rendendole di brevissima durata.

Difatti piccole unità navali nemiche, specialmente cacciatorpediniere, dalle 4 alle 6 del 24 corr. hanno tirato colpi di cannone sulle nostre coste adriatiche. Anche aereoplani hanno tentato di attaccare l'arsenale di Venezia.

Le navi avversarie dopo un brevissimo cannoneggiamento sono state costrette da un nostro naviglio silurante ad allontanarsi. Gli aereoplani nemici sono stati cannoneggiati dalla artiglieria antiaerea, fatti segno a fuoco di fucileria ed attaccati da un nostro aereoplano e da un dirigibile che volava sull'Adriatico.

Località attaccate sono: Porto Corsini, che rispose immediatamente e costrinse il nemico ad allontanarsi subito; Ancona, ove l'attacco, diretto specialmente ad interrompere la linea ferroviaria ha cagionato lievi danni facilmente riparabili; Barletta, ove l'attacco fu compiuto da un esploratore e da cacciatorpediniere, che una nostra nave, scortata da siluranti, mise in fuga.

A Jesi aereoplani nemici gittarono bombe sull' "hangar", ma senza raggiungere l'obbiettivo. Ogni altra notizia sulle operazioni di questa notte non ha fondamento."

Need not be returned.

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(1)

Messaggero, May 25, 1915.

Agenzia Stefani - rough translation:

596/9/198 ENCLOSURE 14-9 Naval War College JUN 3 1915

One of our destroyers, at 3 a.m. entered the port of Buso, near the italo-austrian frontier and destroyed the pier thereof, also the station and the barracks, sinking all the auto-boats gathered in that port.
The Italians suffered no damage either; while the enemy is reported to have had 2 dead and 47 made prsioners, among them, 1 officer and 15 non-commissioned officers.

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American Embassy,
Need not be returned.
L O N D O N. 87

May 25, 1915.

From: Lt. Col/ Thomas C. Treadwell, U.S.M.C.

To: Naval Attaché.

Subject: The Forcing of the Dardanelles.

5 80 9 191 ENCLOSURE H H JUN 15 1915 Naval War College

The forcing of the Dardanelles, presents the greatest example of combined operations against strong defences, supported by large mobile forces, of modern times. The scope of these operations embraces the co-operation of fleets and armies of Great Britain, France, and Russia, the use of ships against forts and mines, and of land forces in conjunction with the fleets. Much time must elapse before we can arrive at correct conceptions of the political, strategical, and tactical problems involved, and view the whole undertaking in its proper perspective, as the sources from which information can be had are necessarily, at the present time, inaccurate, contradictory, and limited. On account of the great importance and magnitude of the Dardanelles operations however, this study of them has been undertaken during their development, with the hope that it may be useful as a basis for a fuller and more accurate report at a later date.

American Embassy,
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L. of C. 87
May , 1918.

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To: [illegible]

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

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Events Leading up to the Participation of Turkey in the War.

Great Britain declared war on Turkey, Nov. 5, 1914. Thus the opinion of Bernhardi, and other eminent German authorities, that in case of a European War, Turkey would cast her lot with Germany and Austria, while Italy would endeavour to keep out of the conflict, or would join the Triple Entente, was justified by the fact.

The general situation in the Balkans, acute for many years and constantly threatening the peace of Europe, had during the last few years become more threatening and complicated, and had gradually tended to make Turkey to all intents and purposes, a member of the Triple Alliance, and if not a very effective partner, in her sympathies at least, a much more real ally of Germany and Austria, than Italy. The whole situation presented without doubt, a very complicated diplomatic tangle. Austria has suddenly declared the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and Turkey had been at war with Italy in 1911-12 over the question of Tripoli, which she obtained as a result of the war, and is still occupying Rhodes and other islands of the Aegean. Thus, while Turkey had reasons for hostility to these two countries, with Germany her relations had been growing more and more intimate. It was German policy to be Turkey's patron, and to secure political and commercial control of that country. "Peaceful penetration" was the method adapted, and on account of the financial difficulties of the Turk, she found many opportunities for strengthening her hold in his country. To build and own railroads, to furnish loans, to train Turkish army, and sell munitions of war, and to dominate Turkish diplomacy were the objects pursued. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia, and the Italian war and annexation of Tripoli, threatened German influence, but she managed nevertheless, to retain it, during these periods.

In 1912, came Turkey's disastrous war with the Balkan Allies, in which German sympathies were with Turkey, but in which German support was confined to good wishes; but as the Balkan Allies fell out and fought among themselves, Turkey was able torecover Adrianople, and by the backing of Germany to retain it at the treaty of Bukharest.

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When the European crisis developed in July, 1914, it obscured an acute crisis between Turkey and Greece, which threatened war between those two countries, on account of persecutions of Greeks in Asia Minor, and the question of ownership of islands off that coast. There was rivalry between the two for Naval supremacy. Turkey had two dreadnoughts building in England, to be delivered in the Autumn, but Greece had forestalled her rival by the purchase of two battleships from the United States to reach Greece in July. Thus if war was declared in the summer, the arrival of the American battleships would give the Naval superiority in the Aegean Sea to Greece, while if Turkey delayed the crisis until the arrival of the dreadnoughts from England, a superiority would rest with Turkey. One of the results of the great war in Europe was, that the danger of a minor war between these two countries disappeared for a time.

Though Turkey did not immediately join the German powers in the European War, it soon became evident that Turkish neutrality was not likely to long continue, and many complications soon sprang up. The mobilization of Turkish Army was begun at outbreak of war, though Turkey declared intention of preserving neutrality, and British Government declared its intention of taking over the dreadnoughts "Berinje Osman" and "Reshadieh" under construction in England for Turks, and nearing completion. On Aug. 10, the German warships "Goeben " and "Breslau" reached the Dardanelles, and the next day it was learned that the Ottoman Government had bought them from Germany for the purpose, as stated, of being on a Naval equality for negotiations with Greece, and not with any intention of making war on Russia. Meanwhile, the Army mobilization was continued, new defences were prepared, and mines laid in the Dardanelles, German crews retained, and warlike preparations were daily more in evidence. Every effort was made by the Triple Entente to preserve the neutrality of Turkey during the war, and it was promised that if this neutrality was maintained, they would uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that should make use of the

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European conflict to attack her, and would recognise sale of "Goeben" and "Breslau", provided it were a genuine one, and German crews sent away. Turkey, however, on Aug. 20, made the proposal that capitulations should be immediately abolished, that two Turkish dreadnoughts taken over by Great Britain at beginning of war should be returned immediately, that there should be no interference in internal affairs of Turkey, that Western Thrace should be restored to Turkey, and that Greek Islands should be restored. To these demands the Triple Entente replied as follows:-- "If the Turkish Government will repatriate "immediately the German officers and crews of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" "will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished "for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, and "that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey "during the present war, the three Allied Powers will in return agree "with regard to the Capitulations to withdraw their extra-territorial "jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration which "will satisfy modern conditions is set up. They will further give a "joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence "and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the "terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence "and integrity."

The Triple Entente had every reason to try to preserve the neutrality of Turkey during the war, both from political and military considerations, but all their efforts were in vain. The Porte announced the abolition of the capitulations from October 1; special trains full of German officers, soldiers, and sailors were run through Bulgaria; and many military reservists were posted to garrison the Dardanelles forts. British merchant vessels carrying cargoes from Russia to the Mediterranean had throughout August been subjected to delays and searches, at the Dardanelles. The case of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" had compelled the British Navy to keep a close watch at the entrance to the Straits. On Sept. 26, a Turkish destroyer was stopped outside the Dardanelles and turned back, and thereupon the Dardanelles were closed, and in spite of assurance given by the Grand Vizier, were not

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reopened. The "Goeben" and "Breslau" made cruises in the Black Sea. By the middle of September it was estimated that there were over 4,000 German sailors and soldiers in Constantinople alone. The officers of the German military mission, under General Liman von Sanders, displayed much activity in the military affairs of Turkey, and were the principal organizers of preparations in Syria which directly menaced Egypt, and caused many British and Colonial troops to be sent there for its defence. In October, £4,000,000 ($20,000,000) was delivered to the German Ambassador at Constantinople, and it was said that a definite arrangement was arrived at, that as soon as the financial provision reached a certain figure, Turkey should be called upon to enter the war. On October 29, it was reported from Cairo, that an armed body of 2,000 Bedouins had made a raid into the Sinai peninsula, and that their object was an attack on the Suez Canal; and on the same day, 3 Turkish torpedo boats raided Odessa Harbor, sinking the Russian guard-ship, and damaging four steamers.

The protests of the British, French, and Russian Ambassadors were disregarded, and the alternative of rupture of diplomatic relations on the dismissal of German Naval and Military missions having met with an unfavorable response, the Ambassadors handed in their papers and left Constantinople, and Turkey had definitely cast her lot in the war on the side of Germany and Austria.

Effect of Turkish Participation in the War.

It may be that Turkey stood to lose no matter what her attitude might be during the war. Perhaps the fear of Russia was a more dominant factor in determining her policy, than the trust in Germany, or the Ottoman Government may have been too weak to maintain its neutrality against the strong pressure from Germany, and the ambition of Enver Pasha and otherpreminent among the Young Turks. In any case, the importance of the entrance of Turkey into the World-war, both from a political, and a military point of view cannot be overestimated.

In case of the success of the Germanic Powers, it offered chances to the Turk to regain power for his nation, and to secure his position in Europe and the East. The portugual menace to Turkey from Russia might be averted by an Alliance with Germany and Austria. The loss of prestige due to the recent disasters were with Italy and with the Balkan Allies might be neutralized, and perhaps some of the lost territory regained. Egypt and Cyprus as well as Russian Trans Caucasus might be recovered to the Ottoman Empire. India and other Moslem countries under Christian rule might be kindled into a flame of religious war with the Sultan as leader. In fact, Turkey might emerge from the war with her position in Europe assured, and a great power in the East.

To Germany and Austria the entrance of Turkey into the war was equally important, and offered numerous conditions to greatly strengthen their chances of success. It promised a chance of revolutions among the Moslem populations under England and France, in India, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunis - the results of which would be to greatly decrease the power of those countries, and their available troops for European fields. There was a chance of seizing Egypt, and the Suez Canal; and of an attack on Russia by large Turkish forces in the Caucasus, thus affording relief to the desperately engaged German and Austrian armies

on the eastern line. If the Suez Canal could be seized, and the Dardanelles held,two of the principal water-ways of the world would be under the control of the Germanic Powers, and those which it was of the utmost importance for the Allies to keep open. The control of Germany over Turkish affairs would be retained, and the chance of carrying out her policy in the near East. Perhaps the most important result would be the closing of the Dardanelles to shipping of the Allies, thus keeping from Russia vast supplies of munitions of war, of which she was in urgent need in order to put her whole enormous strength in the field, or in fact, to maintain her armies already there; while at the same time England and France would be cut off from valuable supplies of grain and oil from Russia. Even if the Turkish campaigns in the Caucasus against Russia, and in Egypt against England were not successful, they would serve to divert large military forces of the Allies for their protection, which would otherwise be available for the battlefields in the east and west of Europe, and whose absence from these fields might be sufficient to turn the scale there in favor of the Germanic Armies. Finally, the Turkish Navy, strengthened by the Goeben and Breslau, might be able to gain a temporary control of Black Sea, or at least to make raids there to harass Russia, or it might be reinforced by ships and torpedo craft from the German or Austrian Fleets.

The principal military aims of Turkey - Roumania, and Bulgaria being neutral, and Turkey being therefore separated from her Allies - thus became to seize Egypt, and the Suez Canal, or at least, to threaten them with raids, to seize Trans Caucasus and Northern Persia, and to harass Russia by naval activity in the Black Sea.

The military aims of the Allies were to force and keep open the Dardanelles, and take Constantinople; and to seize the head of the Persian Gulf, the lower valley of Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Basra the terminus of Bagdad railway, and to secure and hold the rich oil fields in this district.

on the east and west of Europe, and whose absence from these fields might be sufficient to turn the scale there in favor of the central Powers, namely, the Turkish Army, entrenched by the Dardanelles and Bosporus, might be made to play a tremendous part in favor of the Black Sea, or at least to make terms there to prevent Russia, or it might be reinforced by Italy and forbego entry into the defense of Constantinople.

The hypothetical military value of Turkey - Roumania, and Bulgaria - could hardly be overestimated from the Allied - Central Powers point of view. Turkey being effectively out of the war, and Roumania and Bulgaria out of the way, so as to release their armies, and to release the Austro-Hungarian armies, so as to open a new front on the Black Sea.

The military value of the Allies would be force and keep open

the Dardanelles, and take Constantinople; and to secure the mouth of the Danube, and to secure and keep the trade with Russia in wheat, corn, and provisions from the Black Sea ports.

Any study of the resources of Turkey, and of the country involved will soon show the tremendous difficulties of campaigns either in the Caucasus or against Egypt, and this principally on account of lack of good communications and difficulties of terrain. The country in the Caucasus is a maze of mountains from 16,000 to 17,000-ft. high, with passes at 8,000-ft., and during the winter deep in snow. There are no railroads in that section of Asia Minor, and reinforcements for Turkish Army in that vicinity would have to come via Tribizond, or other Black Sea port, which, if Russia held control of the Black Sea, would be impracticable. Any attack on the Suez Canal is even more difficult. Here, the Turkish Army would have to be concentrated at Jerusalem, and other parts of southern Syria, and would be separated from its objective by miles of waterless desert. No advance could be made over this by a very large force with heavy guns, until a light railroad was laid, which would take considerable time, and moreover, the line of the Suez Canal is a particularly strong one to force.

For the Allies, the operations in the Persian Gulf presented no such difficulties. A force could be sent there from India, and this was done, and the district occupied soon after the declaration of war on Turkey.

The operations in the Dardanelles on the other hand was a tremendous undertaking, presenting the greatest difficulties to the Allies In fact, it was held by many that to force the Straits would be impossible, without a very strong fleet acting in conjunction with large military forces; and this operation was not undertaken until the latter part of February.

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Turkish Army and Navy.

The strength of the Turkish Army is more difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy than that of any other country in Europe. While the Turkish Empire includes 20 million inhabitants, there are so many nationalities and religions embraced in this figure, and so many of the people are remote and cannot be mobilized, that the Turkish Army could only draw soldiers from about half this population.

The Balkan War of 1912-13, reduced considerably the military prestige of the Turkish Empire, and deprived it of certain sources of its power. The faults in organization and administration of this Army are such that in itself it could not be considered as an efficient force in modern war, but on the other hand owing to its considerable numbers, and the good fighting qualities of the Turkish soldier, it might under German leadership and control, be made a very useful factor in the war. The army in the field would rarely if ever correspond with the paper estimates, and there would always have to be large deductions made on account of Turkish methods, lack of money, intrigues, and other embarrassments.

According to the latest estimates, the peace strength of the Army was 17,000 officers, 250000 men, 45,000 horses, 1,500 guns, and 400 machine guns. There were 130 regiments of infantry, 70 rifle battalions, and 13 frontier battalions. About 473 battalions in all. The second line was intended to provide 500 battalions more. The infantry are armed with Mauser Magazine rifle.

There were 200 squadrons of Cavalry, each regiment having 5 squadrons of 70 men each, armed with sabre and Mauser carbine.

The Field Artillery consisted of 35 regiments of two or three battalions - 3 batteries to a battalion;; 23 mountain Artillery battalions; 10 horse batteries; and 18 heavy howitzer batteries. Most of the batteries had 4 guns.

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The Field Artillery consisted of 35 regiments of two or three battalions - 3 batteries to a battalion; 23 mountain Artillery battalions; 10 horse batteries; and 12 heavy howitzer batteries. Most of the batteries had 4 guns.

Each Army Corps has 3 divisions of 27 battalions, with 9 machine gun companies, 6 rifle battalions, 3 cavalry regiments; 12 batteries of field, 3 of horse, 6 mountain, and 3 of heavy artillery.

There are nominally, four armies. The first consisted of the 1,2,3, and 4 Army Corps with Headquarters at Constantinople, Rodosto, Kirke Kilisse, and Adrianople.

The second consisted of 5, 6, and 8 Army Corps, the first two in Europe, and the 8th with Headquarters at Damascus. The third army included, 9, 10, and 11 Army Corps at Erzerum, Erzinghian, and Van. The fourth army included the 12, and 13 Army Corps at Mossul and Bagdad. The 14 Army Corps which was independent, was at Sanaa, Hodeida and Ebka.

Mobilization had been in progress since the war began, and it is estimated that there are now 500,000 more or less trained men with the army, and 250,000 or more untrained men at the depots.

. At and near Constantinople, there were, when Turkey entered the war, the 1, 3, and 5 Army Corps, and part of the 6th. There were also the Bosphorus defence troops, several cavalry brigades, etc. In Thrace were the 2 and most of the 6 Corps; 3 Cavalry brigades, and Dardanelles defence troops. At Smyrna, was part of the 4th Corps. In Palestine, was the 8th Corps, and numerous irregular Arab troops, etc.

The main mass of the Turkish Army (over 250,000 men) was thus in Europe, the next largest body was on the Russian frontier in Asia Minor (about 150,000 men) and the third mass was near the borders of Egypt (about 65,000 men).

The Turkish Navy consisted of 3 old battleships of about 10,000 tons each; a small harbor defence ship of 2,400 tons; 2 small cruisers, 3 torpedo gun-boats, 10 small destroyers, and 10 torpedo boats. The chief strength of the Turkish Navy was in the battle cruiser Goeben and the cruiser Breslau, both formerly of the German Navy. A list of ships of the Turkish Navy is appended.

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Operations Leading up to Attack on Dardanelles.

After the entrance of Turkey into the war, in the early part of November, operations were undertaken by her in the Caucasus, Egypt, and in the Black Sea, for all of which she had been mobilizing her forces and preparing previous to that time.

On Nov. 18, The Russian Black Sea Fleet engaged the Goeben and Breslau both of which disappeared in the fog, the former damaged to some extent by the Russian fire. The Goeben also ran on a mine at a later date, and was so badly damaged, that she could not be repaired at the Turkish yards for some months, and when she did again take the sea, the first part of April her speed was much reduced.

On Dec. 12, submarine B 11 entered the Dardanelles, dived under five rows of mines, and torpedoed the Turkish battleship Missudiyeh which was guarding the mine-fields. Although pursued by gunfire and torpedo boats, the B 11 returned safely after being submerged on one occasion for 9 hours.

These disasters to the Turkish Navy destroyed all hope of Turkey obtaining naval control of the Black Sea, which thus definitely passed to Russia. Turkish troops could not be moved thereon without great danger, and the Russian fleet succeeded in sinking a number of transports and supply ships, and bombarded TREBIZOND and other ports on the Asia Minor coast.

On Dec. 17, the Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was ended, and Egypt annexed to the British Empire, strong military forces having been collected therefor its defence, consisting of British Territorials and Indian troops, and also contingents from Australia and New Zealand.

About the middle of November a force consisting of a division of Indian troops was landed at the head of the Persian Gulf, defeated and drove back the small Turkish force in that region, and occupied Basra and Kurna. This operation put the British in possession of the lower

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These disasters to the Turkish Navy destroyed all hope of Turkey obtaining naval control of the Black Sea, which thus definitely passed to Russia. Turkish troops could not be moved thereon without great danger, and the Russian fleet succeeded in sinking a number of transports and supply ships, and bombarded ZONGULDJ and other ports on the Asia Minor coast.

On Dec. 17, the Turkish suzerainty over Egypt was ended, and Egypt annexed to the British Empire, strong military forces having been collected therefor its defence, consisting of British Territorials and Indian troops, and also contingents from Australia and New Zealand.

About the middle of November a force consisting of a division of Indian troops was landed at the head of the Persian Gulf, defeated and drove back the small Turkish force in that region, and occupied Basra and Kurna. This operation put the British in possession of the lower

Tigris and Euphrates, the terminus of the Bagdad railway (not yet completed), and the important oil fields of that district. This country is still held, though the Turks have made various attacks here, the most important of which was one near Basra in April, by a force of about 15,000 which resulted in the driving back of Turks with heavy losses.

As Turkey did not enter the war until the beginning of November, military operations in the Caucasus could be undertaken only with great difficulty, which with a long and ardous desert march before her towards Egypt, with Bulgaria and Greece neutral, and the Navy incapable of more than raids, made it appear as if Turkey's participation in the war would for months to come, be of little more than a nominal kind. The Turks, however, under their German leaders did not let the winter pass without undertaking both of these campaigns. No doubt the Germans hoped that by an immediate vigorous campaign in the Caucasus, Russia would be forced to detach considerable forces from the eastern theatre of war, and thus relieve the pressure upon herself and Austria. The Russians were, however, prepared for Turkey, whose hand had been plainly shown from the beginning of the European War. The Russian Army in the Caucasus stood at its post, and when Turkey entered the war, no men were transferred from the eastern front.

The Russian troops crossed the Turkish frontier and drove the Turkish advance bodies back towards Erzerum. This was only a demonstration and not an advance in force, the general policy of Russia being to act for the time on the defensive in this theatre. At the end of November, the Turks began to develop their advance having concentrated the 9th, 10th and 11th Corps at Erzerum. The Russian concentration took place at Kars, distant about 100 miles. The whole intervening country between these two fortresses is a tangle of mountain ridges, and snow swept valleys. The plan of the Turks, as prepared by the Germans, was to attempt the envelopment of the Russians. Though the Turks had superiority in numbers, about 150,000 to 100,000, such a plan in this difficult country, covered with snow, without railroads or good roads, and depending on the Black Sea via Trebizond for reinforcements had little chance.

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The Turkish plan, however, in spite of difficulties of communications, and of timing various movements, came near to success, but the stubborn Russian resistance at all points upset the Turkish plan of delivering a sudden stunning blow on inferior forces. The fighting went against the Turks, two of whose Army Corps wereaalmost annihilated, and in the first part of January the Turkish forces were driven back into Asia Minor, Trebizond, was bombarded and communications by Black Sea cut, and the remnants of the Turkish Army as well as the civil population of Erzerum and surrounding country have since been decimated by disease and hunger.

The Turkish forces for operations against the Suez Canal were mobilized in southern Palestine with Jerusalen as a base, and various reconnaissances of small forces were made in the Sinai peninsula. In January these forces were said to number 65,000. No extensive operations could however, be undertaken until a railroad was built across the desert, and this would take considerable time, but was necessary in order to supply troops with water, transport heavy guns, etc. Nevertheless, a reconnaissance in force, or raid, by about 12,000 men, was attempted and succeeded in transporting light guns, and briging equipage.

On Feb. 2 and 3, the Turks tried to cross the canal but were repulsed with considerable loss by British forces, and lost most of their bridging outfit. It is difficult to see what such a small force could have accomplished, but it seems that they hoped to get possession of a portion of canal temporarily, and accomplish some destruction. The British forces do not appear to have advanced across the canal in any great strength, until the morning of Feb. 4th. They collected about 600 prisoners, but the bulk of the Turkish force got away with the guns. By Feb. 8th. there were no Turks within 20 miles of the canal. There was no organized pursuit, but enemy suffered losses of about 1,000 in dead and wounded.

It is understood that German engineers are busy with light railway in Syria, and other attempts against the canal will perhaps be undertaken. The raid in February at least showed that the Turks can cross the desert in some strength, and can bring guns with them.

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The first few months of her war had therefore been disastrous. The territory at the head of the Persian Gulf had been occupied by the British, the operations in the Caucasus and in Egypt had resulted in complete failures; the Turkish Navy had been roughly handled, and transports sunk in Black Sea and towns bombarded. By keeping the Dardanelles closed and defended, and thus shutting off munitions of war from Russia, so necessary to her in developing the full strength of her army, as well as supplies of grain and oil for Great Britain and France, Turkey could still, however, exercise a considerable influence on the results of the war.

The forcing of the Dardanelles became, after the entrance of Turkey into the war, one of the important features of the Allies' strategy. When such an attack could be made depended much on the results of operations in other theatres of the war. Operations in the Dardanelles being far removed from the main theatres, and to a certain extent a secondary operation, any attempt there likely to weaken the Allies in the principal theatres in the east and west of Europe would be open to criticism. The disastrous results of the Turkish campaigns, however, in the Caucasus, Egypt, and Mesapotamia, and their naval losses in the Black Sea; together with deadlock on the western front, defeat of German armored cruiser squadron in the North Sea; clearing of the sea of German cruisers; and apparent secure position, preponderance in force, and limited field of activities for British and French fleets; and the importance of the results to be achieved by a successful attack on the Dardanelles seemed to warrant the move.

The political and strategical results of the forcing of the Dardanelles would be of the utmost importance to the Allies cause. If the straits could be forced, Constantinople would be at the mercy of the Allies' fleets, European would be separated from Asiatic Turkey without means of sending reinforcements from one to the other, and the Ottoman Empire might be compelled to sue for peace. German interests

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in Turkey would be lost. Russia might be freely supplied with the munitions of war so vital to her successful military operations, and the mobilizing of her full strength, and Great Britain and France could draw on Russia for grain and oil. Any threat of further operations against the Caucasus or Egypt would be lessened or completely disappear; and the effect on the Balkan States of Roumania, Greece, and Bulgaria now hesitating on the brink of war, and whose policy had been such a source of trouble and uncertainty to the Allies, might be to cause them to join them or come out openly in their support. The decision of Italy might also be hastened.

To force the Dardanelles in view of the strong and numerous fortifications defending the straits, and the other difficulties attending the work was a task for the combined operations not only of a powerful fleet, but also of a strong landing force. To insure success and that the Straits should be forced in the shortest time, and with a minimum of loss would probably require the joint action of a strong British and French naval force in the Dardanelles, in conjunction with the Russian Black Sea Fleet at the other end in the Bosphorous; and the operation was not one that could be left to the Navy alone, but would also require strong military forces from these countries to act in conjunction with the fleets. The situation was such that a naval force would accomplish little unsupported by a landing force. If, however, the operation would have to be undertaken by both military and naval forces of Great Britain, France, and Russia, acting together, we may form some estimate of the great difficulty in co-ordinating plans to provide for the best use of the 3 armies, and 3 fleets involved. Successful co-operation under the circumstances could only result from a well matured plan, a good system of command, and thorough accord and team work among the various forces.

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It became an affair of ships against forts and mines, and the result was naturally disastrous to the ships. The attack was started earlier than anticipated, owing to conditions stated above, and the military expeditionary forces were not ready to participate. To undertake such an affair was to count too much upon the inefficiency of the Turks, on the second-class character of the fortifications, and the effect of their guns being outranged by the ships, on the east of guarding against mine fields and drifting mines, and on the chance of creating panic in Constantinople by the threat of forcing the Straits.

Military Geography and Defences of the Dardanelles.

The Dardanelles is over 31 miles in length from the Sea of Marmora to the Aegean. At the mouth of the Straits are over 4,000 yards across, from which they open out until near the Narrows. The Narrows are 13½ miles from the mouth, about 3 miles in length, and at Chanak less than 2,000 yards from the European to Asiatic shore. while at Nagara the distance apart of the two shores is slightly more. The two most critical points for a fleet in the Straits are the passage at Chanak, and opposite Nagara Point. More than 20 miles beyond Naraga Point the Straits broaden out into the Sea of Marmora.

North of the Straits on the European side is the Gallipoli Peninsula closed by the isthmus of Bulair. This isthmus is only about 3 miles wide at its narrowest point, and across this narrow neck have been constructed permanent works to defend the peninsula from an attack by land. On the peninsula are a confused mass of heights, the higher summits of which are in a range along a part of the northern coast, the peaks here rising to an elevation of over 1,000-ft., the highest being over 1,200-ft. On the rest of the peninsula is a confused mass of hills whose summits are from 400 to 1,000-ft.

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The position of the forts at the Narrows with respect to the northern coast line of the Gallipoli peninsula renders indirect fire over the peninsula practicable. The shortest range from the open sea to the main forts of Kilidbahr is about 11,000-yards, and to the Asiatic shore beyond 14,000 yards. It is therefore possible for the latest and most powerful battleships to attack both shores by indirect fire. The reduction of forts upon the Narrows from the open sea depending on heavy guns operating with accuracy at over 11,000 yards, observation from the air above target to correct fire, and communications from aeroplanes to ships to regulate fire. These conditions did not exist when the Dardanelles forts were designed, and consequently there is only one small permanent work on north shore of peninsula.

Between the Narrows and open sea to the north west - that is in line with the shortest range - there is a flat topped hill, the Pasha Dagh, about 650 feet high, and sloping down rather steeply to the Narrows, and gently towards the open sea, in such a way that ships lying in the open sea can hit some of the works on northern shore at Narrows, and with greater accuracy those on Asiatic side.

The permanent works at the Narrows are the strongest in the Dardanelles. The most powerful group is upon the slope of the Pasha Dagh, and here within the limits of a little over a mile are 12 permanent works.

Upon the Asiatic shore opposite, are 4 principal works near the town of Chanak.

There are also in the Narrows besides the above 7 works on the Asiatic and 5 works on the European side. These latter, however, would seem to be less difficult to force than those defending the Narrows at Chanak.

The shores are steep everywhere in the Dardanelles, and there is a great depth of water, except in bight below Chanak, where the 5 fathom line comes well out from the shore. The current runs from Black to Aegean Sea, and at places has a speed of from 4 to 5 knots.

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The attack upon the Dardanelles is chiefly a Naval operation, with a naval object, but which depends on the joint operations of strong land forces for its success. If the Isthmus of Bulair is captured and held by a power commanding the sea, the reduction of the forts, with modern siege train, and high explosives, would be only a question of time.

This isthmus is occupied by one big hill with three summits between 400 and 500-ft. high, the 200 foot contour reaching close to the sea, upon each side. The highest summit near the centre of the isthmus has a permanent work, and there are entrenched lines following the ridge and reaching across the narrowest part. This line can be turned by a power in command of the sea. A range of 6,000 yards will carry clear over the isthmus, and there is deep water clear up to the north-western shore.

The whole of the Gallipoli peninsula may be regarded as a large fortress, and in March was said to have a garrison of 60,000 Turks. Besides the permanent works shown on the map, the terrain offers opportunities to place heavy howitzers in concealed positions, and lighter guns and howitzers which could be moved from point to point.

The terrain on the Asiatic side is flatter near the entrance to the Dardanelles, where are the plains of Troy, and the river Meander, flowing in northerly direction and emptying near Kum Kale. Further up the shore is lined with a mass of high hills, the highest near Chanak, where a peak rises to over 1,500-ft.

From Bulair at end of Dardanelles to Constantinople across the length of the Sea of Marmora is a little over 100 miles; and Constantinople is practically undefended from this sea. It is, however, defended from a land attack by the famous Tchataldja lines extending from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora, about 25 miles in length and the same distance from the city; and there is an inner line of defences from sea to sea a few miles from the city.

The Bosphorus extends for about 15 miles from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora. It has many windings, is very narrow, and

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The Bosphorus extends for about 18 miles from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora. It has many windings, is very narrow, and

reaches between high hills on each side. It is defended by numerous forts and batteries on each side of the Straits. These forts are not supposed to be so strong as those at the Dardanelles, but to force the passage might be even more difficult.

As Russia has command of the Black Sea, she is in a position to land a large invading force near Constantinople, either on European or Asiatic side. The work of Russian fleet should, therefore, be confined to covering the landing, and maintaining oversea communications. Only a long range bombardment of forts would probably be attempted. From Cape Rumili to Constantinople, is only about 15 miles, but the Straits are very narrow - at points not over half a mile wide. The whole passage is difficult, and there are heights on each side from which a plunging fire can be delivered, which would given an immense advantage to guns on shore, and little opportunity for outranging an account of turns, and over a part of course ships would have to steam in column.

Malta and Bizerta the bases for British and French fleets are distant about 800 miles from the Dardanelles. Tenedos and Imbros islands that belong to Turkey and suitable for advance bases are about 12 and 30 miles respectively. Lemnos, a Greek island is about 30 miles distant, and Mytilene and other Greek islands at short distances. Alexandria, a base for military forces operating against the Straits is 700 miles distant. Smyrna, the second city of the Turkish Empireis a good naval base, defended by forts, and connected with Constantinople, about 250 miles distant, by railroad.

The theatre of the Dardanelles and Constantinople had during the few years before the present war, figured in military operations. In the war with Italy in 1912, when the war had dragged on for a long time, and Italy had been unable to bring a decision by operations in Africa, she sought to bring the war nearer home to Turkey, and seized some of the islands off the coast of Asia Minor. At that time, it was rumored that Italy intended to attack the Dardanelles. The attack, however, went no further than a bombardment of forts at Kum Kale by the Italian Fleet, whereupon Turkey closed the Straits for a month to

the great inconvenience of shipping, and did not open them until assured that attack would not be renewed.

During the Balkan War in 1913, Turkish and Bulgarian Armies confronted each other for months on the Tchataldja and Bulair lines without either side being able to advance; and towards the end of the war, a Turkish force of two Army Corps was sent to attack Bulgarian forces confronting Bulair lines. Part of this force reinforced Turks on Gallipoli peninsula, but attack on Bulgarians there was defeated with heavy loss; and other part attempting to land at various points in Sea of Marmora, and unsupported by the Turkish fleet, was almost annihilated.

The Dardanelles and Bosphorous defences are shown on maps attached.

FIRST ATTACK.

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

The attack on the Dardanelles began on Feb. 19th. The following account of operations is taken from Admiralty statements:--

"At 8 a.m. Feb. 19, a British fleet of battleships and battle cruisers, accompanied by flotillas, and aided by a strong French squadron, the whole under the command of Vice Admiral Sackville H. Carden, began an attack upon the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles.

"The forts at Cape Helles and Kum Kale were bombarded with deliberate long range fire. Considerable effect was produced upon two of the forts. Two others were frequently hit, but being open earthworks, it was difficult to estimate the damage. The forts being outranged were not able to reply to fire.

"At 2.45 p.m. a portion of the battleship force was ordered to close and engage forts at a closer range with secondary armament. The forts on both sides of the entrance opened fire, and were engaged at moderate ranges by Vengeance, Cornwallis, Triumph, Suffren, Gaulois, Bouvet, supported by Inflexible and Agamemnon at long range. The forts on the European side were apparently silenced. One fort on the Asiatic side was still firing when the ~~fleet~~ operation was suspended owing to fading light. No ship of the Allied fleet was hit. The action was resumed the following morning, the forts being further damaged."

On Feb. 25, the forts at entrance to the Dardanelles were again bombarded and reduced by the combined Anglo-French squadrons. The forts at the entrance were shattered by fire of Allied Fleet, including the new British dreadnought "Queen Elizabeth" which had joined attacking fleet. Demolition parties were landed under protection of Marine Brigade Royal Naval Division, and completed the destruction of the forts.

On the 26th, the Dardanelles bombardment continued. The Straits were swept for 4 miles from entrance. British warships proceeded to limit of swept area, and bombarded Dardanus and other forts.

On March 1, the battleships went in the straits bombarding forts at C. Kephez, and opposite on European shore.

On March 4, sweeping and bombarding operations were continued, demolition parties landed to continue clearance of ground at entrance of Straits. The Sapphire silenced a battery of field guns in Gulf of Adramyti, and defences at Bisika were shelled by Prince George.

March 5, Dardanelles operations opened by indirect fire from Queen Elizabeth which fired 29 rounds upon defences at Narrows. This attack was supported by Inflexible and Prince George. Magazine in Fort L was blown up, and two other forts damaged.

March 6, "the Queen Elizabeth supported by Agamemnon and Ocean began to attack forts U and V by indirect fire across Gallipoli peninsula at 21,000 yards. These forts were armed as follows:--

"U" 2 - 14-in. guns.	"V" 2 - 14-in. guns.
7 - 9.4-in. "	1 - 9.4-in. "
	1 - 8.2-in. "
	4 - 5.9-in. "

"Queen Elizabeth was replied to by howitzers and field guns, and 3 shells from field guns struck her without doing any damage.

"Meanwhile, inside the Straits. Vengeance, Albion, Majestic, Prince George, and the French battleship Suffren, fired on forts F. and E. and were fired on by a number of concealed guns. Fort J. which had been attacked on previous day opened fire, and was engaged and hit by 12" shells. The majority of the ships inside were struck by shells, but there was no serious damage and no casualties.

"On March 7, the weather continuing calm and fine, the four French battleships entered the Straits to cover the direct bombardment of the defences of the Narrows by the Agamemnon and Lord Nelson. The French ships engaged Dardanus battery and various

On Feb. 25, the forts at entrance to the Dardanelles were again bombarded and reduced by the combined Anglo-French squadrons. The forts at the entrance were shattered by fire of Allied Fleet, including the new British dreadnought "Queen Elizabeth" which had joined attacking fleet. Demolition parties were landed under protection of Marine Brigade Royal Naval Division, and completed the destruction of the forts.

On the 26th, the Dardanelles bombardment continued. The Straits were swept for 4 miles from entrance. British warships proceeded to limit of swept area, and bombarded Dardanus and other forts.

On March 1, the battleships went in the straits bombarding forts at C. Kephez, and opposite on European shore.

On March 4, sweeping and bombarding operations were continued, demolition parties landed to continue clearance of ground at entrance of Straits. The Sapphire silenced a battery of field guns in Gulf of Adramyti, and defences at Biaika were shelled by Prince George.

March 5, Dardanelles operations opened by indirect fire from Queen Elizabeth which fired 29 rounds upon defences at Narrows. This attack was supported by Inflexible and Prince George. Magazine in fort I was blown up, and two other forts damaged.

March 6, "the Queen Elizabeth supported by Agamemnon and Ocean began to attack forts U and V by indirect fire across Gallipoli peninsula at 21,000 yards. These forts were armed as follows:--

"U" 2 - 14-in. Guns.	"V" 2 - 14-in. Guns.
7 - 9.4-in. "	1 - 9.4-in. "
	1 - 8.2-in. "
	4 - 5.9-in. "

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concealed guns, silencing the former. Agamemnon and Lord Nelson then advanced and engaged the forts at the Narrows at 14,000 to 12,000 yards by direct fire. Forts J. and W. replied. Both were silenced after heavy bombardment. Explosions occurred in both forts. Gaulois, Agamemnon, and Lord Nelson were struck three times each, but not seriously damaged. While these operations were in progress, the Dublin continued to watch the Bulair Isthmus. She was fired at by 4" guns, and struck 3 or 4 times.

"Owing to the importance of locating the concealed guns, seaplanes had to fly very low on occasions, and suffered some damage and casualties. The Ark Royal is equipped with every appliance necessary for the repair and maintenance of the numerous air craft she carries."

On March 8th, the Queen Elizabeth supported by four battleships entered the Straits and bombarded forts at the Narrows.

On March 19th, the Admiralty issued the following statement:--

"Mine sweeping having been in progress the last 10 days inside the Straits, a general attack was delivered by the British and French Fleets yesterday morning upon the forts at the Narrows of the Dardanelles.

"At 10.45 a.m. Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Agamemnon, and Lord Nelson bombarded forts, J. L. T. U. and V; while Triumph and Prince George fired at batteries E. F. and H. A heavy fire was opened on the ships from howitzers and field guns. At 12.22 the French squadron consisting of the Charlemagne, Suffren, Gaubois, and Bouvet advanced up the Dardanelles to engage the forts at closer range. Forts V, U, F. and E. replied strongly. Their fire was silenced by the 10 battleships inside the Straits, all the ships being hit several timed during this part of the action.

"By 1.25 p.m. all forts had ceased firing, Vengeance, Irresistible, Albion, Ocean, Swiftsure, and Majestic then advanced to relieve the 6 old battleships inside the Straits. As the French squadron which had engaged the forts in the most brilliant manner was passing out, Bouvet was blown up by a drifting mine, and sank in 36 fathoms north of Erinkior village, in less than 3 minutes.

"At 2.36 p.m. the relief battleships resumed the attack on the forts who again opened fire. The attack on the forts was maintained while the operations of the mine sweepers continued. At 4.9 the Irresistible quitted the line, listing heavily, and at 5.50 she sank having probably struck a drifting mine. At 6.5 Ocean, also having struck a mine, sank in deep water; practically the whole of the crews of both vessels having been removed under a hot fire.

"The Gaubbis was damaged by gunfire. Inflexible had her forward control position hit by a heavy shell, and requires repair.

"The bombardment of the forts, and the mine sweeping operations terminated when darkness fell. The damage to the forts effected by a prolonged direct fire of the very powerful forces cannot yet be estimated, and a further report will follow."

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"The losses of ships were caused by mines drifting with the current which were encountered in areas hitherto swept clear, and this danger will require special treatment.

"The British casualties in personnel are not heavy considering the scale of the operations, but practically the whole of the crew of the Bouvet were lost with the ship, an internal explosion having apparently supervened on the explosion of the mine.

"The Queen and Implacable, which were dispatched from England to replace ships casualties in anticipation of this operation are due to arrive immediately, thus bringing the British Fleet up to its original strength.

"The operations are continuing, ample naval and military forces being available on the spot.

"On the 16th inst. Vice Admiral Carden, who has been incapacitated by illness, was succeeded in the Chief Command by Rear Admiral de Robeck with acting rank of Vice Admiral."

The general procedure in this naval attack on the Dardanelles was about as follows:-- To use Malta and Bizerta as bases and Tenedos as an advance base for the fleets. To carry on long range bombardment of group of forts until the guns were apparently silenced; then to send in ships to closer range to complete the work of destruction with their lighter armaments. The distance to which these ships were sent in was limited to area up to which mine sweeping operations have been carried out. To use the Queen Elizabeth with her large 15" guns, and sometimes other ships for indirect fire. To use aeroplanes to correct results of indirect and long range fire, note damage done, and positions of newly mounted guns. To sweep Bulair Isthmus with fire from ships, destroy defences there, and make it difficult or impracticable to reinforce Gallipoli peninsula. To use destroyers, trawlers, etc. for sweeping mine areas. To land demolition parties, covered by force of Marines, and fire from ships, where practicable, to complete demolition of forts that had been silenced.

Up to Mar. 17, three weeks after attack on Dardanelles began, there were gales and a good deal of thick weather, so that long range bombardment had been practicable on only about 7 days, as at such ranges it would be essential for effective fire both for gun pointer to see his mark, and for those observing fire to detect where shells fall to correct the range. Without such observation, long range fire is of course a waste of

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ammunition. In any case the number of shells used to destroy so many forts would have to be prodigious. The operations in any case could only have been continued by sending the ships close in, which even if the Straits were swept clear of mines, would greatly endanger them from fire of the forts. The operations being interrupted for such long periods the Turks had ample time not only to repair the forts and get guns ready to meet new bombardments, but also to plant other guns and howitzers in concealed positions,

The great advantage of the forts over the ships was that though they might be termporarily silenced by ship fire, their permanent destruction was practically impossible, unless demolition parties were landed; and that in the face of a strong covering mobile force would be a very difficult operation for the fleet which necessarily had only a limited number of men available. If the fleets had been accompanied by a military force capable of extensive operations both against the mobile field army and of attacking forts from land side, matters would have been simplified.

If the forcing of the Dardanelles had been a naval problem only, and if waste of ammunition and of time were a matter of indifference the operations might have continued as they had begun. But a rapid solution was of the utmost importance, and the ammunition question was serious. The forcing of the Dardanelles was not, however, a purely Naval problem as must have been apparent from the first. Military forces were absolutely essential, and when the military forces were fully employed, the function of the fleet should have been principally to cover the advance of the Army and protect communications. The ships guns supporting the artillery on shore, and maintaining fire on the enemy's defences up to time the assault was delivered; but obviously such an effective fire could not be maintained from a very long range.

Reports of military expeditions were current soon after the attack was begun by the fleet. A French Army under General d'Amande was concentrated near Bizerta. The island of Lemnos was used for a time as a base for military expeditions, and here on March 18, there were encamped a part of the French forces and an Australian contingent

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and there were about 40 transports in the harbour. The French Army was about the the first of April moved to Egypt, and camped near Alexandria. A British force under General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O. who was to command combined British and French forces was assembled in Egypt. And a Russian Army was rumoured to be assembling at Odessa.

Why the military expeditions were so long in getting ready, and a landing for operations against Dardanelles was so long delayed is not apparent. The difficulties of preparing such large expeditionary forces composed of such a variety of national units, so far from the home countries and without suitable bases near the objective, were no doubt very great, and there were also political conditions which may have caused delay and change in original plans.

The four outer forts were reduced by the fleet without a great deal of trouble, but even here the limitations of ships in an action against shore defences was so apparent that it is remarkable the operations should have been so long persisted in, without the aid of land forces. These forts had only 10 - 10.2" and 4 - 9.2" guns, and it is not probable that any of them were of latest type. Yet they survived the first heavy bombardment, and were finally reduced after over 7 hours firing from 9 battleships, one the Queen Elizabeth, all the ships making excellent practice against a poor reply. Moreover, some of the guns were found still mounted when demolition party was landed, and the Turks concealed behind the ruins of the forts and villages caused considerable loss to the brigade of Royal Marines covering demolition parties, until finally driven off by fire from the ships.

From these preliminary operations, it was possible to estimate the magnitude of the task on which the Allied Fleet was engaged, and to arrive at the conclusion that, if the Turks made best use of defensive possibilities and unless their resistance suddenly collapsed, progress was likely to be extremely slow, difficult, and costly. The work at the entrance was only preliminary and not to be compared with that when the Narrows came within zone of operations. Yet many people in England, and some Naval authorities among them seemed to look on the forcing of

forces. Those forts had only 10 - 10.5" and 4 - 8.5" guns, and it is not proposed that any of them more of heavier type. Yet they average the later naval requirements, and more usually reached still over 7 tons. Using from 8 destroyers, one the Queen Elizabeth, all the ships could excellent practice against a poor enemy. Moreover, some of the guns were found still mounted when demolition party was landed, and the forts commanded nearly the entire of the forts and ALL could be brought to bear of the purpose of novel naval coverage demolition parties, until finally driven off by fire from the ships.

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The fort ontes forts were reduced by the first attack a final demolition of ships in an action which could have been so long sustained in, although the old of land defenses were obsolete, they were still formidable and could only be reduced by a combined military and naval operation.

A British force under General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., K.C.M.G. and the combined British and French forces were mustered in [illegible]. The following extracts from a letter of Major Wood to [illegible], and cabled home immediately.

"The British force consisted of the 29th Division, 13th Brigade, 42nd Division, Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, Royal Naval Division, and 1st Mounted Brigade, and 1 Indian Brigade, and 1 Squadron Australian Light Horse, and 1 Company Engineers, and 1 Signal Company, and 1 Field Troop Engineers, and 1 Mounted Troop Engineers, and 1 Mounted Troop Signall

the Dardanelles as not much more than a Naval parade to be accomplished in a few weeks at most.

The Admiralty seems to have grown impatient at the delay, and limited results caused by long range fire, and to have ordered ships in to make an attack on forts at closer range, apparently believing it practicable to reduce the forts guarding the Dardanelles, and get ships through, or at least to give mine sweepers such support as would enable them to successfully clear the Straits. If this was the idea it was reckless in the extreme, and doomed to meet with disaster. Three battleships were sunk in the attempt, and three others considerably damaged, one of which the Gaulois was only saved by being beached at Tenedos, and this without accomplishing any results commensurate with the heavy loss.

It has been said that Admiral Carden was opposed to taking this risk, and resigned his command rather than to take fleet in for a close bombardment of Narrows defences. However, this may be he was relieved shortly before the attempt was made, and Admiral de Roebeck put in command

After this disastrous action on May.18, there was little news of Naval or Military operations there for over a month. During this time the fleets were repaired, and their strength increased by the joining of new units, and the military expeditions were concentrated in Egypt preparatory to a renewal of attack by combined operations. The ships were protected against mines and torpedoes by fitting them with double nets and other means. Some mine sweeping and reconnaissance were carried out, but little bombardment of the forts. During one of these reconnaissances a British submarine was lost, and about the middle of April the transport MANITOU, with British troops was attacked in the Aegean by a Turkish torpedo boat from Smyrna, three torpedoes being fired without a hit, but 51 men on transport were lost owing to capsizing of boats on which they were attempting to abandon the ship. The Turkish torpedo boat was then chased by British destroyers that had come up, and ran ashore and was destroyed on coast of Chios.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet bombarded forts at the entrance to the Bosphorous late in March at long range. Early in April, the Turkish

Fleet made a raid into Black Sea, when the Hamidish struck a mine and was damaged, and the Goeben, which was reported as much reduced in speed, engaged in an action with Russians at long range and was driven back to the Bosphorous.

Smyrna was also attacked early in March by East Indian squadron for purpose of demolishing fortifications, in order that it could not be used as a naval base by the enemy. In this attack the Swiftsure and Triumph joined. The forts were first bombarded at long range producing no response; then mine sweepers were sent in, forts opened on them and ships came in to closer range and engaged. One of the forts fired well making 8 hits on the ships, but causing no great damage. The bombardment did not apparently do very much damage to forts which were not reduced. In April flights were made over Smyrna by aeroplanes, bombs dropped and considerable damage reported. From observations of aviators at that time it was estimated that there were 35,000 Turkish troops at Smyrna occupying trenches recently dug between Vosula and Smyrna, and heights which dominate the city; the two forts of Two Brothers and Restrati, which had been rebuilt; and a new fort constructed above the farm of St. George which was said to be armed with 30 guns brought from Constantinople.

The Naval activities at the Dardanelles brought Malta to much prominence as a Naval base. English and French fleets and transports collected there in large numbers. Supplies, munitions, and ammunition were drawn from its arsenals, and to it damaged ships retired to be docked and repaired. The wounded found accomodation in its hospitals, and it served as a port of call for transports on their way to Egypt and the Dardanelles.

While Admiral Jellicoe and the main British fleet blockades the German coast, and the main French fleet is bottling up the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic, practically the whole of the powerful pre-Dreadnought fleet are free to attack Dardanelles, and to assist British and French armies to land to open the Straits and attack Constantinople.

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A purely Naval attack had, however, been unable to drive the Turks from the Gallipoli Peninsula. There is plenty of cover among the hills and besides fire from forts, and danger from mines, howitzers, and guns could be mounted to shell ships from concealed positions. Even had the ships succeeded in reducing the forts, so long as Turkish troops with artillery held the peninsula, traffic through the Straits would not be safe. And even if mine fields were all swept there would still be danger from floating mines.

For ships alone to force the Straits and appear before Constantinople was clearly impracticable, if Turks made best use of defensive possibilities, and this in spite of large naval force available, weight of primary armament, excellence of gunnery, and means of observation from large number of aeroplanes. Having made such preparations to force the Straits the Allies were obliged to carry the attempt through at any cost, and could not afford to fail, not only on account of military importance but also from political considerations, and because the eyes of the world were on them.

Why then did the fleet attempt to force the Dardanelles in March - an attempt, which made without the support of military forces, not only led to a considerable disaster, but gave the Turks and Germans many weeks to organize their defence. There are only two answers which can at present be offered to this question. The first is that the British Admiralty was guilty of a gigantic and easily avoidable blunder. The other is that their plan was **apoilt** at the last moment by the downfall of Venizilos the Greek Premier. An interesting article in support of this second reason appeared in the "New Statesman" of April 17, and is quoted below:--

> "In the last week of February a **powerful squadron** of British and French ships began a bombardment of the Dardanelles, and successfully reduced the 4 small forts at the mouth. No secret was made of the importance of the operation comtemplated; the official communiques were more than usually communicative, and the French no less than the English press foreshadowed an early triumph. Well informed people who opined that at least a month would be necessary

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for the forcing of the Straits were suspected of official caution.

"One can hardly imagine that the Admiralty shared this easy optimism. They have before them not only the general considerations showing the disadvantages at which ships are placed in a contest with land artillery, but the special experience obtained last autumn in our bombardment of the Belgian coast. A belated despatch from Rear Admiral Hood published only last week confirms what one had surmised about that amphibious operation. It was very successful so long as the Germans had no very heavy guns mounted among the sand dunes. But the ships could not prevent the guns from being mounted there, and eventually the guns drove the ships away. In spite of all our naval preponderance the enemy have been able to hold this strip of coast at our very doors, with sufficient security to maintain their submarine bases there, although the later phases of such submarine activity gave us the strongest motives for interfering with them. There is evidently only one way in which our navy could master the German positions at Knocke and Zeebrugge, and that is by the co-operation of an adequate land force. And if that is true of the Belgian coast it will be true of the Turkish. The natural obstacles are much greater in the latter case, while the artificial ones - German generalship and German gunnery are the same.

"Yet no adequate land force did in fact co-operate at the Dardanelles, and for that reason the ships failed as they were bound to do. For 3 weeks they kept up an intermittent and costly bombardment, weather permitting. Mines were swept clear, coast villages were destroyed, and here and there a few hits were recorded on an almost impossible target, which a widely dispersed and well concealed land artillery presented. But nothing was done by land operations at Bulair or elsewhere to prevent the Turks from indefinitely re-inforcing the Gallipoli peninsula, and more than making good any losses sustained there in men, guns, or ammunition.

Finally on Mar. 18, the Allied commanders resolved to attempt a "coup de main". Their fleet entered the Straits and failed disastrously. Not only were 3 battleships sunk, but the full accounts

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published in the Italian press, which appear to be on the whole trustworthy, suggest that very great damage was inflicted on many other vessels by gun fire. The strongest corroboration of this is the sequal. The Allied Admirals held a council of war and decided to keep their fleet in the neighbourhood. A formal abandonment of the attack would have had too serious a moral effect throughout the impressionable East. But in fact, save for mine sweeping and a little reconnoitering, nothing more appears to have been attempted from that day to thid.

"How and why was this quasi-inevitable failure courted and incurred? The explanation seems to lurk in the sudden reversal of Greek policy following the down-fall of M. Venizelos. Venizelos had made arrangements for Greece to co-operate with the Allies. They were to have the aid of a division of Greek troops, and (still more important) could use all the Greek islands and harbours as bases. Relying on this, they started their operation, and then at the critical moment the Greek Premier whs unable to carry out his part of the bargain. King Constantine, and his German Queen, and Germanophile officers dealt the Allies one of the shrewdest blows possible. Having begun their attack they had to go on, though they had little chance of success. Moreover their difficulties increased. They had occupied Lemnos as a base for troops with Venizelos tacit or express consent. They have now had to abandon it. Some say they did so because the water supply was unsatisfactory, but there is reason to suppose that M. Gourmaris the new Greek Premier took up a strong attitude against their staying on. Indeed since Lemnos was a Greek island it is difficult to see how they could stay if Greece is to remain neutral.

"The despatch of the French Expeditionary Force to Alexandria, which was casually announced last week, shows how much this has embarrassed the Allies. They need now a very large army to overcome the German-Turkish position, which since February has been incalculably strengthened. The total force which was originally arranged for seems to have been about 100,000 men (20,000 Greeks

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and the rest French, British, Australian, and Indian). It could have used Lemnos, Mitylene, and Salonika as bases so that its accommodation, supply, and handling presented no difficulties. Now men on the spot talk of 250,000 troops being necessary. Even if this large force can be collected, where can the men be put? Imbros and Tenedos, the only islands which are not Turkish and can be used by the Allies are small, timberless, almost waterless, and with little accommodation. The bases to which the Allies must apparently be reduced are Alexandria and Cyprus, which are about equidistant from the Dardanelles, and each over two days steaming for transports. The handicaps imposed by these facts are obvious.

"If one asks how the Greek "volte-face" has been possible in view of the obviously serious effect which it must have on Greece's prospects if the Allies win the war, the truest answer probably is, that opinion in the Balkans on the whole, expects Germany to win it. The consequences of this expectation may be observed not in Greece alone. Since the war began an enormous number of German officers, engineers, and artillerists have found their way to Constantinople, together with guns, shells, mines, and even it is said parts of submarines. All these have come through Bulgaria or Rumania, and they have been coming quite openly through the latter country ever since the bombardment of the Dardanelles." .....

The second phase of the attack on the Dardanelles - Combined Operations - began with the landing of military forces there during the latter part of April, and will be made the subject of a continuation of this paper.

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TURKISH NAVY.

Goeben	22635 tons	IO-I2in, I2-4
Breslau	4478	I2-4.I
Khor-Ed-Din Barbarossa	9900	6-IIin, 8-4,Iin
Torgut Reis	9900	6-IIin, 8-4.Iin
Main-I-Zaffa	2400	2-9.2in, I2-6in
Hamidieh	3830	2-6in, 8-4.7in
Mejidieh	3432	2-6in, 8-4.7in

3 Torpedo Gunboats 763 to886 tons

IO Destroyers I84 to 237 tons

IO Torpedo Boats.

RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FLEET.

Svyatoi Evstafii	I2840	4-I2in,4-8in,I2-6in
Ioann Zlatoust	I2840	4-I2in,4-8in,I2-6in
Panteleimon	I2582	4-I2in,I6-6in
Rostislav	8800	4-I0in, 8-6in
Tri Svyatitelya	I3318	4-I2in, 8-6in
Georgii Pobyedonosets	II032	6-I2in, 7-6in
Sinop	II230	6-I2in, 7-6in
Pamyat Merkevia	6675	I2-6in
Kagul	6675	I2-6in

25 Destroyers 345 to IIIO tons

II Submarines IIO to 700 tons

Imperatrista [illegible] building, laid down I9I2, 22250 tons, 2I kts.,
Imperator Aleksandr III I2-I2in, 20-4.7in
Ekaterina II

Admiral Sazarev building, laid down I9I3, &085 tons,
Admiral Nachimov 50 kts., I6-6in

British and French Fleets during First Phase of Attack on Dardanelles.

Queen Elizabeth	27500 tons	8-I5in, I6-6in guns
Inflexible	I7250	8-I2in, I6-4in
Lord Nelson	I6500	4-I2in, I0-9.2 in
Agamemnon	I6500	4-I2in, I0-9.2in
Irresistable	I5000	4-I2in, I2-6in
Cornwallis	I4000	4-I2im, I2-6in
Vengeance	I2950	4-I2in, I2-6in
Ocean	I2950	4-I2in, I2-6in
Albion	I2950	4-I2in, I2-6in
Swiftsure	II800	4-I0in, I4-7.5in
Triumph	II800	4-I0in, I4-7.5in
Majestic	I4900	4-I2in, I2-6in
Prince George	I4900	4-I2in, I2-6in

French Fleet.

Suffren	I2527	4-I2in, I0-6.4in
Charlemagne	II082	4-I2in, I0-5.5in
Gaulois	II082	4-I2in, I0-5.5in
Bouvet	I2007	2-I2in, 2-I0.8in, 8-5.5in

In addition to the above big gun ships there were numerous cruisers, destroyers, submarines, trawlers &c; and a large number of hydroplanes.

2-14in, 7-9.4in

2-14in, 1-9.4in, 1-8.2in, 4-5.9in

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SUBJECT S I T U A T I O N TO M A Y 25, 1915.

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ENCLOSURE
2-1
Naval War College
JUN 12 1915

From Z No. 241 Date May 25, 1915. , 191

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date , 191

With the entry of Italy into the war at midnight of May 24th 1915, a new phase of the European complication is probable.

The extraodinary concessions to remain neutral offered to Italy by Austria at the solicitation of Germany, are well known and show how important the matter is considered here.

Not only has Austria and Germany been compelled to detach large forces from the Eastern front which could have driven home the late victories over Russia in Galicia, but the Mid-European powers must face threatened complications on the Turkish flank.

The best information asserts that Greece must join the allies in a very short time. Italy now belonging to the allies, is to send troops to the Gallipoli peninsula and for this ~~xxd~~ aid is to have her aspirations in Asia Minor, in the region of Alexandrette recognized. Greece also has aspirations in Asia Minor in the region of Smyrna, and cannot see Italy receive colonies in Asia Minor without joining the race for colonial expansion. The participation of Italy and Greece means the certain fall of Constantinople. The entry of Greece into the war means that the remaining Balkan states will more than probable take up arms to satisfy their ambitions at the expense of the falling Turkish power and of Austra. Bulgaria wants back Adrianople and the strategic line proposed for her at the Treaty of London. Roumania wants Transylvania from Austria.

The situation between the United States and Germany over the treatment of American ships and citizens during the submarine warfare remains in the critical state. The demands of the United States have not yet been answered, but from all indications the substance of the reply will be a refusal of the principal demands made by our government.

Since the sinking of the "LUSITANIA", very little appears to have been accomplished in the submarine blockade of England. In the Baltic the German fleet assists the army in the occupation of Liebau and generally controls the Baltic Sea.

There does not appear to be any indication which can be interpreted into a probable ending of the war for a long time to come.

The questions involved are so far reaching in their consequences to the countries involved that only the absolute exhaustion of the resources of the countries will bring about peace. Germany shows no signs of exhaustion. To make any predictions on the duration must be regarded as almost a guess, but I see no reason to believe those people who hope to see peace this summer. To my mind another year of war is probable and perhaps more.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 3, 1900.] Need not be returned

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SUBJECT CAPTURE of HOSPITALSHIP "O P H E L I A".

580
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188
ENCLOSURE
2-2
Naval War College
JUN 12 191

From Z No. 236 Date May 25, 1915. , 191

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date , 191

References:- Z-337 of 1914.
Z-357 of 1914
Z-398 of 1914
Z-190 of 1915.

The English Prize Courts have declared this ship as good prize. A careful study of the whole affair and of the reasons for declaring the ship a prize should be made in connection with the outfitting, conduct and anouncing of U.S. hospital ships in war time.

The German point of view has been covered in past reports referred to above.

The following is a translation from the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung":-

THE HOSPITALSHIP "OPHELIA" DECLARED A PRIZE.

London, May 21. Reuter reports:- The Prize Court arrived at a judgement this morning regarding the German hospitalship "Ophelia". The Court declared the ship as prize, as she had neither been built for a a hospitalship nor fitted up as such and used as such, but had served for military purposes only.

We have been informed from competent authority:- The "OPHELIA" was sent on the 17th of October 1914, after the news of a torpedofight arrived which had taken place on the Dutch coast, from Helgoland to the scene of action to look for survivors. The hospitalship was stopped by English naval forces and brought to Yarmouth. Later it developed that the anouncement of the "OPHELIA" as auxiliary hospitalship had not been made by the neutral power requested to do so, The German government has protested against the seizure of the ship and requested that the ship be given free. The English government, instead of givong the ship free, had her brought before a Prize Court which has now declared her a prize, basing the decision on the fact that she had served as a miliaty ship.

"OPHELIA" was fitted up as a hospitalship. It is of course understood that the ship had not been used for any but hospital purposes, as provided by the Hague Convention.

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ENCLOSURE 8-1
JUN 26 1915
Naval War College

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U.S.S.NORTH CAROLINA.
Alexandria, Egypt.
May 25,1915.

From: Lieut.(j.g.)E.G.Blakeslee, U.S.Navy.
To: Office of Naval Intelligence.

Subject: Landing of Ally forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula April 25, 1915, and General Operations in the vicinity of the Dardanelles.

1. The following information of the landing of the Australian and New Zealand forces on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, April 25, 1915, has been gained by me from Captain G-, an Australian officer, wounded on the first day of the landing and convalescing in Alexandria. Captain G- was second in command of a Company of the Third Brigade of the Australian force, this brigade being the covering detachment and the advance body during the landing. The Captain went over the landing with me on the ship's charts of the Dardanelles and Peninsula which I had provided previously; and he pointed out the principal points of the enemy's strength and disposition together with what information he had been able to obtain of the Turks preparations on the Peninsula. The facts, which follow, I believe, may be considered most reliable as I have checked up same with snatches of conversation with numerous officers and men among the wounded now in Alexandria. I consider this information as doubly reliable as Captain G- spent eight years in the British navy and was quite familiar with the Navy's part in the occupation and able to discuss same intelligently, having entered the navy as a Midshipman and schooled for the Naval service.

2. The Australian and New Zealand forces, about 50,000 in number, arrived in Egypt on December 6th, 1914, after a voyage of fifty days on thirty eight transports, were disembarked and encamped at the foot of the pyramids. The Australian force consisted of four brigades of infantry together with a regiment of cavalry and a regiment of artillery, the whole being a complete advance force and army corps unit. Since the arrival of this force in Egypt, the whole has been put on the new British war footing, the Infantry arm, which is modeled as follows:

Australian force comprised four brigades of infantry.
A brigade comprises four (4) battalions.
A Battalion comprises four (4) companies.
A company comprises four (4) platoons.
A platoon comprises four sections.(4)
A section comprises fourteen (14) men.

Each section is in charge of a non-commissioned officer, there being sixteen (16) to the company. There are six (6) officers to each company, a Major in command, a Captain, who is second in command, and four lieutenants, each in command of one platoon; each platoon having four non-commissioned officers, each in charge of a section. The foregoing is the model of the latest British war footing for all troops.

3. The Australian Advance Force consisting of the Third Brigade left Alexandria aboard transports for the first time on March 2, 1915, and went to Lemnos Island, which was to be and has been made the British Advance Base for her land attack on the Dardanelles. The remainder of the Australian and New Zealand forces left for Tenedos Island from Alexandria, between the 5th and 10th of April and remained there seventeen days aboard their transports. The Advance force which left Alexandria March 2, disembarked at Lemnos Island and there remained until embarked aboard destroyers for the final occupation of Gallipoli. On the 24th instant, all transports under cover of darkness moved on to the

JUN 26 1918

Island of Imbros where they were anchored before midnight of the 24th. The Third Brigade had been placed on destroyers at Lemnos Island for transport to the place of landing. Concentrated off Imbros Island then were about 35,000 men aboard transports and ready for the landing on the Peninsula. This force consisted of sixteen battalions of Australians, four battalions of New Zealanders and twelve battalions of British Naval Division.

4. The Third Brigade of Australians acting as the covering detachment and embarked aboard destroyers proceeded to Imbros ahead of the transports. Each destroyer carried one company of infantry, about 450 men and towed a line of six boats from each quarter. There were seven destroyers used. The boats towed were boats from the men-of-war present, transport's boats and as it was termed, any boats they could get. The destroyers at a speed of four knots, towing twelve boats each with 432 of the Advance Party aboard each destroyer, left Imbros after midnight and went within 500 yards of the projected landing place.

5. The landing was supposed to be in the nature of a surprise and was made during darkness just preceding daylight. Destroyers had all lights out, with orders not to fire. As soon as the destroyers were within a thousand yards of the beach, the Turks commenced firing and the destroyer, on board of which was Captain G-, had twelve men wounded before embarking in the boats. The destroyers, however, did not use their guns during the landing. Arriving about 500 yards from the beach, the destroyer was stopped, port side to the beach, and the troops embarked in the boats over the starboard side. Each boat was manned by four bluejackets from a destroyer, there being thirty six men of the advance force to each boat. This was done under a heavy fire from the beach, the port side of the destroyer being hit numerous times. There was no confusion in the boats, each man taking his place as previously ordered. Two steam launches towed a string of six boats each to within fifty to one hundred yards of the beach and into shallow water. Here the boats were in some cases beached, but most of the troops jumped overboard and waded ashore. The four bluejackets in each boat were unarmed, acting simply as boat keepers. After disembarkation, steamers picked up all boats and returned them to the destroyers which took them in tow and rushed back to the advanced base for more troops. The landing took place about 4.00 a.m., and about one mile and a half to the North of Gaba Tepe. The firing from shore broke out very badly as soon as the boats were seen to approach and there were a number of casualties left in the boats. This advance force having landed, the main body came up in transports and two hours later began landing in the ship's boats, the transports anchoring within about a mile from the beach.

6. The Advance force dressed in khaki, was fully equipped with three days rations, water bottle and 200 rounds of ammunition. The Australian fully equipped pack weighks about 56 pounds, which includes the overcoat. The officers were equipped same as the men, except they carried a revolver, which was said to be of little use, this officer in question picking up a rifle and using same instead of revolver. Only one officer was seen flourishing a sword and he was killed almost as soon as he landed. The force landed with fixed bayonets, pieces loaded, deployed and charged immediately driving those Turks who were near the beach back up the hill. The men threw off their packs as soon as the landing was made, the beach being littered with knapsacks, overcoats and canteens.

7. The actual landing took place to the Northward of the intended one. The proposed landing was to be made just above Gaba Tepe, but due to darkness and reasons unknown, the landing was made about a mile and a half to the Northward of Gaba Tepe. As afterwards proved, this was a fortunate mistake as Gaba Tepe consisted of a seven gun emplacement of four inch guns, as well as being well

entrenched and mined with wire entanglements throughout. Barbed wire entanglements had been placed below the surface of the water from fifty to a hundred yards from the shore line. It was here that the Turks had prepared for the landing, they notbbeing as well prepared to the Northward where the beach is steeper and covered over with heavy underbrush. The beach where the landing took place rises in steppes about a hundred yards from the water and is very steep but not enough to prevent climbing. The hills were crowded with Turks and the guns from Gaba Tepe and another three gun emplacement in the hills enfiladed the whole beach. About seventeen thousand men were either killed or wounded out of a force of thirty five thousand landed. Infantry only was landed at first. A regiment of cavalry was later landed without their mounts and sent to protect a certain position. An Indian mountain battery of six six inch guns was landed later in the day. This battery is commanded by British officers with a few native officers. These heavy guns were landed in flat bottom lighters in which the stern drops out and the lighters beached. These were said to be the lighters used for landing horses and known as the horse lighter. The Infantry and Mountain Battery guns consisting of ten pounders and eighteen pounders were landed in life boats, being taken to pieces and later assembled on the beach.

8. The Navy took very little part in the landing, the ships present did not protect the landing of the troops nor was the beach shelled before or during the landing. The ships were in a position to protect the flanks and in one case H.M.S.Majestic, turned her search lights on a movement of Turks around the left flank of the landing force and fired a few shells, driving the Turks back. Later the ships opened up on Gaba Tepe but did not succeed in silencing same as the guns here are concealed from seaward behind a small hill. The ships present took a very small part in the landing delivering only a small covering fire and as this officer stated not anything like the Army expected. It is said that only one out of five of the advance party escaped being killed or wounded. Turks as snipers in concealed positions did terrible damage. They were found later in concealed positions, pits covered over with underbrush, the pits containing several thousand rounds of ammunition and one month's rations. Some of the ships present were the Queen Elizabeth, Swiftsure, Majestic, Amethyst, London and seven destroyers, besides, the transports, hospital ships and ammunition and supply ships.

9. After landing, the companies, plattoons, etc., became all mixed up and the men belonging to different companies were not sorted out that night. The senior officer in a small redius taking command of those near him. Twenty two out of twenty nine officers in one battalion were killed or wounded the first day. In another battalion only two hundred and fifty men were left at the close of the first day.

10. From a British War Department map issued to each officer, an idea of the country was gained. This was simply a contour map showing topography, elevations, all principal land marks, roads, etc. The Peninsula was divided into squares, each square being numbered and subdivided into nine equal squares, lettered from a to i inclusive. Each numbered square was 675 yards in length. The whole Peninsula was so divided into squares, which were used for purpose of directing gun fire, it being possible to switch your fire wherever you pleased. The following is an example:





11. One reason given for the lack of help by the ships was said to be due to the difficulty in signalling ranges and positions to the ships from shore. The ranges had to be relayed by several signal parties on shore and by the time same reached the ships the position of the Turks would have changed.

12. The Turk's batteries were well masked and concealed and it was said that the ships had extreme difficulty, in fact it was almost impossible to pick out these batteries. Everything favored the Turks and they made good use of all their resources, such as covering, obstacles, entanglements, etc.

13. Captain G- remarked that it had been realized that a mistake was made in not using the ships to protect the landing as well as shelling the beach previous to the landing. The opinion was expressed when asked concerning the Navy's part in forcing the Dardanelles; that they were sanguine, too sanguine, it was thought. The two forts at the narrows of the Straits were said to be among the strongest in the world and that same could not be taken by the fleet acting alone. Very little damage had been done as yet to either of these forts. The present strategy seemed to be the occupation by troops of the several hills on the Peninsula mounting heavy artillery thereon and taking the forts both from land and sea. Once having gained command of the several hills, such as 900 metre hill, etc., it was thought that the forts would in time, be reduced, but the time would be considerable as the forces ashore were paying dearly for every foot of ground gained. At this date there was a great need of Infantry, though fresh troops were coming regularly. Infantry is all that can, at present, be used on the Peninsula, at least until those hills commanding the forts and surrounding country can be taken. The Cavalry has been sent back to Egypt. It might be said here that hundreds of horses died on board the transports. They were stabled in small stalls without room to lie down, in consequence of which their limbs became swelled to large proportions and their feet became sore and diseased. It became necessary to use straps to trice them up, taking the weight off their legs.

14. Before the actual landing, feints were made on the Peninsula at various points. In one place a thousand mules were put ashore near dark and with a piece of khaki on their backs to resemble saddles, were driven up in the hills. This ruse was said to have had the desired effect and the mules were sacrificed.

15. The Turks are said to have placed Torpedo tubes along the shores of the Straits of the Dardanelles and at the entrance to the sea of Marmora. Preparations for the defense of the Peninsula were said to have been started by the Turks as early as November. Railways run up to all forts and as soon as a gun or carriage is put out of action another can be readily put in place. The whole Peninsula is said to be a mass of modern intrenchments, obstacles and entanglements with all of the principal elevations defended by well concealed batteries.

16. At the same time the landing was being made to the North of Caba Tepe similar landings were taking place by the French on the Asiatic side and by English regulars and territorials at Cape Helles. The remainder of the British regular army comprising such regiments as the Dublin Fusileers, Lancashires, Munsters and Royal Fusileers, were here entirely annihilated. An attempt was made off Cape Helles to beach a transport loaded with about 3000 Territorials, the idea being to run her on the shore and land the troops in shallow water without the aid of boats. The transport, unfortunately, grounded astern before close enough to the beach. The troops, however, piled down the gangways,over the side and through the cargo ports into the water and under an enfilading fire from Turkish batteries ashore. Those who were not killed by gun fire were for the most part drowned and a very few of the three thousand aboard were saved from destruction.

(signed) E. G. Blakeslee.

Need not be returned.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

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(1)

SUBJECT The Declaration of Blockade of the Coasts of Austria-Hungary and Albania.

From T *No.* 132. *Date* May 26, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— *Date* ———

590 9 198 ENCLOSURE 1410 Naval War College

1. Beginning from the 26th of May, 1915, an effective blockade will be considered to exist by the Italian Naval Forces as follo s:

1) The Austrian-Hungarian coast extending north to the Italian frontier and south tb the Montenegrian frontier including all the islands, ports, inlets, roads and bays;

2) The coast of Albania extending from the Montenegrian frontier north to the Cape of Khiephali(inclusive).

The geographical limits of the blockaded territory are:

Austria-Hungary - North - lat. 45° - 49' - 50" N
long 13° - 51' - 10" E.

South - lat. 42° - 6' - 25" N
Long 10° - 5' - 30" E

Albania - North - lat 41° - 52' - 00" N
long 19° - 35' - 30" E

2. The ships of friendly and neutral powers will be given a time limit which will be establishe by the Commander-in-chief of the Italian naval forces. The time to commence from the day of the declaration of the blockade in order to be free to leave a blockaded port.

All ships that violate this blockade and should attempt to cross the line between Cape Otranto and Cape Khiephali will be treated in conformity with the international laws and with existing tr ties.

(See-Paragraph 4. Instructions of October 31. 1900.) K **Need not be returned.** 5

.26

(2)

SUBJECT Naval Actions in the Adriatic Sea on May 24, 1915.

From V No. 18 Date May 26, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date

ENCLOSURE SEP 1 1915 H-1 Naval War College

On the 24th instant the following official announcement was made in Vienna:

"In the night following the declaration of war (May 23-24) our fleet undertook an action against the east coast of Italy between Venice and Barletta, and effectively bombarded important military objects in numerous places. Simultaneously our naval aeroplanes dropped bombs on the baloon shed in Chiarvalle, the military works of Ancona and the arsenal in Venice, whereby visible damage and conflagrations were caused.

Commander of Fleet."

On the 25th inst. the following report was given out:

"The official telephonic report of the fleet action on the morning of the 24th inst. is as follows:

"Before sunrise to-day, that is within 12 hours of the declaration of war by Italy, the I. & R. Navy executed a set of successful simultaneous attacks on the coast of Italy from Venice to Barletta.

"A naval aviator dropped 14 bombs in Venice, setting fire to the arsenal, seriously injurung a destroyer, and bombarding the railway station, oil tanks, and hangar in the Lido.

"The destroyer "Scharfschütze" pushed into the very narrow channel of Porto Corsini until it found itself in the immediate proximity of a fully manned infantry trench. A large portion of the completely surprised garrison was shot down, whereupon three entirely concealed shore batteries opened a heavy fire from guns of about 12 cm. caliber against the cruiser "Novara" and torpedoboat "80", which were lying at the entrance to the channel. The latter received a hit in the officers messroom which seriously wounded one man and caused the boat to leak. The "Novara" continued the fire, in order to help the destroyer out of its predicament, and enfiladed the trenches and demolished a barracks, but received many hits herself.

"Lieutenant Persich and 4 men killed, 4 men seriously and several slightly wounded, but the losses of the enemy are perhaps 10 to 20 times greater.

"The "Scharfschütze" escaped entirely uninjured; torpedoboat "80" to Pola with a collision mat.

"The railway station and bridges in Rimini were bombarded by the armored cruiser"St. Georg"

"In Sinigaglia railway bridges, water tower, harbor works, station buildings and a train were demolished by S.M.S."Zrinyi"; the stattion, train and adjacent buildings were burned.

"In Ancona the old forts, the cavalry and infantry camp, wharves, electric power house, railway station, gas tanks, petroleum depot, semaphore and radio station were bombarded by the main body of the fleet, and great damage was wrought by stray shots and fire. Two steamers in the harbor were sunk and one on the ways ready for launching was demolished. Resistance was made only by two light batteries and a few machine guns against two destroyers. In the only modern fort, Alfredo Savoe, the

SUBJECT .....

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From ..... *No.* ..... *Date* .....

Replying to O. N. I. No. ..... *Date* .....

men stood at their guns at the beginning of the bombardment, but two of our aviators who appeared at the right moment drove them away so effectively that they did not return to their stations. These aviators and a third also dropped bombs on the baloon shed inshore of Chiaravalle and on several other military objects.

"The airship "Citta di Ferrara" threw several bombs at S.M.S. "Zrinyi" without results and attempted to attack the retiring fleet, but hurriedly retreated at the approach of two aeroplanes, which, however, had used all of their bombs.

"The same or another airship had already been sighted half an hour after midnight by the fleet on opposite course halfway between Pola and Ancona, doubtlessly bound for Pola. However, when the two vessels that were accompanying it retreated before gunfire the airship put about and disapeared to the northwestward, apparently without having seen the fleet.

"S.M.S."Admiral Spaun" with 4 destroyers fired on the railway bridge over the Sinarea river, the railway station, locomotives, pumping station, etc. in Campo Mariano, demolished the semaphore of Tremiti and damaged that of Mileto.

"S.M.S."Helgoland" with 3 destroyers bombarded Viesto and Manfredonia and near Barletta fell in with 2 Italian destroyers which it at once took under fire and pursued. One of the destroyers made its escape, but the second, the "Turbine", was pressed toward Pelagosa by our destroyers Csepel and Tatra, and was set on fire and reduced to a sinking condition by hits in the boilers and engines. She surrendered. The "Csepel", "Tatra", and "Leka" rescued 35 of the crew, including the captain, executive officer, and chief engineer, and made prisoners of them. The rescue work was disturbed by the appearance of two battle ships of the "Vittorio Emanuele" class and an auxiliary cruiser which approached to within 9000 meters.

"In the ensuing gunfire action only the "Csepel" received an unimportant hit, whereby one man was seriously wounded and 2 men slightly wounded. The fire was returned with good effect by the "Helgoland" and the destroyers. Minimum range 8000 meters. Within a short time our vessels were out of range.

"The railway bridge over the Potenza river was fired upon and damaged by the "Radetzky".

"The I. & R. fleet suffered no losses than those noted above."

Stephen V. Pleban

U.S.S.North Carolina,
Alexandria, Egypt.
May 27, 1915.

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27

From: Lieut. (j.g.) E.G.Blakeslee, U.S.Navy/
To: Office of Naval Intelligence.

5 Po
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196
ENCLOSURE
8-3
Naval War College
JUN 26 191

Subject: Hospital and Transport Service to and from the Dardanelles.

1. The following features of the British Army Transport and Hospital Service were noted in Alexandria, Egypt, between May 14th and May 26th, 1915. The harbor was crowded with British and French transports and Hospital Ships, coming and going daily and it is believed that in saying there were 200 ships in the harbor, is not an over estimation. These ships are converted passenger steamers, merchant steamers, etc., and having been requisitioned by the British authorities are being us ed as transports, supply and hospital ships.

2. Each transport and supply ship has had its name painted out and all marks of identification done away with. In their place, each ship is given a letter and number, such as A-4, B-5, N-16, etc. These letters and numbers are about four feet high and painted black on a white field, carried forward of the bridge and on the bow or side. Each letter indicates some distinct service such as A= Army Transport Service or Australian Forces, Z=Indian Troops,F-French Troops and N=British Naval Division, etc.

3. The Hospital ships are painted white with a green band around the side and with the red cross displayed on both sides. At night the Hospital ship carries green lights around her side, spaced two feet apart, with the red cross in red lights. These ships are for the most part converted South African liners, P.&O. liners, etc., and it is said that it takes but six weeks to convert a passenger steamer into an efficient hospital ship.

4. The wounded from the Dardanelles and Gallipoli Peninsula are being cared for at base hospitals, situated at Alexandria, Port Said, Malta and Marseilles. The Australians and Territorials are being brought to Alexandria; the British Marine and Naval Divisions to Port Said; the Naval wounded to Malta and the French wounded to Marseilles. There are seven hospital ships plying between Alexandria and the Dardanelles alone, there being some 20,000 wounded men in Alexandria. The seriously wounded who are convalescent with little chance of being returned to the scene of hostilities, are being sent to England. A hospital ship on May 16th arrived with 600 wounded from the Dardanelles and one sailed the same day with the same number of convalescent wounded for England.

5. Several transports were seen to fly the commission pennant and are in command of naval officers with the rank of Lieutenant Commander or Commander. La Provence, the French liner, came in on the 17th inst.,flying a commission pennant and commanded by a Commander of the French navy. She was fitted with guns as a commerce destroyer.

6. The French cruiser Jeanne D'Arc, flying the flag of Vice Admiral Dartige du Fournet commanding the 3rd squadron, came in on the 19th inst., and remained several days, giving liberty.

7. Regarding the transport and supply system, it is said the navy has full charge of the ships to the anchorage, where the Army Transport Service takes charge.

(signed) El G. Blakeslee.



Need not be returned.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

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(1)

SUBJECT Italian Mail Steamers taken over by the Navy.

From T *No.* 134 *Date* May 28, 1915.

Replying to O. N. 1. No. ——— *Date* ———



1. The four Government owned steamers, "CITTA' di PALERMO","CITTA' di CATANIA", "CITTA' di MESSINA", "CITTA' di SIRACUSA", of 3500 tons displacement have been taken over by the Navy and listed as auxiliary men-of-war. The "CITTA' di CATANIA" and "CITTA' di PALERMO" have Parson turbines and the "CITTA'di SIRACUSA" and "CITTA' di MESSINA", quadruple expansion engines. These vessels, all, develop 12000 HP. and are rated as 23 knot steamers. They are armed with 6 - 4.7 guns.

2. In addition to the former, there have been taken over by the Navy, the following steamers: "CITTA' di CAGLIARI", "CITTA' di SASSARI", and "CAPRERA", of 2500 tons displacement. These vessels develop 4500 HP., and are rated as 15 knot steamers.

Need not be returned.

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(2)

Tribuna, May 28, 1915.

ENCLOSURE
370
9
198
14-7
JUN 28 1915
War Council

The heroic end of the TURBINE.

The heavy loss suffered by the enemy should not make us regret the loss of the old 330 ton destroyer TURBINE built in 1901. The TURBINE while on scouting duty the morning of the 24th, saw an enemy's destroyer at which she immediately gave chase, thereby getting a long way from her main body. After chasing for half an hour, she was surprised by four units of the enemy; three destroyers and the light cruiser HELIGOLAND The TURBINE trying to get back was hit by two shells, and slowly lost her speed. She continued fighting for nearly an hour notwithstanding a fire on board. Having exhausted all her ammunition the Captain ordered her sea valve opened rather than she should be captured by the enemy. The Turbine then commenced to sink, and although her entire crew were drawn up on the poop, the enemy continued to fire on her from a short distance. The Captain who had been wounded from the ~~xxxxx~~ beginning of the fight, seeing that the ship was sinking, gave the order to the crew to jump overboard. The Austrian destroyers lowered their boats to pick up the survivors. At this moment the ships to which the Turbine belonged came over the horizon, and the enemy picking up their boats steamed away towards their own coasts. Our ships leaving their boats to pick up the men, steamed after the enemy, and repeatedly hit them. A destroyer of the type Tatra and the Heligoland were severely damaged.

Nine men of the Turbine were saved. An Austrian communication states 35 were picked up, the Captain being among the survivors.

Office of Naval Intelligence, Copy 5

~~June 15, 1915.~~ N.H.L. 29

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Report from Naval Attaché, Berlin, May 29, 1915. (1)

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Plans for the Defense of Naval Stations and Fuel Stations against Air Craft.

580 9 194 ENCLOSURE 3-1 JUN 23 1915 Naval War College

The subject is best considered under two headings. First the installations for repulsing the attack and second the method of screening or concealing the station in question.

1. At the outbreak of the war there had been a certain amount of preparation in regard to anti-balloon guns. Batteries of anti-balloon guns were on the very latest ships and were in course of preparation for all the ships of the "Dreadnaught" type. For the Army and Coast Defense Krupp and Ehrhardt had designs which may be found in the "TASCHENBUCH der LUFTFLOTTEN 1914". With the development made by the war, however, there was at once an enormous demand for guns of this class made necessary to defend important positions.

Of the class of guns observed as most in use are 1st the Navy 8.8 c/m cal. 45 semi-automatic Krupp gun, roughly described in report 37 of 1915. The German army, pressed for guns, took a number of captured French field pieces, cal. .75, had them changed at Krupp's to calibre .77 to take the German ammunition and used them with a special mounting as anti-balloon guns.

The following rough description of the protection given an important headquarters illustrates the present practice:

1. The guns are not in the town but on the tops of certain hills surrounding the town where a clear observation may be had all around.

2. The guns are grouped in batteries of four to six guns.

3. The control and range finder station is removed from the guns some little distance and control is by telephone.

4. The control station has a range finder and also a telescope mounted, so as to be turned in azimuth and altitude. Degrees are marked so that they can be read off by the telephone operator to put the gun pointers on the target. I give a rough sketch of this arrangement.

5. The guns have a broken backed telescopic sight.

6. The wheels move in an iron track and the trail of the piece is on a brick or cement floor, if possible, so that turning the gun in azimuth is easy.

Machine guns are also part of the defense scheme but owing to their short range, they must be mounted in the immediate vicinity of the position to be guarded.

For instance, to protect the New York Navy Yard under this system, the anti-balloon guns might go on Fort Green Park, Governor's Island, and Blackwell Island, while the machine guns would best be on top the most prominent building in the Yard and on the towers of the Brooklyn Bridge, Williamsburg Bridge, etc.

JUN 5 1918

A sketch of the improvised mounting for machine guns for high angle firing is given also, see illustration page 80 of the book "Mit dem Hauptquartier nach dem Westen" by Heinrich Binder, forwarded with this mail. Engl. Reg. 5279.

Where positions are of great importance such as a group of dirigible halls, or a big dock yard, all these precautions are taken and also there are aeroplane groups always on watch ready to go up and take the offensive against an enemy.

The protection of the Kiel Canal requires very heavy anti-balloon guns installations. In addition it is necessary to protect the bridges which go over it. The following is a general description of the method of protecting one of the great iron railroad b bridges which span the Canal.

"On a recent trip to Flensburg in Schleswig-Holstein, my route carried me over the Kiel Canal. The railroad crosses it on a steel bridge, one span over the Canal, at a height probably 130-150 feet above the water.

Approaching the Canal from the south the railroad at a distance of nearly a mile begins its elevation on an earth embankment, The immediate approach to the bridge on both banks is on a steel viaduct. The tracks parallel the Canal on the southern bank and turning across the water at right angles to the Canal. On the north shore the railroad makes a large loop so that it runs into the station at Rensburg beneath the steel approach on the north side.

At Bokelholm, a small station on the south bank, the train is boarded by a detachment of soldiers (Landsturm) four men to each car. All windows are closed, shades pulled down, packages and hand luggages taken from the seats and floors and placed on racks above the seats. The guards are so stationed that each one has a watch over two compartments. Passengers are not permitted to leave their compartments during the crossing.

On the north shore, Rensburg, there is a small basin, a floating dry dock, large enough to accommodate small steamers-1000 tons. A marine railway on which was drawn up a tug of perhaps 500 to 600 tons displacement. Two tramp steamers - flying no flag - were steaming westward through the Canal, while a third was moored alongside the wharf.

The approaches were patrolled by soldiers Landsturm. Machine and anti-balloon guns were placed along the bank for some distance from the bridge."

The highest towers in a town to be protected is almost always armed with anti-aricraft guns. Under certain circumstances the Germans have found it to advantage to use captive balloons, both as observation stations and as a position for a machine gun to keep off bomb dropping from aeroplane.

These balloons are of a special type frequently seen in the war illustrations. In appearance they resemble a large sausage with a smaller one looped about one end. They are up about 800 metres and ride steadily so that there is a fairly good gun-platform.

At places where are good roads and a considerable stretch is to be covered I have seen automobiles with anti-balloon guns used. In regard to calibre of guns, the naval officers tell me the best gun is the one of largest calibre which is practicable with rapid fire. I should judge 4-inch would about fill this condition.

At the beginning of the war the very oldest armored ships, long since past their usefulness in the fleet ("AEGIR" class), were commissioned for port guard duties. These ships are said to have been given anti-aircraft armaments and to be prepared to assist in repelling attack from the air.

2. SCREENING and CONCEALING.

In several previous reports (No.399 of 1914, etc.) the screening of lights has been referred to. This is carefully looked out for in regard to ships of the Navy, merchantships in port where the navy may be attacked, and all Navy Yards, shipbuilding works and ammunition factories. Windows and skylights have dark ourtains which pull completely across them.

In addition to this all buildings in the vicinity of stations, or factories are required to be screened as well as street lamps, or anything which might give a leading makr to an aeroplane or airship.

In such an important naval place as Kiel, the whole city is prepared to be thrown into darkness by turning off the electric lights in case of attack.

Where practicable important reservoirs are under ground and in future, I believe, all reservoirs of fuel oil and gasoline, hydrogen plants,etc.are to be also placed under ground.

An excellent description of the method of disguising an naval hydro-aeroplane station, written by Lieutenant Herbster occurs in report No. 9 of 1915 to which attention is invited.

The Zeppelin shed at Potsdam has also been painted, both sides and roof, so as to merge with the landscape, no matter from which direction the aviator approaches and this is apparently the general practice.

The importance of having magazines and explosive factories protected or concealed may be judged from the recent attack on Ludwigshafen. The important ammunition factory at this place was attacked by a squadron of eighteen French aeroplanes, although Ludwigshafen is nearly a hundred miles behind the German front.

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON DEFENSE AGAINST

AERIAL ATTACKS by Lieut. Herbster.

Methods used:-

1. CAPTIVE BALLOONS.

One of the methods used by the Germans to repel attacks of enemy flyers is the use of a large captive balloon of the Parseval-Siegsfeld type. This type of balloon was used recently at Friedrichshafen to repel an attack by French flyers and its is claimed that it was successful in repelling the attack. This balloon, floating at a height from 800 to 1500 metres, has a better field of observation and a better point from which to resist an aerial attack than any other location, such as on the ground. The ordinary balloon of spherical form should not be used as it is not only unsatisfactory in regard to handling, but also affords a poor platform for the observer and gunner. This balloon should, if possible, be anchored directly above the group of buildings to be protected. It should be armed with both machine gun and rifle.

The "Taschenbuch" for 1915 contains a description and several illustrations of the Parseval-Siegsfeld captive balloon. This balloon has been in active service for about seven years and has proven to be a very stable type of balloon in strong and variable winds.

2. TRANSPORTABLE ANTI-BALLOON GUNS AND MACHINE GUNS MOUNTED ON AUTOMOBILE TRUCKS WHICH MAY BE ARMORED OR UNARMORED.

A number of these should be distributed along the approaches to the place to be protected. The gun mounted should be at least 6.5 c/m in calibre and if possible, 10.5 c/m in calibre; the higher the calibre the better. On pp.398 and 399 of the "Taschenbuch der Luftflotten, 1914" are seen several illustrations of the mounting of an anti-balloon rapid fire guns. On p.399 is an illustration of the mounting of an anti-balloon gun on an automobile truck. On p.395 are shown illustrations of a 7.1 c/m anti-balloon gun mounted on an automobile truck and a 7.5 c/m gun mounted in a field. On page 396 is shown a 10.5 c/m anti-balloon gun.

3. SEARCHLIGHTS for REPELLING NIGHT ATTACK.

The use of searchlights is both an advantage and a disadvantage. However, it seems to be the only satisfactory method of discovering the location of an enemy's aircraft at night - especially when the night is very dark. If searchlights are used, they should be of the very highest possible power and should be mounted at the approaches to the city or port to be protected, so that they will sweep all these approaches.

4. ONE OF MORE AEROPLANE SQUADRONS FOR INSTANT SERVICE.

These should be located at a short distance from the yard or place to be protected and close by the approaches to this harbor or location, in order that the flyers whose duty it is to repel this attack may have time to ascend and engage the enemy flyers, or if possible, to cut off their retreat.

5. THE PATROL OF FLYERS PATROLLING ALL THE APPROACHES OF THE PLACE TO BE PROTECTED.

This is especially difficult at night, but can very often be used.

Plan.

ircular steel track for wheels of gun mount.
made in two half circles, and bolted together.

ck track
trail of gun.





Elevation of wheel in track.

Mounting of Army Anti-aircraft gun.

Instrument for directing the fire of a group of Anti-Aircraft guns

Circumference of disk marked in degrees on hundreths.



Elevation

Plan & elevation of mount shown on page 80. of "Mit dem hauptquartur nach dem Western."

Wood block with hole, mounted on wood legs

machine gun

Wood upper mount the legs of the field machine gun mount are spread over the triangle.

Mounting for machine gun for aeriel defence.

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

Need not be returned

JUN 10 1916

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K (2)

SUBJECT GERMAN NAVAL POLICY.

From Z No. 246 Date May 29, 1915. , 191

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date , 191

580/9/247

ENCLOSURE 4-4 SEP 1 1915 Naval War College.

This morning I received a telephonic message from Admiral B e h n k e , Acting Chief of the Admiralty Staff, saying he would like to talk with the Ambassador in regard to the recent torpedoing of the American ship "GULFLIGHT" and the hydroplane attack on the American ship,"CUSHING".

The meeting took place in the Embassy at 12 a clock at which I was present. Afterwards I had a short talk with Admiral B e h n k e alone.

The converation touched on many points besides the ones mentioned. Admiral B e h n k e spoke with great earnestness and with apparent conviction that the German attitude was a correct one. The tone of the conversation was in no sense provocative or unpleasant.

THE "GULFLIGHT".

The German submarine which torpedoed the "GULFLIGHT" sighted the ship approaching accompanied by two vessels of the trawler type. One of these vessels had a very wireless installation. The trawlers occupied positions a little ahead of and on the bows of the steamer which positions are the best for attacking a submarine attempting to torpedo the ship. The flag of the ship was not visible, nor any distinguishing mark up to the time that the torpedo was fired. At that moment the flag on the staff on the poop came in sight but too late to stop the firing of the torpedo. The nearest trawler turned toward the submarine and attempted to ram her. Under the circumstances Admiral B e h n k e considers the captain of the submarine not liable to disciplinary measures, as he made a mistake which considering the circumstances were unavoidable. Of course full recompense would be made for damage. He hoped that our government would consider it as an unintentional mistake which he considered that it was.

"CUSHING".

In this case the officer of the hydroaeroplane recognized no marks showing the ship to be a neutral and it was very much regretted that the attack had been made but it was hoped that it would be regarded as an unfortunate, unintentional accident. No damage had been made.

"LUSITANIA".

On the subject of the "LUSITANIA" the Staff considered that they had acted within their rights and that while they deplored the loss of life which could not be foreseen, they considered that they had complied with international law when they had published warnings in regard to the steamer. However, the subject was so bound up with other subjects that the reply to be given in the answer to the American note must be consulted before judging the whole matter.

This reply is to be submitted May 29th to our Embassy and will appear in the German newspapers of Monday May 31st.

Admiral B e h n k e called attention to the propositions made earlier in the war to insure safety of neutral passengers that of convoy and of securing a"free port" in England to which no reply had been given. Admiral Behnke spoke of the misuse of the neutral flag, especially the Scandinavian flags, and of the paintings which he claimed was still done. I asked him if he had any evidence to show that such had occurred with the American flag, as no information had been given us of such misuse. He said he had no direct evidence but there had been some reports which he would send to the Embassy. He thought they had come from a Spanish port where English steamers had arrived.

I asked Admiral B e h n k e if any of the neutral ships torpedoed had been found to be English ships under false colors as I had never seen any reports to show that such was the case. He replied that he thought there had not been such a case.

Admiral B e h n k e and the Ambassador each stated their positions in regard to the American delivery of ammunition which has been one of the great factors in the intense dislike of the German people for America. Afterwards Admiral B e h n k e spoke about the growing power of submarine warfare about as follows: With the increasing efficiency of the German submarine fleet due to the numbers now under construction and to the greatly increased efficiency of the units, it is certain that we can blockade England absolutely so that not a single ship can get in or out. If we surrender our rights to conduct the warfare of the sea with the submarine, we bar ourselves forever for securing our rights under international law for the free navigation of the ocean for our merchant marine. We can therfore make no concessions which will lead to the abandonment of the submarine blockade. The captains of our submarines have orders to be most careful in their regard for neutral ships and their report having had opportunity to torpedo in one case as many as nineteen ships before a ship flying the British flag came along. Admiral B e h n k e said that to finish the submarine fleet to the proportions proposed would take four to five years.

(See Paragraph 4, Instruction of Oct.31,1900)

Need not be returned.

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SUBJECT Relation Between China and Japan.

From K No 12 Date May 31st. 1915.

Replying to O.N.I.No Date

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ENCLOSURE
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AUG 1915
Naval War College

It is an absolute fact that Japan's policy towards China is to ultimately make China a dependency of Japan.

There is no doubt that Japan is in no way attempting to help China to better herself financially or otherwise.

Japanese actions towards China have been so high handed and crooked as to cause the biggest contempt to be felt by all foreigners in China towards Japan.

The following is a direct translation of the Japanese Premier's speech, Count Okuma.

The Government, with a view to placing the peace of the Far East on a permanent basis and for the furtherance of Sino-Japanese friendship, approached the Chinese Government in January last with some diplomatic demands. Fortunately these negatiations have been brought to a peaceful settlement, and I feel now quite confident that the basis of Oriental peace has been consolidated and Sino-Japanese friendship all the more enhanced. The only matter for regret is that hostile conditions in Europe still remain unimproved. I hope and trust with you all that the worthy efforts of the Allies will be duly crowned with success, and that peace in the European Continent will be restored before long.

The Government had compiledtthe Budget for the 4th fiscal year of Taisho, embodying therein plans for financial and administrative readjustments, national defense, and various other important State projects laid down after careful deliberat ations. These Estimates were submitted to the Diet in December last, but unfortunately a difference of opinion in the House necessitated a dissolution and a general election. As a conse-quence, the Government had to follow precedent and enforce the Budget for the preceding fiscal year, with the exception of projects of such urgency as to require prompt execution, and

SUBJECT Relation Between China and Japan.

From K No 12 Date May 31st. 1915.

Replying to O.N.I.No Date

to meet these expenses the Government has decided to introduce a Supplementary Budget and other necessary Bills. It is my earnest desire that you will in these circumstances exercise every sincere effort for the attainment of the important object for which we have assembled here.

BARON KATO'S SPEECH.

The following is a direct translation of Baron Kato's speech, the Foreign Minister.

Gentlemen,- I have the honor of addressing you on the subject of the negotiations that have practically been concluded between Japan and China, except which there is little to be reported in our foreign relations since the last session of the Diet. As, however, the text of the treaties and accompanying notes, which are now being prepared by the representatives of the two countries, are not yet ready for publication, my statement of to-day will necessarily be general in scope and more or less abstract in character.

As was reported to you in the last session, with the occupation on November 7th by the Imperial Army and Navy, of Kiaochau Bay, the base of German activities in the Far East, the Main object with which we entered into war with Germany was attained. In order to meet the consequent exigencies of the situation, and at the same time actuated by the desire to promote friendly relations between between Japan and China and also to ensure a lasting peace in the Far East by strengthening the Empire's position in that region, the Imperial Government presented to the Chinese Government the following proposals, which include those regarding the province of

Shantung, together with those relating to the recognition of Japan's special position in Manchuria and to the solution of various other questions.

The Exactions.

1. Proposals relating to the province of Shantung:

1. Engagement on the part of China to consent to all matters that may be agreed upon between the Imperial Government and the German Government with regard to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses in relation to the province of Shantung;

2. Engagement for non-alienation of Shantung province;

3. Grant to Japan of the right of construction of a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkou with the Tsinan-Kiaochau Railway:

4. The Chinese Government to open the principal cities of the province of Shantung for the residence and trade of foreigners.

5. II. Proposals relating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia:

1. Extension of the terms of the lease of Port Authur and Dairen, and those of the South Manchuria and Antung-Mukden Railway to a period of ninety-nine years respectively;

2. Japanese subjects to be permitted to lease or own land necessary either for erecting buildings of various kinds for commercial and industrial uses or for agricultural purposes;

3. Japanese subjects to be permitted to reside, travel, and carry on business of various kinds, commercial, industrial or otherwise;

4. Japanese subjects to be granted the mining rights of certain specified mines;

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5. The consent of the Imperial Government to be obtained in advance when China proposes to grant a railway concession to subjects of a third Power or to procure a supply of capital from a third Power for the construction of atrailway or to raise a loan from such Power on security of duties or taxes;

6. The Imperial Government to be consulted before engaging Advisers or Instructers regarding political, financial or military matters;

7. The management and control of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to be transfer ed to Japan for a term of ninety-nine years.

111. Proposals relating to the Han-Yeh-Ping Company:

1. Having regard to the close relations between Japanese capitalists and this Company, the Chinese Government to agree to bring the Company at an opportune moment under joint Japanese and Chinese management and not to dispose or permit the Company to dispose, without Japan's consent, of any right ot property belonging to the Company;

2. Owing to the necessity for the protection of the interests od Japanese capitalists, the Chinese Government to engage not to permit without the consent of the Company any one other than the Company to work mines situated in the neighborhood of those belonging to the Company, and also to obtain its previous consent in case it is proposed to take measures which many be deemed to affect the Company directly or indirectly.

IV. Proposals that Chinese Government engage not to alienate or to lease to another Power any ports or bays on or any islands off the coast of China.

V. Proposals relating to solution of pending questions and others:

1. The Central Government to engage influential Japanese as

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political, financial, and military advisers;

2. The Chinese Government to recognise the right of land owner ship for the purpose of building Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools thereon in the interior of China;

3. The police in localities, where such arrangements are necessary, to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration or Japanese to be employed in police offices in such localities;

4. China to obtain from Japan a supply of certain quantity of arms or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese arrangements and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan;

5. Japan to be given the rights of construction of the railway to connect Wuchang with Kiukiang-Nanchang line and of Nanchang-Kangchou and Nanchang-Chaochou railways;

6. In view of the relations between the province of Fukien and Formosa and the agreement respecting the non-alienation of Fukien, Japan to be consulted whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines and harbor works in that province;

7. The Chinese Government to recognise the right of preaching by Japanese in China.

INNOCUOUSNESS OF THE DEMANDS.

In these proposals, which were framed with the object as above stated, there is nothing that cannot be regarded as either a natural demand or a reasonable wish on the part of Japan. They include no item which is incompatible with the principle of territorial integrity, equal opportunity and the open door, which the Imperial Government have in the interest

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of China declared to the Powers from time to time. Thus regarding the province of Shantung, in view of China's obvious inability tp prevent the revival of German influence there, it is natural that Japan, who at a great sacrifice has just succeeded in expelling the disturbing factor, should seek means for perpetuating the result of her victory so as to prevent the reappearance of Germany in that province which will be as much ed a menance to Japan as to China. As regards South Manchuria, Japan's predominant position, about which there is nothing unnatural considering the close and special relations she has with that region, is universally recognised. The case is almost similar with Eastern Inner Mong lia which is so closely and inseparably connected with South Manchuria geographically as well as economically. In many respects, however, Japan's position in these regions has hithertobeen not specifically recognised by the Chinese Govern-mnet. The result was the regrettable outgrowth of various questions between the two countries, thus leaving much to be desired in their relations. It is therefore most necessary in the interest of good relations of the two countries that full recognition by the Chinese Government of Japan's natural position in these regions should be obtained. As regards the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, with which Japanese capitalists are so closely identified the object of the proposal is to safeguard the company's best interest, while as to the proposal for non-alienation of China coasts it is only intended to emphasise the principle of China's territorial integrity which has so often declared by the Imperial Gover nment.

Besides in order to promote the friendly relations of the two countries it is most desirable that several pending questions and others, which are somewhat different in character from these

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above-mentioned, should also be solved on this occasion. The Imperial Government therefore presented as their wishes certain proposals covering these questions to the Chinese Government and advised them to accede thereto in the interest of the friendship of the two countries and for the sake of their mutual benefit.

Of these proposals, the Chinese Government refused absolutely to discuss those relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia and those included in Group.V., while consent as to the others was withheld under various excuses. Further much to the regret of the Imperial Government the terms of their proposals were permitted to leak out in exaggerated forms and the proceedings of the conferences were also allowed to appear in the newspapers, thus hindering the progress of the negotiations.

THE REVISED DRAFT.

Notwithstanding this attitude of the Chinese Government, the Imperial Government, throughout the twenty-five conferences extending over more than three months, fully showed their sincerity by repeatedly explaining the motives of the proposals and endeavoring to hear the unreserved views of the Chinese Government. Their ceaseless effort to reach a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations in a spirit of conciliation appeared to have had some effect on the Chinese Government; for the Japanese proposal respecting the province of Shantung was as a whole assented to with a slight amendment of Item 3, while regarding the South Manchuria question agreement was reached in respect of Items 1,4,5,and 6 with some alterations, and of Item 7 relative to the Kirin-Changchun Railway with understanding that a radical amendment of the existing loan contract shall be made in a manner most advantageous to Japan. But with regard to the most important question of rights

respecting residence and land tenure, the Chinese Government proposed to put various restrictions, and as to the question of Eastern Inner Mongolia and the questions enumerated under Group V., they refused to consider them on the ground that these questions were derogatory to the sovereign rights of China or that they conflicted with the treaties withother Powers, in spite of the Japanese Minister's repeated explanations that such was not the case. Apparently the sincere spirit of conciliation on Japan's sid was not fully appreciated by the Chinese authorities. The Imperial Government seeing however that a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations was absolutely essential to the maintenance of peace in the Orient, presented on the 26th April a revised draft in which the Chinese contensions were taken into consideration and some concessions were made.

In this revised draft, which was formulated in deference to the views of the Chinese Government which had been expressed at the conferences, proposals regarding Eastern Inner Mongolia were separated from the propesals respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia under the second group above referred to and China was left free in Item 2 to alter the werding "lease or own land" to "lease or purchase land," to change it into "lease land for a short ot an long term;" or simply into "lease land" with the understanding that a long lease with the privilege of unconditional renewal shall be permitted, and further as restrictions upon the propesals mentioned in Items 2 and 3, passports were to be presented to the local authoritiesand registered, the police laws and regulations agreed by the Japanese Consuls were to be observed, and taxes, similarly agreed, to be paid, while a civil and criminal suits the court of the defendants nationality was to have the jurisdiction as in open marts, with the only

proviso that the officials of both countries shall be permitted to attend the trial at each other's court to watch the proceedings, and civil suits concerning land between Japanese and Chinese were to be jointly heard and decided according to the laws and local customs of China.

EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA AND OTHER MATTERS THAT COUNT.

The proposals relating to Eastern Inner Mongolia were confined to (1) joint enterprises of Japanese and Chinese inagriculturaland auxiliary industries, (2) preferential rights with respects to railway loans and loans to be secured by the taxes, and (3) increase of open marts. As regards the Han-Yeh-Ping Company the Chinese Government were as they had frequently declared at the conferences, to approve the agreement that may be concluded in future between the Company and Japanese for its joint undertaking and not to confiscate it, or to nationalise it, without the consent of the interested Japanese capitalists, or to permit it to contract any foreign loan other than Japanese. As regards the non-alienation of the Japanese coasts, the wish of the Chinese Government that it should take the form of a voluntary declaration of that Government on the subject was respected. Finally as regards the proposals made under Group V., suggestions were made according to the statements made at the conferences by the Chinese representatives (1) that the Chinese Government should, in case of necessity in future, employ Japanese advisers; (2) that the lease or purchase of land for the purpose of building schools and hospitals in the interior should be permitted by the Chinese Government; and (3) that the Chinese Government should some day in future send military officers to Japan to make arrangements either

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for purchase of arms from Japan or for establishing an arsenal in China under the joint Japanese and Chinese management; and the Japanese Government on their part, taking the Chinese contentions into consideration, (4)agreed to withdraw the proposal respecting land for building of temples while leaving the question of freedom of preaching for future discussion, and proposed (5) that the desired railway concessions in South China should be granted to Japan if there was no objection to it on the part of any other Power et that the railway concessions in question should not be granted to any other Power until Japan had reached an agreement by direct negotiation with the interested party. What we proposed in this connection was merely to place these five points on record. (6) As regards the joint police administration, the proposal was withdrawn, a clause relating to police having been appended to Item 6 respecting the employment of advisors in South Manchuria. (7) With regard to Fukien province the Chinese Government were to engage, by exchange of diplomatic notes, that they would not grant to another Power the right to build a shipyard, coaling or naval station, or any other military establishment on or along the coast of the said province, or to allow any such establisment to be built with foreign capital on the same coast.

THE RESTORATION KIAOCHAU.

At the same time as the presentation of the revised draft the Imperial Government declared to the Chinese Government that should China agree to all the terms of the new draft, Japan would, in case she should be given a free hand in disposing of the leased territory of Kiaochau Bay, as the result of the peace conference upon conclusion of the present war, return the said territory to China on the conditions that it be opened as a commercial port, a Japanese concession be established there and an international

settlement be also established if so desired by the Powers, and arrangements be made between Japan and China regarding the disposal of German public establishments and other questions. Germany having after many years of labor and heavy expenditure of money converted Kiaochau into a military and commercial port of highest importance to her as her only basis of expansion in the East, it was utterly hopeless for China single-handed to regain possession of the leased territory; and Japan having taken it by force of arms, she is at liberty to dispose of it as she wills, and is certainly under no obligation to return it to China; but offered her own will to return Kiaochau, because respected the principle of China's territorial integrity and was anxious to promote her friendly relations with China and to maintain the general peace of the Far East.

THE CHINESE COUNTER-DRAFT.

The Chinese Government, however, failed to reciprocate Japan's sentiment of accomodation and conciliation, and on 1st May presented a counter draft which they declared to be their final answer. In this counter draft they refused, with regard to South Manchuria, to grant a long lease of land to Japanese and demanded that Japanese should submit unconditionally to Chinese police laws and regulations and that all actions arising out of land disputes whether between Japanese and Chinese or between Japanese themselves should come under the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. As regards Eastern Inner Mongolian, they put limitations on the extent of that region and refused to permit the main point of the Japanese demand, which was the joint enterprise of Japanese and Chinese in agriculture and auxiliary industries. Further the Chinese Government demanded at the same

time the unconditional surrender of the leased territory of Kiaochau and recognition of their right to participate in the coming peace negotiations between Japan and Germany, and also the indemnification by Japan for the inevitable losses suffered by China in consequence of Japan-German war and the immediate removal of the various military establishments of the Japanese army and prompt evacuation of the occupied territory. They also refused all the proposals, with the exception of that relating to Fukien contained in Group V. of the Japanese revised draft, and yet these proposals were more than records of the statements made by the Chinese representative at the conferences. Indeed , in their counter-draft, the Chinese Government, in disregard of the responsible statements made by their representatives, revived in some cases articles which had been withdrawn, and in others made alterations in matters already agreed to. Moreover, itwas clearly impossible for Japan to accede to such demands as these for the unconditional surrender of Kiaochau, the indemnification for losses suffered in consequence of the Japan-German war, and the participation of the Chinese Government in the peace negotiations between Japan and Germany. Yet the Chinese Government declared that the counter-draft containing these demands gave their final decision, and accordingly so long as Japan could not accede to these unjust demands, there was no hope of a satisfactory settlement whatever arrangemens might be made in other directions. In fine, the terms of the Chinese Counter draft are absolutely illusory.

THE NEGOTIATION.

In view of this attitude of the Chinese Government, the Imperial Government perceived that it would be useless to continue

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the negotiations; but being desirous to make every effort to avoid complications in the situation and thus maintain peace in the Orient, we decided, after most careful consideration, to leave unaltered the items of Group I. to IV. and reserve for further discussion the items of Group V. with the exception of that relating to Fukien province which had been agreed to by the Chinese Government; and on the 6th. May we instructed the Japanese Minister at Peking to convey the above decision to the Chinese Government and at the same time to notify them that they should after mature consideration, express their ascent to our amended draft not later than 6 p/m/ of the 9th. May and that should the Imperial Government fail to receive a satisfactory answer by that hour, they would take such measures as they might deem necessary.

THE CHINESE SURRENDER.

The Chinese Government, equally soliciters as the Imperial Government for the maintenance of peace in the Orient, decided to send their Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister to hand him a note promptly accepting all our proposals. Thus the negotiations were brought to a satisfactory conclusion. As to the drafting of the treaties and notes which which are to give a concrete form to these negotiations, our Minister at Peking is already, under instructions of the Imperial Government, in consultation with the Chinese authorities; and it is believed that the document in question will shortly be signed and presented to His Majesty for ratification and it is our intention to lay before you the official papers bearing on the subject when the proper moment arrives. The Imperial Government confidently believe that when these agreements come into force, we shall see the solution of the most important of the questions which had long been

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pending between Japan and China to the detriment of their cordial relations and that as the result the friendship between the two countries will grow closer, and the peace of the Far East will be placed on a more solid foundation than ever.

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The following is an extract from the Peking Gazette of May 31st. 1915, commenting on Baron Kato's speech showing the ideas of the educated Chinese regards this matter.

It should be added that the comments on Baron Kato's speech are facts and show the real condition of affairs in this country.

The striking impression left on the normal mind from a perusal of the speech delivered by Baron Kato to the members of the Japanese Diet, which is reproduced in this issue, is the sense of intellectual insincerity marking it from the beginning to end. There is no inevitable assurance - without which no Japanese utterance on the subject is complete - that "actuated by the desire to promote the friendly relations between Japan and China" the Imperial Japanese Government presented to the president a series of demands which put a Power, unfettered by the restraints and sanctions of civilised life, would exact of a weaker state that was not a victim of conquest. It is not a little astounding that one of the first Mikado's first Ministers of State should a have the immoral hardihood to rehearse in Parliament and to the world the catalogue of exactions specified in the Japanese demarche and at the same time to assert that there is nothing in them that cannot be regarded as either a "natural demand" or a "reasonable wish" on the part of Japan and that none of them is incompatible

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with the principles of the territorial independence and integrity of China and of the open door in this country. It is not easy to indicate the meaning and force of the "natural" demands and "reasonable" wishes enumerated in the Protocol of January 18 in apter words than those used by the Daily News and Leader when the document was first published in England by the Manchester Guardian:

These demands would convert the province of Shantung into a Japanese sphere of influence; they would make South Manchuria for practical purposes, Japanese provinces; they would give Japan a monopoly of the vast mineral wealth of the Yangtse valley, incidental to which would be the power to sever Northen from Southern China; they would give Japan the control of China's war munitions; they would hand over the policing of important areas of China to Japan; they would set Japanese experts in control of China's political, military, and financial affairs; they would set up a Monroe doctrine operative against all Powers except Japan; they would open all China to the enterprise of Japanese political missionaries. A scheme of this kind would put all China under Japanese suzerainty. Of course, it would also imperil extensive British commercial and industrial interests in China, and it would knock the bottom out of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which guaranteed the integrity of China and equality of opportunity to all Powers.

Regarding Baron Kato's re-statement of the Japanese contention concerning South Manchuria, it is time to point out that the war with Russia was waged not for the conquest of South Manchuria - this was stated and repeated from the outbreak of the war down to the Treaty of Portsmouth and after - but for the declared purpose of forcing the Russians northwards on the ground

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that their presence in South Manchuria menaced certain vital interests of Japan; and the Japanese succession to Russian rights in the province was demanded and justified less in the sense that those rights were fruits of conquest than that such a succession was necessary for the,protection of Japan against Russian aggression. On this view it will be seen how very fallacious is the suggestion that, because Japan succeeded in partially defeating the Russians on the Manchurian plains, she is entitled now to demand of China rights which would never have been conceded to her in 1905. And it is a gross misreading of the facts of history to contend that the Japanese warred with the Russians in the series of indecisive battles ending with the struggle of Mukden in order to save Manchuria for China. They did nothing of the kind. They believed, rightly or wrongly, that the extension of Russian influence and power to the Liaotung Peninsula was inconsistent with the existence of a Great Japan; and it was this alone that inspired them to challenge Russia by delivering their first treacherous blow at the Russian ships in Port Arthur and thus commence a war in which defeat was certain if Anglo-Saxon succour had been withheld. Nothing of gain has enured to China by the retreat of the Russians from South Manchuria. That retreat has resulted in the removal of a Power to whom Far Asian hegemony was never but an irresolute expression, a vision, of the Slav's sense of dreaming grandeur - a thing of imperial lure and luxury - and the substitution of another Power to whom the subjection of China and the use of her unnumbered millions and continental resources are a necessity if Japan is to pursue successfully her march of mastery across the world.

Duplicate
Original mailed June 1, 1915

Need not be returned.

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(2)

Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople,&c.
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.
Date of Report...May 31,1915.

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Country.....Turkey. Port.....Constantinople.
Report from U.S.S.SCORPION.
Date of Report...May 31,1915.

5. The ex-BRESLAU returned from a trip to the Black Sea and escorted two loaded colliers from the Turkish mine about 100 miles to the East of the Bosphorus. Numerous colliers have been sunk by the Russian fleet;a sailor,returned from one of the sunken colliers,reported nine sunk in one day. He also reported that large raiding parties of Russian soldiers were on the coast. All private accumulations of coal have been taken over by the Government,or the owners notified that it would be taken as needed.

6. Dardanelles.

The "Torgut Reis" and "Barbarossa",by reason of the great angle to which their large guns can be elevated,have been employed to fire over the peninsula. The firing has been witnessed by some of our observers,but the effect can only be judged by the word of the authorities. It is claimed that they have done great damage to the Allies' fleet. Since the advent of the German submarine the Allies' fleet has been withdrawn,only destroyers now remaining in the vicinity of the peninsula. This considerably weakens the position of the invading forces on shore. At Ari-Burnu the Allies are in rather a precarious position,having advanced only a short distance from the beach. Their trenches are,in some places,not over thirty yards from the Turks,while theirmposition is dominated by batteries situated on the high hills in front of them. From Sedd-ul-Bahr the advance is checked,and the Turks are taking the offensive. The withdrawal of the fleet makes this expedition appear hopeless. The effect of the fleet's fire on the shore batteries is practically nil;only one gun,so far,having been damaged - according to a reliable authority.

SIGNED:- J. F. MORTON.

Need not be returned

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31. 1900)

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31

(B)

SUBJECT Change in the southern limit of the blockade of Albania.

From ..... *No.* 135 *Date* May 21, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ..... *Date* .....

5 80 9 198 ENCLOSURE 14 11 Naval War College JUN 22 1915

1. The Italian Government has this day publish a decree modifying the limits to the blockade declared eg inst Austria-Hungary and Albania as reported in "I" 19 of May 20th, 1915.

2. The southern limit of the blockade of the coast of Albania has been changed to the point of Capri Puga (Strade Bianche). This gives the geographical limits of the Albanian coast blockade as follows:

North - lat. 41° - 5' - 0" N.
long 19° - 17' - 30" E.
South - lat. 40° - 9' - 36" N.
long 19° - 35' - 45" E.

3. The new line of exclusion established between Cape Otranto and Capri Puga will form the line of blockade for all the purposes of the previous declaration. The time allowed to vessels of friendly or neutral powers to leave the blockaded zone has been fixed by the Commander-in-chief of the Italian Naval Forces at 15 days, beginning from the date of the declaration of the blockade.

Need not be returned.

(See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900)

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SUBJECT Conditions - Italy.

May 1st-May 31st. (4)
— 1915. —

From T *No.* 137. *Date* May 31, 1915.

Replying to O. N. I. No. ——— *Date* ———

580/9/198 ENCLOSURE 14-1 JUN 28 1915 Naval War College

1. On the morning of the 6th of May, after a conversation with the Austrian Naval Attaché, I learned that the diplomatic situation between Italy and Austria had reached a very acute stage. Of course it was well known that negotiations between the two governments had been going on for some time, but the change from a possible peaceable outcome to a very possible contrary one had come so suddenly that no one realized that a crisis had been reached. That evening the papers announced that parts of 6 classes were called to the colors. On the 6th I again visited the Austrian Embassy and had a long conversation with the Military Attaché. He was very downcast and stated that the Embassy had given up all hope for peace, and that it was only a matter of a few days before war would be declared. He further stated that if the Italian people knew all the concessions that Austria was willing to make seventy percent of them would vote for continued neutrality. That day I saw other German and Austrians and they voiced the same opinions that war was imminent. In the meantime members of the Embassies were packing for a hurried departure, while all German and Austrian nationalists received instructions to leave Italy without delay. This was the state of affairs when quite unexpectedly Sig. Giolitti, ex-Prime Minister, and a recognized neutralist, arrived on the scene. This was the final stroke of von Bülow, and it almost succeeded. Giolitti controlled four hundred out of the 508 Deputies which was evident from the long list of callers that daily did him honor. On the morning of the 9th, I met several Germans; all were optimistic, and it was generally believed that Giolitti had forced the Government's hand, and Austria's terms would be accepted. Three days the Ministry kept in constant session, but no information was forthcoming. The optimism of the Germans and Austrians was reckoning, however, under the stress of demonstrations about the city, denouncing Giolitti and crying for war. Finally on the night of May 13th, the Ministry resigned, because it lacked the confidence of Parliament which was so in the control of Giolitti, and thus von Bülow was credited with another diplomatic victory. Sonnino, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet, was an old and hated rival of Giolitti, and it is believed that it was his staunch stand against him and neutrality that kept the Ministry to the side of war. For three days the King tried, but invain, to form the new Cabinet. Finally, it was given out that the old Ministry was still in power as its resignation had never been accepted by the King. On Sunday, May 16th, 100 000 men of Rome marched through the city denouncing Giolitti and calling for war. This was the largest of the demonstrations, but all during the

wool: smaller and more disorderly ones had occurred about the city. The crisis being so acute, Parliament which was to have met on the 13th. was ordered not to convene until the 20th. on which date Parliament met amidst the wildest enthusiasm. Giolitti having seen how the tide was flowing, discreetly left town. I was present during the entire session of Parliament. The Deputies having been observed by Giolitti, and knowing full well that the Italian people were not for neutrality, upheld the Government in any course that it desired to take as well as giving it all necessary power for financial transactions which might become necessary for the safety of the realm. The vote cast was 407 for and 74 against, and on the following day the Senate unanimously approved the measure.

3. May 22nd. - A general mobilization was called adding ten [illegible] to the colors and bringing the total number of men under arms to [illegible]. This is the estimated strength on a war footing at this date in accordance with the latest data. Certain of the north-eastern provinces were declared to be in a state of war. The Government ordered the requisition of all motors, after a certain date, horses and available vehicles.

4. May 23rd. - At 3 p.m. this day the Embassy received a formal notice that beginning at midnight war would be considered as existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary. A mobilization of the personnel of the Navy was ordered.

5. May 24th. - Hostilities commenced between 4 and 5 a.m. consisting of attack by an Austrian naval force on the towns of Ancona, Barletta, Porto Corsini, Senigallia, and Rimini; The Italian destroyer Turbine sunk; Italian destroyer off the attacks Porto Buso; Austrian air raids on Jesi and Venice. Italian army crosses Austrian frontier along the Friulian border. Austrian and German Ambassadors and staffs left at 9 p.m. Italy declares blockade of Au

6. May 25th. - Italy declares blockade of Austro-Hungarian and Albanian coasts. Italian army cross the Austrian frontier in the Trentino and Carnia.

7. May 26th. - The King leaves Rome for the front and assumes command of the Army and the Navy.

8. May 27th. - Army makes advances; Island of Grado occupied; Italian aircraft drop bombs on the Trieste-Pontebba railroad.

9. May 28th.- The Italian dirigible [illegible] reports making an aerial attack on Austrian destroyers before Venice; Commanding officer of Venice reports sighting of an Austrian submarine. Two Austrian aeroplanes and one Italy drop bombs on Venice Arsenal.

10. May 29th. - Austrian hydroplane captured on the Adriatic coast.

11. May 30th. - Italian army occupies Cortina in the Trentino Naval dirigible bombards Pola.

12. May 31st. - Italian destroyers bombard [illegible]..

[See Paragraph 4, Instructions of October 31, 1900.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

K 5 .31 (5)

SUBJECT: SUBMARINE POSSIBILITIES.

From Z No. 249 Date May 31, 1915, 191

Replying to O. N. I. No. Date , 191

3.8.0 / 9 / 24 ENCLOSURE 4-N SEP 1 1915 Naval War College.

The recent success of German submarines in sinking British battleships at the Dardanelles shows the increasing range of the submarine and the vigor of this arm of the service as conducted by the German Navy.

If these boats made the run from the most advanced German port Zeebrügge, they had over 3000 miles to go. If they went from an Austrian port, the problem was much more simple. During the winter there were numerous rumors that submarine parts were on their way by rail to Austria and it is quite practicable that they were assembled there.

Nevertheless, if the submarine easily capable of crossing the Atlantic, is not actually ready, such boats undoubtedly soon will be. To fuel on the American side of the Atlantic, considering the efficiency of the present day intelligent services, would not be an insurmountable difficulty. There are many deserted harbors on the coasts of Canada and in the West Indies and along the Spanish Main and plenty of agents to attempt to run a cargo where directed. A great success might be had against an unprotected fleet at anchor and greatly popularize a war. It would have also a very demoralizing effect on commerce. The great method of prevention lies in being fully cognizant of the destination of fuel suitable for submarine use as is being done in the Mediterranean. On the declaration of war by Italy, a Dutch steamer loaded with oil sailed without her clearance papers, but was overhauled and brought back by men-of-war. It was supposed that her fuel was to be used by enemies submarines.

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